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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In this age of continuous technological advancements, where intangible assets have
become much more important as compared to the tangible assets of rms (Brennan &
Connell (2000)), management of intangible assets has become very important. Trade
secrets are one of the most important ways to protect the intangible assets of rms1.
This thesis explores trade secrets, often considered to be an aspect of intellectual
property and a topic which generally falls under this subject area2. Trade Secrets
law, which protects companies against the misappropriation of the secrets by rivals
and employees, plays a fundamental role in modern economic systems. It remains,
however, an under explored topic.
In the economic literature, most of the work on intellectual property focuses on
patents. However, empirical studies have shown the importance of trade secrecy over
patents as a method of protection of the intellectual property resources of rms3.
Some recent studies on intellectual property protection have shown that patents are
the least favoured method of protection, which points towards the importance of non
1Almeling (2012) presents several reasons why trade secrets are increasingly important.
2In the United States, trade secrets are considered to be Intellectual Property rights. However,
some countries in Europe do not consider them as Intellectual Property rights. For more informa-
tion, refer to the Baker & McKenzie report, 2013.
3It may be noted that trade secrets are explicitly considered to be intellectual property in many
legislations across the world. We will discuss it further in the following pages.
2registered intellectual assets such as trade secrets (Hall et al, 2013). There have
been some other studies which analyse the preferences of rms between secrets and
patents and nearly all of them nd that rms prefer trade secrets over patents for
both product innovations and process innovations4.
Trade Secrets law in its modern form was created in the nineteenth century. During
the industrial revolution, the need for trade secrets law became clear after decisions of
English and American courts on damages for misappropriation of trade secrets in 1817
and 1837 respectively5. However, trade secrets protection is claimed to be found as
far back as the Roman period. Schiller (1930) argues that the Roman courts created
"actio servi corrupti", which literally refers to an action for corrupting a slave. He
contends that the "actio servi corrupti" was a protection mechanism for the slave
owners against third parties who would "corrupt" slaves and make them reveal the
secret information belonging to their owners. With the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, trade secret protection has become
an explicit cornerstone of the international intellectual property policy.
Trade Secrets are generally understood as secret information which gives its owners
an edge over its competitors. At the international level, the denition of Trade Secrets
is provided by the TRIPS agreement of the members of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO). Section 7, Article 39 of TRIPS denes Trade Secrets as:-
"Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, or acquired by, or used by others
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long as
such information:
4We will discuss these studies in detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
5Cases: In 1817, England - Newbery v. James, 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch. 1817); and in 1837, the
United States - Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837).
3a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise conguration and
assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
b) has commercial value because it is secret;
c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret."
There are many other denitions available in di¤erent parts of the world. For
instance, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) states,
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being gener-
ally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of e¤orts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
In Japan, a denition is provided by the Unfair Competition Prevention Act. The
Unfair Competition Prevention Act, Article 2(6), denes trade secrets as "technical
or business information useful for commercial activities such as manufacturing or
marketing methods that is kept secret and that is not publicly known".
Concurring denitions are provided by some jurisdictions across Europe: Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia and Sweden have specic denitions of Trade Secrets in their own
legislation. However, all of these denitions are very close to the denition in the
TRIPS agreement (Baker & McKenzie report, 2013).
41.1 A Brief Survey of Literature on Trade Secrets
Though lawyers have studied and debated the issues of trade secrecy at great length,
the economic analysis on the subject is still emerging. Intellectual Property has been
a very important aspect of general innovation policies of lawmakers especially in last
few decades 6. Trade Secrecy is an important issue in the broader policy issues of
innovation policies. This is because it poses a potentially informative and useful
research area and this is reected in the ongoing policy debates at the European
Union level (Directive proposal of the European Commission (Proposal 2013/0402)).
Policy makers are interested in the implications of trade secrets policy and its general
welfare implications.
In a famous article, leading researchers in law and economics termed trade secrets
as a neglected orphan in economic analysis (Friedman et al, 1991). They contended
that despite its importance to the business community at large, trade secrets have not
been given enough attention by economics scholars. However, there has been large
amount of research on trade secrets since then, and many researchers are working in
this area today. Some of the notable issues analysed in the literature are employee
mobility, patents-secrecy mix and damages for misappropriation of secrets. Employee
mobility is extensively analysed by researchers because of the possible conict between
trade secrets protection and freedom of employees in changing their jobs. Many
researchers have looked at patent-secrey mix because of the synergies between them.
Some argue that patents and secrets are substitutes while others contend that they
are complementary to each other. Damages in case of misappropriation is another
issue which is analysed in both the legal and economic literature. We present some
of the theoretical literature in this chapter.
6See Reichman, J. H. (2009) and Chen, Y., & Puttitanun, T. (2005).
51.1.1 Employee Mobility and the protection of trade secrets
One of the main issues analyzed in this area of research is the mobility of employees
and the subsequent e¤ect on trade secret protection strategies. There exists a tension
in the relationship between remedies to protect the trade secrets and the ability of
ex-employees to use their skills and knowledge in the new employment. Trade secret
law may require the employees not to join competing rms or reveal any kind of
condential information which they get from previous employment. Thus it hampers
the job prospects of the employees (Kitch, 1996).
Motta and Ronde (2002) analyse the implications of having covenants not to
compete clauses on researchers e¤orts and the protability of the rm. They contend
that if the researchers contribution to the innovation process is crucial (observable but
not contractual), covenants not to compete reduce both the researchers e¤orts and
rms protability. However, if the rms R&D investments are the most important
aspect, having a non competing agreement is optimal for the rm, as it ensures rms
incentives to invest in research.
Zabojnik (2002) looks at how trade secrets can be protected by means of com-
pensation in case of employee mobility. He contends that in most states in the US,
the law restrains the employeesmovement to protect rmstrade secrets, with the
exception of California. Zabojnik analyses how rms protect their secrets using com-
pensation as a tool. His analysis rests on the crucial assumption that each manager
has information about the trade secrets at his and his lower levels of hierarchy. He
nds that the managers have incentives to overpay their subordinates to protect their
secrets. This creates a moral hazard problem which arises because by overpaying the
subordinates, they increase the value of those employees to competition and increase
their wages. This has clear potential ramications for the economy as a whole as
6some technical roles are remunerated based on the value of secrets held rather than
for the work undertaken by the individual.
Fosfuri and Ronde (2004) analyse rmsincentives to locate in an industrial vicin-
ity to benet from technological spillover with the mobility of employees. They argue
that punitive damages are generally benecial for rmsprots and that they stim-
ulate clustering. In the end, they are not an impediment to technology spillovers.
Their analysis suggests that weak trade secret protection might not be a prerequisite
for clustering and labour mobility as some legal scholars (Gilson 1999, Hyde, 2001)
have argued.
Bernhardt & Dvoracek (2009) analyse the impact of trade secret protection e¤orts
in terms of wage premia, in a multi-national context. They argue that wage premia
can be used to protect trade secrets in addition to non competing contracts. The au-
thors focus on the strategic behaviour of multinational rms with superior technology
operating in a developing country. The domestic rms may want to hire employees
of the multinational rms in an e¤ort to access the superior technology and secrets
of the multinationals. However, wage premia can be used to restrain the employees
from joining the domestic rms. In this way, multinational rms can retain their
technological superiority and protect their trade secrets.
1.1.2 Patents and Secrecy
There is a branch of literature which looks at the interactions and mixture of patents
and secrecy to protect the innovation.
Anton and Yao (2004) argue that in equilibrium large innovations are protected
by secrecy, small inventions are not imitated whereas the medium sized inventions are
licensed by the inventor when the property rights are weak. Their arguments are based
7on three basic assumptions; that innovation creates asymmetric information; that it
has limited legal protection; and, that disclosure creates incentives for imitation. The
innovators choice of intellectual property rights and disclosure plays a signalling role
for imitation. The imitators base their decision to imitate on the innovators choice
of disclosure. They argue that small inventions are always patented, and, there will
be no imitation because the risk of paying damages outweighs the marginal benet
from imitation. For medium innovations, the marginal benets may exceed the risk
of paying damages due to infringement and thus the imitator may imitate. However,
the innovator would nd it better to license the medium innovation. With a large
innovation, the innovator protects his innovation by secrecy to reduce the chances of
imitation because the prots by keeping the invention to himself ensures larger prots
to him.
Denicolo and Franzoni (2004) present a model of optimal patent design when in-
novators can protect their inventions with secrecy as well. The authors investigate
whether the prevalence of trade secret protection by innovating rms is socially desir-
able. They build a two stage model, an innovation stage where the innovator chooses
the research e¤ort level and decides on the protection mechanism and a duplication
stage where the duplicator decides on the e¤ort to duplicate. The innovator has to
balance the limited benet of patent protection against the duplication risk associ-
ated with keeping innovation secret. These authors show that patents are superior to
trade secrets in a broad set of circumstances, because they provide better incentives
to innovate (no reward for the loser of the innovation race). Furthermore, patents
prevent wasteful duplication costs. If the competition intensity in the product market
is not too strong, patents lead to smaller deadweight losses as well.
Denicolo and Franzoni (2012) concentrate on the cases where research spillovers
8arise in the innovation race, and analyse conditions for the desirability of a strong
form of protection which grants exclusive rights to the innovator as opposed to weak
forms of protection, which allow some sort of imitation and competition. It is argued
that the comparison between the two alternatives boils down to a specic ratio
test, which suggests that strong, exclusive intellectual property rights are better
when the competition from potential imitators is weak, the innovation induces large
R&D investments, and the research spillovers are su¢ ciently small.
Jorda (2008) claims that trade secrets are not solely applicable as protection de-
vices to early stage inventions, sub-patentable innovation or manufacturing processes
as is commonly believed. It is argued by the authour that contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom, inventors may rely on trade secret protection in conjunction with, and
complementary to, patents to protect the tremendous volume of collateral or associ-
ated know how that might exist for any patentable invention. "Patents are but tips
of icebergs in an ocean of Trade Secrets", Jorda argues.
Ottoz and Cugno (2008) also argue that di¤erent protection mechanisms may be
employed at the same time when an innovation is comprised of separately protectable
components. If patents and trade secrets can be mixed in protecting single innova-
tions, then surprisingly a strengthening in patent breadth may induce a lower level
of patenting, as innovators are prone to rely more on secrecy in that case. Ottoz
and Cugno (2011) analyse optimal trade secret policy based on the optimization of
economic welfare. They build a model with an incumbent rm having a product
whose technology consists of two components, one protected by patent and the other
by secrecy. The principal argument is that the duplication costs can be limited with
strong trade secret law. Thus, they suggest strong trade secret law.
The literature is growing rapidly and it is not the objective of this thesis to present
9all dimensions of the general literature on trade secrets. We focus on specic issues
revolving around trade secrets law. Hence the literature we present is related to the
issues we analyse in this thesis. There is another important strand of literature on the
remedies in case of misappropriation of trade secrets. We look at some of the studies
focusing on damages for misappropriation of trade secrets in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
The empirical literature on trade secrets is presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
1.2 Policy Relevance
Trade secrets law is currently going through a period of signicant reforms and modi-
cations in various parts of world. In particular, the European Union and the United
States are strengthening their legal protection for trade secrets. In the European
Union, a new legal framework of the union to protect trade secrets against misap-
propriation is set to be operational soon7. In the United States, stronger protection
of trade secrets, especially against foreign companies or foreign governments is being
pushed for8. We present these policy debates and the specic legal changes below.
1.2.1 In the European Union
On 26 May 2014, the council of the European Union agreed on a general approach9
for establishing a new legal framework for the protection of trade secrets (9870/14).
The new framework is expected to make it easier for national courts to deal with the
misappropriation of trade secrets/condential business information. It also aims at
7For the full text of the proposed directive see the following link: (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0813:FIN:EN:PDF).
8Please refer to Administrative Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of US Trade Secrets (2013) for
more details.
9It should be noted that the EU parliament has not delivered its opinion yet.
10
making provisions for removing the trade secret infringing products from the market,
and making it easier for victims to receive compensation for illegal actions.
The president of the Competitiveness Council, Notis Mitarachi, made the following
comment:-
"Today, we have decided on a single, clear and coherent legal regime protecting
against misappropriation of trade secrets in EU Member States. This decision will
promote innovative companies, ensure fair and honest competition and create a secure
environment conducting to innovation, the exchange of valuable know-how and cross-
border commercial activities within the internal market. This will empower companies
to continue investing with more condence in research and innovation in Europe."
Under this agreement10, the new framework is characterised by the following fea-
tures:
i) a minimum harmonisation of the di¤erent civil law regimes, whilst allowing
member states to apply stricter rules;
ii) the establishment of common principles, denitions and safeguards, in line
with international agreements, as well as the measures, procedures and remedies that
should be made available for the purpose of civil law redress;
iii) a limitation period of six years for claims or bringing actions before courts;
iv) the preservation of condentiality in the course of legal proceedings, while
ensuring that the rights of the parties involved in a trade secret ligation case are not
undermined;
v) the establishment of a favourable regime to employees in what concerns their
liability for damages in case of violation of a trade secret if acting without intent.
10The press release of the council of the European Union can be found at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/142780.pdf
11
The new provisions would come into e¤ect, at the latest, one year after the nal
adoption of the directive.
1.2.2 In the United States
Similarly, debates are going on for stronger legal protection against trade secret mis-
appropriation in the US. In 2013, the United States released the Administration
Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of US Trade Secrets11which suggests for increased
protection for trade secrets both domestically and internationally.
The strategy suggests a whole governmental approach to stop the theft of trade
secrets by foreign competitors or foreign governments by either means- cyber or oth-
erwise. The specic features of the strategy are as follows:
i) First, the government wants to increase the diplomatic engagement. The US
government will convey its concerns to countries where there are high incidents of
trade secret theft with coordinated and sustained messages from the most senior
levels of the administration. The government will urge foreign law enforcement to
do more, and, will use its trade policy tools to press other governments for better
protection and enforcement.
ii) Second, the government will support industry-led e¤orts to develop best prac-
tices to protect trade secrets and encourage companies to share with each other best
practices that can mitigate the risk of trade secret theft. Promotion of voluntary best
practices by private industry will be encouraged.
iii) Third, Department of Justice will continue to make the investigation and
prosecution of trade secret theft by foreign competitors and foreign governments a
11This strategy report can be found at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/les/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_
the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf
12
top priority. Enhancement of domestic law enforcement is another area to focus.
iv) Fourth, the government wants to improve the domestic legislation dealing with
trade secrets. The government will also conduct a review of their laws to determine
if further changes are needed to enhance enforcement.
v) Lastly, the government will increase public awareness of the threats and risks
to the U.S. economy posed by trade secret theft.
The organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published
a working paper by Lippoldt and Schultz (2014), which looks at the relationship of
the stringency of the protection of trade secrets to various economic indicators, using
data from a sample of 37 countries for the period 1985-2010. They nd a positive
association between the stringency of trade secrets protection and key indicators of
innovation and international economic ows.
They argue that through these relationships trade secrets protection may have
implications for developments in innovation, international technology transfer and
access to technology intensive inputs and related products. However, it should be
noted that this study presents associations of variables and does not provide any
causality.
In this thesis, we look at questions revolving around the optimal scope of trade
secret law, desirability of alternative damage regimes in terms of incentives to misap-
propriate, incentives to innovate, and ex-post welfare. Further we look at relationship
between trade secrets sharing and misappropriation using a novel survey data. The
next section provides a brief sketch of the research problems and the results.
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1.3 Research questions and ndings in a nutshell
This thesis is primarily based on three core chapters, focused on the fundamental
issues of trade secrets law. It is largely a policy oriented research in a bid to improve
legal institutions. The goal is to come up with policy recommendations to improve
legal structure governing trade secrets. The focal points of the rst part of this
research are the following. What is the optimal scope of trade secrets law? How
does it depend on the market characteristics such as degree of product di¤erentiation
between competing products. What factors need to be considered to balance the
conicting objectives of promoting innovation and knowledge di¤usion? The second
strand of this research focuses on the desirability of lost prots or unjust enrichment
damage regimes in case of misappropriation of a trade secret. A comparison between
these regimes is made and simple policy implications are extracted from the analysis.
The last part of this research is an empirical analysis of a possible relationship between
trade secrets sharing and misappropriation instances faced by rms. The research
questions studied in these chapters provide several policy implications which may be
used by the law makers to improve the legal structure governing trade secrets. The
research questions studied in di¤erent chapters are summarised below.
1.3.1 Chapter 2
The second chapter of this thesis looks at the question of the optimal scope of trade
secrets law. A simple model is developed where one innovative rm invests resources
in creating and protecting its secret knowledge. A rival rm invests resources to ferret
this knowledge out. Once the knowledge is created by the innovative rm, it enters
a "secrecy contest" with the rival rm. Trade secrets law reduces the probability
of disclosure of the trade secret. It is shown that with stronger protection of trade
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secrets, the secret owner reduces her e¤orts in keeping the secret and the imitator
reduces her e¤orts in extracting the secret.
Stronger trade secrets law also increases the incentives to innovate by increasing
the payo¤ to the innovative rms. However, it also retards competition by inhibiting
di¤usion of innovative knowledge in the society. Thus, there exists a tension between
incentivising the innovator with stronger protection and promoting greater welfare by
allowing the dissemination of innovative knowledge. A proper balance between these
two objectives depends on the intensity of market competition in the product market,
the cost of self-protection by the owner of the secret and secret extraction costs. We
show that maximal protection is warranted when product market competition is weak,
cost of self-protection is low and cost of secret extraction is high.
In the case of horizontally di¤erentiated goods, however, the optimal scope of trade
secrets law is thinner. Product di¤erentiation dilutes the incentives of the parties to
invest in the secrecy contest. It enhances the value of entry for the consumers, but also
allows rms to charge more. This result has interesting ramications in the context
of unfair competition law. For instance, in Germany, courts consider the degree of
similarity between the products before delivering their verdicts. The chances of a suit
under unfair competition succeeding in court is higher if the products are similar to
each other (see de Vrey 2006).
1.3.2 Chapter 3
The third chapter of this thesis focuses on civil remedies available to the owner of
the secret in case of misappropriation. In particular, we look at alternative damage
regimes and their implications on market competition and welfare.
A model of simple oligopoly competition with asymmetric information is devel-
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oped. The asymmetry arises in the following sense: the owner of the secret does not
know whether the duplicator has introduced a similar product by misappropriating
the secret formula, or developed the product by independent research. The possibil-
ity of receiving damages a¤ects the payo¤ to the owner of the secret, and, hence the
market outcome. Similarly, the possibility of paying damages a¤ects the payo¤ of the
duplicator who misappropriated the secret. Furthermore, the specic doctrine regime
a¤ects the market outcomes in their own manner. We focus on the lost prot and the
unjust enrichment doctrines of damages and analyse their impacts on the behaviour
of the owner of the secret and market outcome. A comparison between these two
regimes is made in terms of the output and payo¤s of the players.
The owner of the secret is better o¤ under the lost prot regime whereas the
duplicator who develops his product with independent research is better o¤ under
the unjust enrichment regime. The duplicator who misappropriates the secret can be
better o¤ or worse o¤under either regime, depending on the parameters of the model.
It is found that the unjust enrichment regime results in higher welfare as compared
to that under the lost prot regime. Further, the incentives to misappropriate are
expected to be higher or lower, depending on the degree of accuracy of courts and on
the proportion of violators (duplicators who misappropriate the secret). We provide
clear conditions under which the lost prots regime provides greater incentives to
misappropriate as compared to that under the unjust enrichment regime.
1.3.3 Chapter 4
This chapter details an empirical study which focuses on the problem of misappro-
priation and its relationship with trade secret sharing behaviour of rms with third
parties. There is little empirical work on trade secrets as compared to other forms
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of intellectual property. In the existing literature, trade secrets have mostly been
studied with reference to patents. In this chapter, however, we look at novel survey
data, focused mainly on trade secrets. The survey looks at many important aspects
of trade secrets protection. This helps us to look at the relationship of trade secrets
sharing and their misappropriation by various parties.
This chapter attempts an empirical investigation to analyse the importance of
trade secrets to companies using a sample of rms in European countries, "Survey
on trade secrets and condential business information in the internal market", pre-
pared by Baker & McKenzie (2013) for the European Commission. This survey was
developed to understand trade secret information sharing and misappropriation inci-
dences. Novel survey data of 486 European rms is used to analyse several research
questions. A relationship between the importance of trade secrets for the rms, in-
formation sharing and misappropriation behaviour is established.
The results of this empirical work can be summarised as follows. We nd that
rms that share trade secrets information with third parties are more likely to face
acts/attempts of misappropriation of their trade secrets. We also nd that rms
are more likely to nd secrecy important for their inventive knowledge, technical
information and business information if they make high usage of patents, which points
towards possible synergy between patents and secrecy. This is in line with recent
research on the complementary nature of patents and trade secrecy.
Finally, we conclude the main ndings of this thesis in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
THE OPTIMAL SCOPE OF TRADE SECRETS LAW1
This chapter investigates the optimal scope of trade secrets law by means
of a simple model. In the model, one innovative rm invests resources rst
to produce knowledge, and then to protect it from unwanted disclosure. A
rival rm invests to ferret this knowledge out. Trade secrets law a¤ects
this "secrecy contest" by reducing the probability of disclosure given the
e¤orts of the parties. We show how optimal trade secrets policy depends
on structural market features and cost parameters.
2.1 Introduction
In modern economies, the competitive advantage that rms enjoy on the market
depends more and more on their specic know-how and knowledge, rather than man-
ufacturing costs di¤erentials. The protection of "intangible assets" from unwanted
disclosure is thus of paramount importance. For this purpose, rms can rely on dif-
ferent legal tools, including patents (for non-obvious inventions) and copyright (for
novel pieces of creative work). Yet, most companies tend to rely on the oldest, and
probably cheapest, form of protection: secrecy.2
1THIS PAPER IS CO-AUTHORED WITH PROF. LUIGI ALBERTO FRANZONI.
2Recent empirical investigations by Hall et al. (2013) show that only 4% of UK innovating
companies patent. In the US, about 5.5% of all manufacturing rms engage in patenting activity
(Balasubramanian and Sivadasan 2011).
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The e¤ort of companies to protect their competitive knowledge by means of se-
crecy is not discouraged by the law. To the contrary, the law supports the secret
conservation of knowledge, by sanctioning conducts aimed at the violation of secrets,
like unauthorized disclosure and espionage. In this respect, however, the law is called
upon to strike a di¢ cult balance between the right of the knowledge holder to preserve
secrecy, and the need of society at large to get access to the information secretly held.
The di¤usion of innovative knowledge favours imitation and fosters competition on
the market.3 Excessive secrecy protection, by retarding the di¤usion of information
in the economy, might not serve the interests of the consumers well.
In this chapter, we investigate the optimal scope of trade secrets law and highlight
the basic trade-o¤s that it should address. In particular, we develop a simple model
in which an innovative rm exerts e¤ort to protect its competitive knowledge, while
another rms invests resources to ferret this knowledge out. Before illustrating the
model, it is important to clarify the main features of trade secrets law.
As opposed to patent law, which shares the same basic features around the world,
trade secrets law varies substantially across countries. In most countries, provisions
regulating the protection of condential know-how are scattered in several bodies
of the law, including tort law, contract law, employment law, criminal law, and -
sometimes- Intellectual Property law. The country that has made the greatest e¤ort
to provide a unied framework of trade secrets protection is probably the US, where
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) of 1979, amended 1985, has been adopted by
most states.
3As aptly remarked by the US Supreme Court in In Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats -
489 U.S. 141 (1989) : "[...] imitation and renement through imitation are both necessary to
invention itself, and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy." In this case, the US Supreme
Court invalidated a Florida statute prohibiting plug molding of vessel designs.
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Provisions close to those of UTSA have been included in the international Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement of 1994, which
requires World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries to provide legal pro-
tection to undisclosed information (art. 39, see below). In spite of the TRIPs, great
variations with respect to substantial trade secrets law persist within the EU (Backer-
McKenzie 2013).4 This has prompted an initiative of the European Commission,
aimed at imposing uniform legislation across the EU (Proposal 2013/0402).
In order to frame the problem, we will follow the denition of trade secrets ("undis-
closed information") provided by the TRIPs, which stipulates that (Art 39.2):
Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing infor-
mation lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by,
or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest
commercial practices so long as such information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise
conguration and assembly of its components, generally known among or
readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the
kind of information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by
the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
From this denition, we learn that publicly available information and everyday
knowledge are not eligible for legal protection; valueless information and information
4Undisclosed business information is protected under the common law of condentiality in Eng-
land, while it is protected under unfair competition law (Unlauteren Wettbewerb) in Germany. In
France, the protection of manufaturing secrets is regulated by the Code of Intellectual Property .
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not subject to reasonable protection do not qualify as trade secrets.
Remedies for misappropriation usually include injunctive reliefs and damage awards.
The latter are commensurate to the actual loss to the owner of the trade secret or
the unjust enrichment of the party that has misappropriated the secret. In most
countries, courts can also set a reasonable royalty for the use of the secret.
Compared to patents and other types of intellectual property, trade secrecy is
characterized by several distinguishing features.
First, it does not require any form of registration. This does not mean, however,
that it can be protected at no cost. To the contrary, the "reasonable e¤orts" required
for its protection can be extremely expensive, depending on the type of information
concerned. Expenses usually include material costs to avoid disclosure, organizational
e¤orts to avoid the spreading of the information, and the imposition of specic con-
dentiality restrictions to contractual relationships. Also, litigation in court can be
very costly.5
Second, the subject matter is extremely broad, as it encompasses any type of
undisclosed information able to provide a competitive advantage to its owner. Under
the UTSA, for example, a trade secret can explicitly take the form of "a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process".6 In fact, it is
hard to see what type of information is not eligible for trade secrets protection.
Finally, the law does not provide an "exclusive right" to the holder of the secret.
5For a sample of civil suits led in Middlesex County, Lerner (1994) nds that, on average, 43% of
the intellectual property cases involve trade secrecy. The share of trade secret cases is signicantly
higher for smaller rms.
6The Economic Espionage Act goes as far as to explicitly include "all forms and types of nan-
cial, business, scientic, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, pro-
cedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled,
or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing" (§1839).
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Rather, the law draws the line between the sets of the lawful and unlawful ways
in which information can be obtained and used. In order for civil remedies to be
applicable, the secret should have been acquired by a manner contrary to honest
commercial practices, which means, under the TRIPs: "at least practices such
as breach of contract, breach of condence and inducement to breach, and includes
the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly
negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition."
(art. 39, footnote 10). Under the UTSA, improper means of acquisition of a secret
include: "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty
to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means." Conversely,
independent creation, discovery through reverse engineering, and acquisition from
public sources represent traditional forms of legitimate appropriation of the secret.7
By drawing the line between the lawful and unlawful ways in which information can
be acquired, the law denes the scope of trade secrets law.
The following examples illustrate the point. Let us consider the case of an em-
ployee who leaves her company to work for a competitor. Should the employee be
allowed to take with her the knowledge acquired in her rst job? Former employees
are usually not allowed to disclose this knowledge (e.g. customers data) if it qualies
as a trade secret, while they are allowed to do it, if it is part of their "general skill
and knowledge." In drawing the line between "trade secrets" and "general skill and
knowledge," courts and legislatures will have to balance the opposing goals of encour-
7"A trade secret law, however, does not o¤er protection against discovery by fair and honest
means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering,
that is by starting with the known product and working backward to divine the process which
aided in its development or manufacture," Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1974). See also
Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg (676 F.2d 400, 9th Cir. 1982) and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc. (489 U.S. 141, 1989). This feature is shared by the Directive proposal of the
European Commission (Proposal 2013/0402).
22
aging investment in knowledge and protecting job mobility, which is at the base of
free competition. In some jurisdictions, courts do not ponder whether the former
employee has actually transferred protected knowledge, but just assume - under the
doctrine of "inevitable disclosure" - that this transfer cannot be avoided under the
new duties taken up by the employee.8
Mobility of groups of employees is subject to specic restraints. In some juris-
dictions, soliciting the departure of employee teams or departments from rival rms
(so called "poaching" or "raiding") is explicitly forbidden. In others, e.g. in Califor-
nia, it is not. California high-tech companies have reacted by agreeing not to solicit
each others employees (by means of "cold calls"). This practice, however, has been
regarded as anticompetitive by the antitrust authority9.
Similar considerations arise with respect to the covenants not to compete after the
termination of the employment relationship. Law-makers of di¤erent jurisdictions
assume di¤erent stands with respect to the enforcement of these covenants. Cali-
fornian courts, for instance, tend not to enforce them at all, while other courts take
a more cautious stance (usually based on "reasonableness" criteria). Clearly, where
non-competition covenants are enforced, the primary producer of the know-how is
protected (she has to spend less to retain her employees, she can share information
more easily), but di¤usion of the knowledge is stymied.10
In some other cases, transfer of know-how takes place by means of activities aimed
at information gathering. While outright theft of documents is obviously illegal, other
forms of information acquisition may or may not be illegal depending on circumstances
8See, for example, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F. 3d 1262, 126364 (7th Circuit 1995).
9"Complaint, US v. Adobe Systems Inc., et al.," DOJ, 2010.
10Californias exceptional labour mobility has been pointed out as a major driving force behind
the success of the Silicon Valleys district (see Saxenian 1994). Gilson (1999) underscores the role
served by Californias lax trade secrets law with respect to labour mobility.
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and jurisdictions. In the famous du Pont vs. Christopher case,11 a company hired a
pilot to take aerial pictures of a newly build plant, with the purpose of uncovering
information about the rivals manufacturing process. The court held that this conduct
was an improper means for the acquisition of information of the rivals production
technique. While recognizing that "for our industrial competition to remain healthy
there must be breathing room for observing a competing industrialist," it concluded
that: "Our tolerance of the espionage game must cease when the protections required
to prevent anothers spying cost so much that the spirit of inventiveness is dampened.
[...] To require DuPont to put a roof over the unnished plant to guard its secret
would impose an enormous expense to prevent nothing more than a school boys
trick." In the Christopher decision, the main arguments for the prohibition of the
conduct relied on the cost of self-protection and the adverse impact of the conduct
on inventiveness.12 These elements are captured in the model below.
In what follows, we develop a simple model able to capture benets and costs
of trade secrets law. We focus on the case in which the secret information provides
a competitive advantage to its owner, who has no interest in sharing it. Once the
information/know-how is obtained by the "innovator," a rival rm invests resources
to ferret it out. At the same time, the innovator invests to protect it. This "secrecy
contest" determines the probability by which knowledge spills from one rm to the
other, and hence the probability that the market moves from monopoly to duopoly.
trade secrets law complements the e¤ort of the innovative rm to keep the information
secrets. By making e¤orts to extract information ine¤ective, strong trade secrets law
11E.I du Pont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
12While to put a roof over a plant to protect the secrets is an unreasonable request, not to put
documents in the trash is regarded as a reasonable measure to keep them secret. In most countries,
dumpster diving (searching in the trash for informative documents) is a legal activity.
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reduces the (wasteful) expenditure of the rms in the secrecy contest. At the same
time, however, strong trade secrets law allows the secret holder to fence o¤competition
and retain market power. On this account, strong trade secrets law is not necessarily
desirable. In a dynamic perspective, however, one should also consider that the "rent"
granted by strong trade secrets law to the secrecy holder provides incentives to the
creation of knowledge, to the benet of nal consumers. In this respect, the optimal
scope of trade secrets law depends in a substantial way on the sensitivity of the
innovative output to changes in the payo¤ to the innovator.
In Section 2.2, we derive a basic formula to determine the optimal scope of trade
secrets law. By strengthening trade secrets law, the policy makers a¤ect the market
dynamics by reducing the chances of disclosure and increasing the protection to the
trade secret owner, who has to spend less on self protection. This increase in the
protection of the secret owner would induce the secret owner to invest higher resources
in the discovery of the innovative knowledge ex-ante. We derive a simple formula
which gives a clear rule to decide whether it is socially desirable to increase the
strength of trade secret law. A marginal increase in the strength of trade secrets law
is socially desirable if, and only if, the ratio of the surplus deriving from facilitated
disclosure (di¤usion benet minus increased secrecy costs) to innovation surplus is less
than the elasticity of innovation with respect to trade secrets strength13. Note that
if the ratio of facilitated disclosure to innovation surplus is lower than the elasticity
of innovation, it is better from societal point of view to not hasten the di¤usion of
knowledge (by having relatively stronger protection) because the innovation e¤ect
dominates the disclosure surplus e¤ect. However, if the ratio of facilitated disclosure
13Elasticity of innovation with respect to trade secrets strength can be understood as the ratio
of percentage increase in innovation to percentage increase in the strength of trade secrets law.
In other words, it represents the responsiveness of innovation to changes in the strength of trade
secrets law.
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to innovation surplus is higher than the elasticity of innovation, it would be desirable
to have weaker protection because the innovation e¤ect is dominated by the benets
of hastened disclosure.
This formula allows us to quantify the main e¤ects driving optimal trade secrets
law: i) the impact of hindered disclosure on market surplus (negative) and secrecy
expenditure (positive), ii) the benet to society due to enhanced incentives to create
innovative knowledge (measured by the "externality" that this knowledge exerts on
the consumers and the rival rm), iii) the elasticity of the creation of innovative
knowledge with respect to an increase in the payo¤ to the innovator.
It is remarkable that strong trade secrets law may be optimal even from an ex-
post perspective (i.e. even if the elasticity of creation is nil), thanks to its impact
on the secrecy expenditure of the parties. This e¤ect resonates with one of the
tenets of Landes and Posner (2003), who argue that the main (social) purpose of
intellectual property law is to reduce the self-protection expenditure of innovators. We
show that strong trade secrets law is optimal ex-post if competition in the product
market is not intense, self-protection costs are low and extraction costs are high.
With di¤erentiated products, strong trade secrets protection is optimal ex-post if
products are weakly di¤erentiated. Product di¤erentiation is relevant because in
some jurisdictions (e.g. Germany), an assessment of the degree of similarity of the
products generally accompanies unfair competition cases (de Vrey 2006).
We further investigate optimal trade secrets law from an ex-ante perspective. Even
in a simple model like ours, welfare e¤ects of trade secrets law can be complex. We
show that optimal trade secrets scope has a non monotonic (U-shaped) relationship
with the intensity of competition (when goods are homogeneous) and that optimal
trade secrets scope decreases with the degree of product di¤erentiation. When prod-
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ucts are more di¤erentiated, rms invest less in the secrecy contest, and strong trade
secrets law only hinders competition.
The economic literature on trade secret law, and on unfair competition in general,
is small. In their pioneering article, Posner, Landes and Friedman (1991) defend trade
secrets law on two grounds. On the one hand, trade secrets law complements patent
law by protecting those inventions that rms chose not to patent (either because they
fail to meet the patentability requirements or because patenting is too expensive).14
On the other hand, trade secrets law allows rms to reduce the investment in self-
protection (a feature captured in our model).
Ronde (2001) investigates the e¤ect of trade secrets law on the organizational
structure of rms. In his model, rms can divide production into independent tasks,
so as to limit know-how leakage due to labor mobility. He shows, among other things,
that the benets of reducing the information sharing are greatest if the competition
in the market is neither very tough nor very weak. Fosfuri and Ronde (2004) analyze
the impact of trade secrets law both on the extent of knowledge spill-over (through
labor mobility) and the incentives of rms to cluster in the same area (so as to benet
from the spill over, at the cost of more intense product competition). In their model,
the strength of trade secrets law is measured by the size of the damages awarded
to the rst innovator, when a worker moves to a rival rm to develop a follow-up
innovation. Without a¤ecting the size of the spill-over, high damages reduce the
wage earned by the worker and provide rms with incentives to cluster together.
Hence, they increase social welfare. The impact of strong trade secrets law would not
14Over the last decade, substantial reseach has been devoted to the patent /secrecy choice, both
from and empirical and theoretical perspective (see the review of Hall et al. (2014)). This liter-
ature, however, is of tangential interest to us, as we focus on TS as a stand alone branch of the
law.
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be necessarily positive, however, if trade secrets law reduced labor mobility (which
is the case, for example, when injunctive relief is o¤ered to the rst rm or when
covenants not to compete are enforced by the courts). In our model, we implicitly
focus on the second case, by assuming that trade secrets law impacts the probability
that knowledge spills from the innovator to a second (non innovating) rm. The next
section presents the model.
2.2 The model
In this section we rst provide the basic features and the assumptions of the model.
The model is based on a secrecy contest between two players, where one party invests
to maintain secrecy of some innovative knowledge and the other party invests to
get access to that secret information. The investment levels of the players in this
secrecy contest combine to determine the probability of leakage. From the optimality
conditions of the players, we develop a fundamental rule determining the optimal
scope of trade secrets law. Then we look at how the optimal scope depends on the
intensity of market competition when the market is characterised by homogenous
goods. Further, we analyse how the optimal scope changes when we allow for the
possibility of product di¤erentiation in the market. Under product di¤erentiation
case, we compare the optimal scope under di¤erent kinds of market competition, that
is, "Cournot" competition, "Bertrand" competition, and "Collusive" competition.
In the subsection "Unfair Competition", we extend the basic model to the specic
case of unfair competition in which the innovative knowledge can not be kept secret
because the innovative knowledge lies on the face of the product. Similar to the
basic model, we look at the optimal policy scope under the "Unfair Competition"
case under homogenous goods market and the market characterised by di¤erentiated
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goods. The description of the model is as follows.
The model is built on the assumption that one rm, labeled "innovator," can
invest in the development of innovative knowledge. This knowledge, if obtained,
allows him to monopolize the market. The prots earned by the innovator, however,
entice a second rm (the "rival"), which tries to ferret out the secret knowledge from
the innovator. The rival invests resources to obtain the information; the innovator
invests resources to protect the information. The structure of this "secrecy contest"
game is a¤ected by trade secrets law: given the e¤orts of the rms, the probability
of knowledge spill-over is smaller if trade secrets law is stronger. When information
spills, the market turns into a duopoly.15
The probability that knowledge leaks from the innovator to the rival is:
probability of leakage = (1  )  (x; y) = (1  ) y
x+ y
;
where y is the e¤ort exerted by the duplicator to ferret the information out and x
the e¤ort exerted by the innovator to protect his information.  2 [0; 1] captures
the strength of trade secrets law: stronger trade secrets law makes leakage less likely,
given the e¤orts of the two parties. If trade secrets law is strongest ( = 1), the
probability of leakage is nil. If trade secrets is weakest ( = 0), the probability of
leakage only depends on the private e¤orts of the two parties:  (x; y) = y
x+y
: Note
that the probabilty of non-leakage is given by 1   (x; y) = 1  y
x+y
= x
x+y
: Therefore,
the secrecy contest is symmetric for both players, that is, the e¤ects of the actions of
both parties equally a¤ect the probability of leakage or the probability of non-leakage
of the secret knowledge.
15The model can be suitably extended so as to allow for a plurality of duplicators. The qualitative
analysis remains una¤ected.
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The payo¤ to the innovator, once he has obtained the secret knowledge, is:
Vi (x; y) = [1  (1  )  (x; y)]m + (1  )  (x; y)d   cx: (2.1)
With probability [1  (1  )  (x; y)] secret information is retained and the innovator
earns monopoly prots m. With probability (1  )  (x; y) information leaks to the
rival and the innovator earns duopoly prots d: The cost of self-protection amounts
to cx:
The payo¤ to the rival is
Vr (x; y) = (1  )  (x; y)d   sy: (2.2)
With probability (1  )  (x; y) the rival ferrets the secret information out and enters
the market (where she gets duopoly prots d). The e¤ort to capture information
costs sy:
In the secrecy contest, the two players will optimally choose x and y so as to
maximize their payo¤s. In the Nash equilibrium, the following conditions hold:
8><>:   (1  ) 
0
x (x; y) (m   d) = c
(1  ) 0y (x; y)d = s:
(2.3)
Note that marginal benets of e¤ort for the innovator and the rival are not the same.
In fact, when the rival enters the market, the loss for the entrant is greater than the
gain for the rival: m   d > d (as far as m > 2d; which is a condition that holds
under very mild assumptions16). The innovator, therefore, tends to have stronger
16This is a standard result in oligopoly theory. See Reinganum (1984) for reference.
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incentives to invest in the secrecy contest than the rival.17 In line with the classic
result of Gilbert and Newberry (1982), we can call this observation the persistence of
secrecy.
Let  = c
m d be the relative self-protection cost (cost as a share of gain from
protection) , and  = s
d
the relative extraction cost (cost as share of gain from
extraction). From eqs. (2:3) ; we get:
x = (1  ) 
( + )2
; y = (1  ) 
( + )2
;
and
 (x; y) =

 + 
=
c
c+ s

m
d
  1
  :
In equilibrium, the probability of duplication (1  )  (x; y) depends on the strength
of trade secrets law  ; and on the relative costs in the secrecy contest: @

@c
> 0; @

@s
< 0;
@
@m
< 0; @

@d
> 0: Stronger trade secrets law (greater ) reduces both the self-
protection and the extraction e¤orts.
Note, for future reference, that total secrecy costs amount to
cx + sy =  (m   d) (1  ) 
( + )2
+ d (1  ) 
( + )2
= (1  )m 
( + )2
(2.4)
= (1  )m (1  ) : (2.5)
As in standard rent-seeking games, total secrecy costs are smaller if the two con-
testants are strongly asymmetric ( close to 1 or  close to 0). Strong trade secrets
17Similarly, innovators will have greater incentives to lobby for favorable trade secrets legislation
than imitators. Innovators can o¤er greater salaries to their key employees than imitators.
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law reduces the amount of resources wasted in the secrecy game by an amount pro-
portional to m
 (1  ).18
Let us move now to the rst stage of the game, in which the innovator invests to
obtain the new piece of knowledge. From an ex-ante perspective, the expected prot
of the innovator is:
i = eVi (x
; y)  d (e) ; (2.6)
where Vi (x; y) is the expected prot that she gets upon discovery (eq. 2.1), e the
probability of discovery and d (e) the discovery costs, with d0 > 0 and d00  0.
Thus, the optimal creation e¤ort e solves
Vi (x
; y) = d0 (e) : (2.7)
By implicit di¤erentiation, we get
@e
@
=  
@Vi(x
;y)
@
 d00 (e) =
 (m   d) + 1+ (1  ) c
d00 (e)
> 0: (2.8)
Stronger trade secrets law increases the innovation e¤ort.
Note that at the optimum, we have:
di
d
=
@i
@
+
@i
@e
@e
@| {z }
0
+
@i
@x
@x
@| {z }
0
+
@i
@y
@y
@
;
where the second and third term are nil because of the optimality of e and x:
18Note that the "rent seeking" specication of the secrecy contest implies that an increase in 
induces the same percentual reduction of x and y:
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Thus,
di
d
= e (m   d)  e (m   d) (1  ) 0y
@y
@
= e (m   d)


 + 
+ (1  ) 1


:
At the margin, stronger trade secrets law increases the innovators prots thanks to
the reduction in the probability of leakage and the reduction in the extraction e¤ort
of the rival.
We can now turn to optimal policy. In this simple set-up, ex-ante social welfare is
W = e f[1  (1  ) ]Sm + (1  ) Sd   cx   syg   d (e) ; (2.9)
where monopoly total surplus is Sm = m + Cm (prots + consumer surplus), and
duopoly surplus is Sd = 2d + Cd (prots + consumer surplus).
Trade secrets law a¤ects the self-protection and extraction e¤orts x and y; the
resulting probability of leakage (1  ) , and, in turn, the probability that knowledge
is created, e:
We have
@W
@
=
@e
@
f[(1  (1  ) )Sm + (1  ) Sd   cx   sy]  d0 (e)g
  e (Sd   Sm)  e @
@
(cx + sy) :
The rst term represents the welfare gain due to additional innovation e¤ort, the
second the welfare loss due to protracted monopoly, and the last the welfare gain due
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to reduced secrecy expenditure.
In view of (eq. 2.7), (eq. 2.1); and (eq. 2.4), we get
@W
@
=
@e
@
f(1  (1  ) )Cm + (1  )  (Cd + d)  syg
 e (Sd   Sm) + em (1  ) ;
(2.10)
that is
@W
@
=
@e
@
f(1  (1  ) )Cm + (1  ) Cd + Vr (x; y)g
 e (Sd   Sm   m) :
(2.11)
An increase in trade secrets protection stimulates innovation, hinders di¤usion, and
reduces secrecy costs. Several remarks are in order.19
First note that the social benet of additional innovation e¤ort lies with the "ex-
ternality" that the innovative knowledge exerts on the rival and the consumers ("in-
novation surplus"). The gain accruing to the innovator is perfectly balanced, at the
margin, by the increase in innovation expenditure. The innovation surplus is higher if
larger surplus is netted by consumers on the market (Cm under monopoly, Cd under
duopoly); and if the rival gets a larger payo¤ (expected prots less capturing expen-
diture). In other words, if the surplus that innovation generates from players (other
than the innovator) is higher, the innovation surplus would be higher. For instance, if
the consumer surplus is higher, the innovation surplus is higher. Similarly, the prots
of the rival comes into existence only when the innovation has taken place. Therefore
if the rival gets a larger prot due to innovation (after reducing the expenditure on
ferreting out the secret knowledge), the innovation surplus is higher.
19It can be seen that
@2W
@2
< 0. This second order condition of maximisation is a technical
condition which ensures that the welfare function can indeed be maximised.
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Second, from an ex-post perspective (after the innovative knowledge has been
created), an increase in trade secrets protection reduces total market surplus, but
also decreases secrecy costs. The net impact is not necessarily negative. We call
this component of marginal welfare: Disclosure Surplus. It relates to the welfare
e¤ect of measures aimed at "hastening" disclosure once the innovative knowledge has
been created. Such measures facilitate the shift from monopoly to duopoly, but also
increase the amount of private resources that parties invest in the secrecy game.
From (2:11) ; we get our fundamental results.
Proposition 1 Stronger trade secrets protection is socially desirable if, and only if:
Fundamental rule:
@e
@

e| {z }
elasticity of innovation
>

Disclosure surplusz }| {
[Sd   Sm   m (1  )]
f(1  (1  ) )Cm + (1  ) Cd + Vr (x; y)g| {z }
Innovation surplus
(2.12)
This formula has a simple explanation. Amarginal increase in the strength of trade
secrets law is socially desirable if, and only if, the ratio of the surplus deriving from
facilitated disclosure (di¤usion benet minus increased secrecy costs) to innovation
surplus is less than the elasticity of innovation w.r.t. trade secrets strength.  is
the probability that knowledge is not disclosed due to legal trade secrets protection.
In view of our formula, strongest trade secrets protection is denitely optimal un-
der two scenarios. First, if the Disclosure Surplus is negative, then strongest trade
secrets protection is optimal irrespective of the level of the elasticity of innovation.
Second, if Disclosure Surplus is positive, strongest trade secrets protection is (mar-
ginally) superior if the impact of the policy measure on the supply of innovation is
su¢ ciently large. We will comment on these two cases in turn.
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Strongest trade secrets protection is desirable ex-post when the gain in market
surplus due to hastened disclosure is outweighed by the increase in secrecy costs:
Disclosure Surplus < 0 , Sd   Sm   m (1  ) < 0:
Disclosure Surplus is more likely to be negative when competition in the duopoly
market is weak (so that Sd Sm is small) and the innovator has the upper end in the
secrecy game ( is small).20
When the Disclosure Surplus is positive, the usual ex-ante vs. ex-post trade-o¤
emerges. Strong21 trade secrets law reduces welfare ex-post (by hampering di¤usion of
the know-how), but fosters innovation. Here, what matters is the size of the elasticity
of the probability of innovation (w.r.t. trade secrets strength). If the "production"
of innovation is very sensitive to an increase in the reward for the innovator (brought
about by an increase in ), strong trade secrets protection is warranted.22 In turn,
the impact of  on the reward to the innovator (see eq. 2.8) depends on the intensity
of competition upon duplication, and the level of the protection costs.
In spite of the simplicity of the model, trade secrets protection tends to a¤ect
market equilibrium and social welfare in a relatively complex way. The following
examples illustrate the features of the optimal policy.
Example 1: Homogenous goods.
Let us consider the case in which the goods produced by the two rms are perfect
20When  is large, both the variation in market surplus and the variation in secrecy costs are
large. However, the impact on market surplus is relatively larger (see eq. 2.10).
21Strong trade secrets protection refers to the values of  close to 1.
22Empirical estimates of the elasticity of the supply of innovation are reviewed by Denicolò (2007).
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substitutes. The inverse demand function is: p = 1   Q: Marginal production costs
are set to zero. Under monopoly, output is Qm = 12 ;prots are m =
1
4
and consumer
surplus is CSm = 18 :
Under duopoly, the output level Qd depends on the intensity of competition be-
tween the rms (upon entry). In order to capture di¤erent outcomes, let: Qd = k;
with k 2 1
2
; 1

: For k = 1=2 we get the collusive outcome; for k = 2=3 Cournot
competition, and for k = 1; Bertrand competition. For us, Bertrand competition is
only a limit case: if the rival expects zero duopoly prots, she will not spend resources
to ferret the secret out.
We have: d = 12k (1  k) and CSd = 12k2:
The Disclosure surplus amounts to:
DS =  (3=8) + (1  k)k + k2=2  1  2k + 2k
2
4 + 4 c
s
  8k + 8k2
The Disclosure Surplus increases with the self-protection cost c while it decreases
with the extraction cost s (recall that DS is more likely to be positive if  is larger).
Figure 2.1 represents the DS with respect to the intensity of competition (k) (given
c > s):
The Disclosure Surplus is negative when competition in the product market is not
intense. Here, the entry of a new rm in the market does not provide substantial
gains to the consumers. Under Cournot competition (k = 2
3
), we have DS < 0 if, and
only if, extraction costs are su¢ ciently large: s > 9
13
c. For k ! 1 (nearly competitive
outcome), we get: DS < 0 if, and only if, s > c:
If DS is positive, the optimal level of  depends on inequality (2:12). If we assume
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Figure 2.1: Disclosure Surplus as a function of the intensity of competition.
a quadratic innovation function, d (e) = 1
2
de2; and x c=s = 100, then the optimal
scope of trade secrets law depends on k as follows (Figure 2.2):
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Figure 2.2: Optimal TS scope given intensity of competition.
Perhaps surprisingly, optimal trade secrets scope is maximal both for low levels of
products market competition (so that Disclosure Surplus is negative) and high levels
of competition (which make the "secrecy contest" more intense). Non-maximal trade
secrets protection is optimal for intermediate levels of products market competition.
The next example generalizes the insights obtained to the case of horizontally
di¤erentiated goods.
Example 2: Product di¤erentiation
Let us consider the case where the rival is able to supply a product which is
di¤erent from that supplied by the innovator and neither product dominates the
other one.
Let the inverse demand functions faced by the innovator and the rival be, respec-
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tively,
p1 = 1  q1   (1  ) q2; and p2 = 1  q2   (1  ) q1;
where  2 [0; 1] is a parameter that captures the degree of product di¤erentiation.23
For  = 1; the two goods are perfectly di¤erentiated. In fact, they are independent
of each other. This implies that there is no competition between the innovator and
the rival: each producer is a monopolist on her own market. For  = 0; the goods
are perfects substitutes (homogeneous goods). Production costs are set to 0.
The diagram below (Figure 2.3) plots the contour of the Disclosure surplus in the
c=s and  space, with respect to di¤erent market congurations: Collusion, Quantity
Competition (Cournot), and Price Competition (Bertrand). Disclosure surplus is
negative underneath the relevant contours (maths in the Appendix).
Figure 2.3 shows the combinations of c=s and  that yield negative Disclosure
Surplus (under the relevant contours). Disclosure Surplus is more likely to be negative
when goods are weakly di¤erentiated (low ) and the probability of secret disclosure
is low (low self-protection cost, high extraction cost): As for the impact of market
competition, Disclosure Surplus is more likely to be negative under Collusion than
under Cournot. Also, it is more likely to be negative under Cournot than under
Bertrand.
23See Singh and Vives (1984). The case of complementary goods, that arises for  > 1; is of no
interest here. In fact, when goods are complements, the innovator is always better o¤ if the rival
enters the market. In this set-up, stronger TS law facilitates technological transfers and hastens
entry.
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Figure 2.3: Disclosure Surplus as a function of product di¤erentiation
Figure 2.4 plots the optimal level of  as a function of ; for some levels of the
other variables (c = 1; s = 0:01).
Trade secrets laws optimal scope declines as goods become more di¤erentiated.
In fact, if goods are highly di¤erentiated, the rival does not represent a serious threat
to the innovator. Parties spend a limited amount of resources in the secrecy game and
the market benets of fast disclosure outweighed its costs. When goods are weakly
di¤erentiated, the secrecy game gains importance (in the welfare analysis). Strong
trade secrets law is more likely to be optimal, especially if disclosure does not bring
strong benets to the consumers (collusive outcome).
Note that, in this example, Cournot competition commands a lower trade secrets
scope than Bertrand. Under Bertrand, the expenditure of the parties in the secrecy
game is the highest. Strong trade secrets protection helps to keep this expenditure
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Figure 2.4: Optimal TS scope and degree of product di¤erentiation.
down.24
2.2.1 Unfair competition
To further disentangle the factors driving optimal trade secrets policy, let us consider
the limit case in which innovative knowledge cannot be concealed: c!1: This case
arises, for example, when the innovation lies on the face of the product. In the absence
of legal provisions25, the innovation immediately spills to the rival (for simplicity, we
stick to the hypothesis that only one rm can imitate the product). "Unfair competi-
24Social welfare under Betrand is highest and is the most sensitive to variations in  :
25In this subsection, we focus on non-patentable innovations only. Note that patenting requires
stringent conditions such as "novelty" and "non-obviousness" and thus innovations of low values
are not generally patented or can not be patented. Thus we restrict our attention to unfair
competition law. The subject matter can be thought of as slavish or parasitic imitation.
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tion" provisions limiting outright imitation of products exist in many countries (under
the heading of unlauteren Wettbewerb, concurrence déloyale, ongeoorloofde mededing-
ing, competenzia desleal, concorrenza sleale). Admittedly, British courts tend to apply
a rather narrow version of unfair competition, mostly based on the tort of passing o¤
(see Henning-Bodewig 2006, de Vrey 2006).26 Most civil law countries have statues
limiting copycat imitation of (well established) products (parasitic copying, slavish
imitation). These statutes create "quasi property rights" complementing traditional
intellectual property law.27
For c !1; we get: x ! 0; y ! 0; and  ! 1: The only obstacle to imitation
is unfair competition law. The product is imitated with probability 1   . We get:
lim
c!1
W = e fSm + (1  )Sdg   d (e) ; (2.13)
and (see 2.11)
@W
@
=
@e
@
fCm + (1  )Cd + (1  )dg   e (Sd   Sm) : (2.14)
This expression highlights the standard innovation/di¤usion trade-o¤. Strong protec-
26Since 1925, protection agains unfair competition is part of the Paris Convention for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Property. Art. 10bis (2) stipulates that "Any act of competition contrary
to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition."
In particular, the following examples of unfair competition are provided: i) acts that create con-
fusion with the activities of a competitor; ii) false allegations to discredit a competitor, and iii)
indications or allegations liable to mislead the public about ones good. Example i) is close the
common law tort of passing o¤.
27The British idiosyncrasy for these quasi-property rights has been vividly expressed by Justice
Jacob: There is no tort of copying. There is no tort of taking a mans market or customers.
Neither the market nor the customers are the plainti¤s to own. There is no tort of making use
of anothers goodwill as such. There is no tort of competition" (Hodgkinson & Corby v. Wards
Mobility Services, 1995, FSR 169)
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tion promotes inventiveness, but stymies competition.
Protection should be increased if
@e
@

e| {z }
elasticity of innovation
>
Disclosure surplus

z }| {
(Sd   Sm)
fCm + (1  ) (Cd + d)g| {z }
Innovation surplus
(2.15)
Note that Disclosure Surplus is always positive.
With quadratic innovation costs, we get
@W
@
=
m   d
d
fCm + (1  )Cd + (1  )dg   m+(1 )dd (Sd   Sm) ;
and the interior optimal policy is
  = 1 
m
m d (Cd + 2d   m   Cm)  Cm
2 (Cd + d   Cm)  (m   d) :
In the absence of a secrecy contest,  a¤ects social welfare through the innovation
and di¤usion channels. The optimal policy scope is narrower, as shown by the next
gure.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal protection against imitation.
Figure 2.5 shows that the optimal scope of unfair competition law (passing o¤) is
substantially narrower in the absence of the secrecy contest. Again, the relationship
between k (intensity of competition) and   (optimal protection) is U-shaped.
The optimal protection is maximal for k  2=3. With quadratic innovation costs,
information sharing and duplication are socially benecial only if competition is more
intense than Cournot competition!
Under product di¤erentiation, a similar result arises. Optimal protection is nar-
rower if the secrecy contest is absent. Below is the case of Cournot competition
(Figure 2.6) (Bertrand and Collusion follow similar patterns).
Also in the simple unfair competition scenario, the optimal policy scope decreases
with the degree of product di¤erentiation: protection against imitation should be
stronger when the product of the rival is a copy-cut duplication of the product of the
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Figure 2.6: Unfair competition vs trade secrets protection
innovator. This is remarkably in line with the legislation of most EU countries.28
2.3 Conclusion
Our model sheds light on benets and costs of trade secrets law. In particular, it
is shown that strong trade secrets law reduces the expenditure of the parties in the
secrecy game (self-protection vs. extraction). Strong trade secrets law also encourages
the creation of knowledge, by increasing the payo¤ to innovative rms. Strong trade
secrets law, however, also hinders the di¤usion of innovative knowledge in society and,
thus, limits competition. Our model shows that the proper balance between these
e¤ects depends on a variety of factors. In particular, we have shown that maximal
28Note that our result does not bear on the issue whether protection should be provided by means
of IP law or unfair competition law.
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trade secrets scope is likely to be optimal when competition in the product market is
weak, the cost of self-protection is low, and the cost of secret extraction is high.
The optimal scope of trade secrets law is thinner when the product supplied by
the rival is (horizontally) di¤erentiated. Product di¤erentiation dilutes the incentives
of the parties to invest in the secrecy contest. It enhances the value of entry for the
consumers, but also allows rms to charge more.
The last result has interesting ramications in the context of unfair competition
law. In Germany, for example, cases in which misappropriation of secrets lead to the
introduction of goods that imitate those of the secret-owner are decided by consider-
ing, inter alia, the degree of similarity between the products. The chances that a suit
under unfair competition succeeds in court is higher if the products are close to each
other (see de Vrey 2006).
Our model does not address several features of trade secrets law that deserve
recognition.
First, we have not considered the case in which the owner of the secret know-how
intends to licence it to another rm. Here, trade secrets law may complement contract
law in facilitating the transfer, by inhibiting third parties from using misappropriated
knowledge.
Second, we have not considered the case in which rms can protect innovative
knowledge by means of a plurality of instruments. Stronger trade secrets protection
induces companies to rely more on secrecy and less on formal intellectual property
rights. With respect to patents, this tends to be a cost. Patents require the disclosure
of the invention and have a nite duration. They provide an exclusive right. Secrets
can potentially last forever, and are not exclusive. In general, patents tend to provide
incentives to innovate at a lower social cost than secrets (Denicolò and Franzoni
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2011).29
Finally, one should consider that knowledge that is not shared may be lost. This
was a concrete possibility in the past, when the secrets (arcana) of the craft were
jealously held by the master. The case of the Stradivarius violins is paradigmatic.
Stradivarius did not share the secrets of his workmanship. With his death, they were
lost forever30
29Trade secrets and patents are compared, under di¤erent scenarios, also in Denicolò and Franzoni
(2012). See Hall et al. (2014) for a exhaustive review of the literature on the patent/trade secrecy
choice.
30This example was suggested to us by Hans-Bernd Schaefer. Similarly, the method developed
by mathematician Scipione del Ferro (1465-1526) to solve cubic equations is not yet known with
certainty. In the 16th century, mathematicians gained their reputation in public competitions
where they challenged each other. They would not, generally, reveal their solution methods (de
Laat 2000).
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Appendix
1) Optimal  under homogenous goods case:
  =
16c3( 1 + k)3k4( 5 + 15k   16k2 + 4k3)
 4c2( 1 + k)2k2( 1  26k + 134k2   296k3 + 336k4   192k5 + 32k6)s
 4ck(1  2k + 2k2)2( 3 + 20k2   33k3 + 16k4)s2 + (1  2k + 2k2)3(7  12k + 8k2)s3
8c( 1 + k)k(1  2k + 2k2)(4c2( 1 + k)2k2(1  3k + k2)
+ck(7  37k + 80k2   90k3 + 48k4   8k5)s  ( 3 + 4k)(1  2k + 2k2)2s2)
2) Optimal  under di¤erentiated goods, Bertrand competition:
  =
256c33( 4 + 92 + 23 + 54)
+s3(1 + )2( + 3   2)3(12  12 + 32   143 + 74)
 8cs2( + 3   2)2(20  4   192   163   244 + 36)
+16c2s2( 104 + 44 + 1622 + 293 + 1004   1415   306   617 + 9)
(16c( + 3   2)(16c22(3 + 3 + 2) + s2( + 3   2)2(2   + 33))
+2cs(20 + 12   112 + 43   184   76)
3) Optimal  under di¤erentiated goods, Cournot competition:
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  =
 ((s3( 3 + ())2(5  6() + ()2)3(23  34() + 7()2)
 256c3( 25 + 56()  21()2 + 2()3)+
8cs2(5  6() + ()2)2(177  380() + 200()2   40()3 + 3()4)+
16c2s(1885  6042() + 6423()2   2748()3 + 523()4   42()5 + ()6))
(16c(5  6() + ()2)(16c2( 5  2() + ()2)
+s2(5  6() + ()2)2(3  10() + 3()2)+
2cs( 85 + 12() + 126()2   60()3 + 7()4))))
4) Optimal  under di¤erentiated goods, Collusion
  =
(c3( 4 + 7())  cs2( 1 + ())2(18  29() + 6()2) + s3( 1 + ())3(12  20() + 7()2)
+c2s( 16 + 40()  25()2 + ()3))
(2c( 1 + ())( 7cs( 1 + ())() + c2(1 + 2()) + 2s2( 1 + ())2( 2 + 3())))
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Chapter 3
"LOST PROFIT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT" UNDER
MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS
This chapter analyses civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.
In particular we deal with the lost prot (LP ) and the unjust enrichment
(UE) doctrine of damages and analyse their impacts on the behaviour of
the owner of the secret and market outcome. A simple model of asymmet-
ric information is developed, where the owner of the secret does not know
whether the duplicator has introduced a similar product by misappropriat-
ing the secret formula, or developed the product by independent research.
We then compare di¤erent remedies available to the owner of the secret,
and the welfare impacts thereof. It is found that the UE regime results in
a higher welfare as compared to that under the LP regime. Further, the
incentives to misappropriate are expected to be higher or lower, depend-
ing on the degree of accuracy of courts and on the proportion of violators
(duplicators who misappropriate the secret). We provide clear conditions
under which the LP regime provides greater incentives to misappropriate
as compared to that under the UE regime.
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3.1 Introduction
When a rm faces misappropriation of its trade secrets, it may decide to go to courts
for legal remedies. This paper deals with two alternative damage regimes in case
of trade secret misappropriation, namely the Lost Prot regime and the Unjust En-
richment regime. An attempt is made to understand the market dynamics in case
of misappropriation of trade secrets under these two regimes. We also compare the
incentives to misappropriate and the ex-post welfare under the two regimes.
Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) (1985), Section 1 (2) denes "mis-
appropriation" as follows:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason
to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means1; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent
by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge
of the trade secret was:
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire
it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason to know
1According to Section 1 (1) of UTSA, "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresen-
tation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through
electronic or other means.
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that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or
mistake.
The UTSA is adopted by 48 states of the United States of America (only New
York and Massachusetts have not adopted it till now). The remedies for trade secrets
misappropriation under the UTSA include an injunction, damages, or both.
The focus of this paper is to study the market dynamics under alternative damages
regimes2. According to the Section 3 of the UTSA, damages can be awarded in the
following fashion:
(a) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior
to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary re-
covery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation.
Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust
enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing
actual loss. In lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by
misappropriation may be measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty
for a misappropriators unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.
(b) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award exem-
plary damages in the amount not exceeding twice any award made under subsection
(a).
Thus the damages are based on three basic principles: i) the economic losses of
the secret owner, called Lost Prot; ii) the prots earned by the misappropriator of
the secret, called Unjust Enrichment; iii) the amount that the owner of the secret
and the potential imitator would have agreed upon if both had been reasonably and
2We do not look at injuction because our purpose is to compare the damage regimes.
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voluntarily trying to reach an agreement, called Reasonable Royalty3.
1. The Lost Prot (LP ) regime: Under this regime, the losses are measured as a
disadvantage to the owner of the secret due to misappropriation. The owner of the
trade secret must be able to prove that the losses are a direct consequence of the
misappropriation of the secret. In other words, the causation link must be proved in
order to get the damages. The burden of proof lies with the owner of the secret.
2. The Unjust Enrichment (UE) regime: The UE damages (also known as dis-
gorgement) are commensurate to the gains that the defendant has obtained from the
secret misappropriation. This regime awards the prots of the misappropriator to the
secret owner. It is typically used in cases where the loss of prots can not be proved.
3. Reasonable royalty (RR) regime: Royalties are an alternative to the actual
damage options. When either lost prots or unjust enrichment can not be proved in
court, reasonable royalty is used. Similar to the patent cases, courts usually determine
reasonable royalty by analysing a hypothetical negotiation between the parties, if both
had been reasonable in their negotiation. This is a quasi-contract4 that courts create
to compensate the trade secret owner in case of misappropriation. This measure
typically provides a certain percentage of the defendants sales revenue (due to use of
the secret).
It is important to note that the concept of reasonable royalty in the intellectual
property litigations is somewhat problematic and inconsistent. The inconsistency
arises because the hypothetical ex ante negotiation is supposed to take place before the
uncertainty about the rights is resolved, and the question of damages arises only after
3In this study, we do not analyse exemplary damages. Our focus is on basic damage regimes.
4A quasi-contract is a legal obligation, not based upon agreement, enforced either specically
or by compelling the obligor to restore the value of that by which he was unjustly enriched (see
Corbin, 1912).
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the invalidity of those rights (see Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) and intellectual
property (2009)). Hence we analyse the policy implications under di¤erent damage
regimes focusing on the LP and the UE regimes only.
3.2 Calculation of Damages
It is often di¢ cult to prove lost prots with certainty, and thus courts may use the
benet of the misappropriator to award damages. Even though the conceptual basis of
calculating damages is straightforward, the actual calculation in the modern business
world is quite complex5 and thus courts have developed various methods to calculate
lost prots6. Lost prots are usually grounded upon the plainti¤s lost net prots
or incremental prots. This is because if the loss occurred due to lost revenues, one
should deduct the incremental costs related with those revenues. Put di¤erently, these
are the costs saved by the plainti¤. Another method used by courts is the defendants
sales proceeds multiplied by the prot margin of the plainti¤7. At times courts have
also used investment value of the trade secret to calculate lost prots. For instance, if
a rm loses its secret whose market is not developed fully yet, the court can calculate
damages based on the investment value of the secret, that is, on the amount that an
investor would have paid to obtain the secret at the time of misappropriation, given
the business information at that time8.
Instead of the lost prots damages, or even in addition to it, courts may award
5Glenn Perdue, The Broad Spectrum of Trade Secrets Damages, Am. Bar Assoc. (Apr. 18, 2012)
6Refer to "Trade Secrets Damages: Understanding the Law is a Framework for Success," AIPLA
White Paper (October 2013)
7This method was used, for example, in David Fox & Sons, Inc. v. King Poultry Co., 23 N.Y.2d
914, 914 (N.Y. 1969)
8This method was used, for example, in Precision Plating & Metal Finishing, Inc. v. Martin-
Merietta Corp., 435 F.2d 1262, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1970)
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unjust enrichment damages. They can include any gain that the defendant might
have received due to the use of the misappropriated trade secret. A practical problem
in the calculation of unjust enrichment damages is the duration of the accounting
period of the use of the secret. For instance in the Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Am. Can
Co. case, the court found that the defendant did not know that it was infringing on
the secret of the plainti¤, and hence the accounting period for calculating damages
started from the date the suit was led9. In another case, the court maintained that
the accounting period should start from the date the defendant started marketing the
misappropriated product10.
Therefore, in practice, the calculation of damages can be quite a challenging task.
It may potentially involve multiple types of damages. The following case from the US
illustrates the issue.
In the Autopartsource, LLC v. Bruton et al.11 case, in 2010, Autopartsource,
LLC ("Autopartsource") reassigned its employee Stephen C. Bruton to exert e¤orts
to develop business in China. However Bruton started his own company which directly
competed with Autopartsource. He developed his business (BBH Source Group, LLC
("BBH")) secretly with two other partners. In the process of developing his new
business, he misappropriated many of Autopartsources trade secrets. When this came
to the notice of Autopartsource in December 2012, Bruton was immediately red.
However, in his last e¤ort to gain an unfair advantage, he entered Autopartsources
Californias business premises and deleted much of their databases containing trade
secrets. Consequently, a suit was led against BBH and Bruton. BBH did not le
9Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Am. Can Co., 75 N.J. Eq 542, 544 (N.J.App.Ct. 1909).
10Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., Inc., 230 F.2d 855, 865 (4th Cir. 1956).
11Autopartsource, LLC v. Bruton et al., No. 3:13-cv-54, (U.S. Dist. 2013).
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an answer to this and therefore the court entered default12 against BBH on March 6,
2013.
Autopartsource proved violation of the Virginia UniformTrade Secrets Act (VUTSA).
The VUTSA provides for damages which may include both the lost prots and un-
just enrichment. Autopartsource demanded compensatory damages of $1,131,801.55.
Though BBH did not appear before the court to defend, the court had an indepen-
dent duty to ensure that the damages demanded were justied. The court found that
a part of the damage claim seemed unjustied. The court awarded damages in the
following manner.
Autopartsource had submitted evidence of reduced revenues from one of its cus-
tomers, Intex Auto Parts, by $50,590.85 due to BBHs use of its trade secrets. The
court awarded these damages, based on the Lost Prot doctrine. Further, the costs
of data recreation was also a direct consequence of misappropriation, and hence a
sum of $262,634.87 was awarded to recover the cost of recreate the data deleted by
Bruton.
On top of this, given the unjust enrichment damages permitted by VUTSA, Au-
topartsource sought damages for the time and resources that it spent in building
the trade secret (with which BBH had been unjustly enriched). It was argued that
Bruton spent approximately 75% of his time in developing the trade secret in ques-
tion13. The court decided to award $616,237.35 as damages under unjust enrichment.
Furthermore, Autopartsource sought damages of $202,339.08 to recover from BBH
12Default judgment refers to the judgement entered against a party who has failed to defend
against a claim that has been brought by another party.
13Autopartsource submitted the Declaration of John Amalfe for esimating this. Amalfe said in
this declaration that the primary role of Bruton was to conduct the research and development.
Bruton developed pricing, marketing and product information that also constituted trade secrets.
Thus, the court awarded 75% of Brutons total compensation from Autopartsource until Bruton
formed his company.
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all compensation paid to Bruton since he formed the competing company. How-
ever, Autopartsource was awarded only $50,584.77, approximately one quarter of
what was demanded by it. The claim was brought under unjust enrichment for the
salary that Autopartsource paid to Bruton to develop business in China. The ar-
gument behind this demand was that BBH was unjustly enriched because Bruton
was paid these sums for work performed in China, where he was actually spending
his time and e¤ort establishing BBHs business operations. However, there was a
logical inconsistency with this argument. The problem with this argument is that it
is inconsistent with Autopartsources theory of recovery for the value of creating the
trade secrets-representing 75% of Brutons compensation throughout his employment
($616,237.35). If Bruton spent 75% of his time working for Autopartsource, as Amalfe
also testied, then he could spend at most 25% of his compensable time working for
BBH. This is why the total claim from Autopartsource was considered unjustied
by the court. Then, the court awarded $75,000 as punitive damages14, $7,797.96 as
attorneys fees, and a permanent injunction on BBH from using a misappropriated
trade secret.
For analytical purposes, we look at the LP and the UE regime in isolation in this
chapter15.
14Punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant, on top of simple compensation.
15In other words, we do not study the case where both remedies can be combined. In the existing
literature on patent infringement too, these remedies have been studied separately (refer to the
literature presented in the next section). Whether remedies are generally combined in practice is
an empirical question which goes beyond the scope of this chapter. We simply compare the lost
prot and the unjust enrichment regime of damages, following the existing literature on damages
for infringement of intellectual property.
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3.3 A brief literature overview
The existing literature on infringement of intellectual property has focused on patent
infringement, in general, while analysing the impact of di¤erent damage rules. The
development of trade secrets valuation in case of misappropriation has rested on the
shoulders of tools of patent infringement damages valuations and the economic mod-
els used for calculation of patents infringement have been adopted to deal with trade
secrets cases by courts (Simth (2001), Sickles and Ayyar in Slottje (2006)). The lit-
erature on patent infringement is well developed. But trade secrets misappropriation
has not received much attention. This chapter attempts to ll this gap in the litera-
ture on damages under infringement of intellectual property. In particular, we analyse
damage regimes in case of misappropriation of trade secrets. We discuss some of the
existing research on patent infringement literature to motivate our analysis. This
literature review depicts the basic understanding of the damage regimes for patents
which also helps understanding damages under trade secrets misappropriation.
Blair and Cotter (1998) present an economic analysis of damage rules for intel-
lectual property infringement prior to the issuance of injunctions. Their principal
argument is that the optimal damages rules should preserve both the incentive struc-
ture of intellectual property law and the property-like features of intellectual property
rights. They argue that courts should award the highest amount between the LP or
the UE damages to the patent owner. On a fairness basis, the patent owner should
be able to keep at least his lost prots. At the same time, the infringer should not
be able to keep any unjust prots from infringement. They show that the courts in
practice follow similar rules as suggested by their analysis. In particular, rules fol-
lowed in Trade Secrets litigation cases (in the US) appear to adhere to their analysis
the most closely among various bodies of intellectual property law.
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Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) investigate how liability rules (use of dam-
ages) and property rules (injunction) protect intellectual property16. Based on their
formulation, they nd that infringement might not be deterred under any of the en-
forcement regimes available, but a credible threat of infringement can actually benet
the patent owner. It is shown that under some circumstances, the patent holder is
better o¤ if the infringement takes place. A credible threat of infringement would
make the patent holder not agree to license terms that would give him lower prots
as compared to what he would get by letting the infringement take place and collect-
ing damages ex-post. The UE regime is more protable to the patent holder than the
LP regime in case of proprietary research tools, when infringement is not deterred.
However if infringement is deterred, the two doctrines cannot be compared due to
multiplicity of equilibria. Both liability rules can be superior to a property rule de-
pending on how much delay is allowed before infringement is enjoined. However, the
results can be reversed for other cases such as end-user products and cost reducing
inventions.
Anton and Yao (2007) analyse the impact of damages under patent infringement in
an equilibrium oligopoly model of process innovation, in which the choice to infringe is
endogenous. They focus on two main questions. First, when does the LP regime deter
infringement? Second, if infringement is not deterred, how are innovation incentives
impacted by the LP regime?
They nd that under the LP regime, infringement always occurs in equilibrium,
with the infringer making market choices that a¤ect the prot of the patent holder.
In equilibrium the infringement form is either "passive" in which case lost prots of
the patent holder are zero, or, "aggressive" in which case they are positive. When
16For a general discussion of liability rules and property rules, refer to Calabresi, G., & Melamed,
A. D. (1972).
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the patentee is protected with the lost prot damage system, incentives to innovate
are lower as compared to a system where infringement is deterred. The explanation
is that in equilibrium infringement always occurs and the loser in the patent race
will always have at least an option of a valuable passive infringement. Since ex-ante
innovation incentives are based on the di¤erence between prots of either party being
a patentee or being an infringer, the incentives to innovate are reduced under the LP
regime.
Choi (2009) investigates how di¤erent damage regimes a¤ect competition when
intellectual property rights are probabilistic17. Chois analysis rests on an oligopolis-
tic competition model to assess the impact of di¤erent damage regimes (the LP and
the UE regimes). Choi nds that the LP regime provides more protection to the
patent holder than the UE regime if both the patent holder and the infringer have
identical marginal costs. Furthermore, after the innovation has taken place, the two
damage regimes yield the same social surplus. It is shown that under a linear de-
mand case, social welfare is higher under LP (UE) regime if marginal costs of the
patent holder are lower (higher) than those of the infringer. Under the LP regime,
enforcement of intellectual property rights is both ex ante and ex post optimal18 for
the patent holder. However, under the UE regime, the patent holder may or may
not choose to enforce his intellectual property rights, depending on the probability of
detection of the infringement.
Finally, Henry and Turner (2010) study price competition between a spatially
di¤erentiated product patentee and an imitator (infringer) anticipating probabilistic
future patent damages. Di¤erent damage regimes are compared using a model of
17Probabilistic intellectual property rights refers to the rights that can be invalidated, if litigated.
18It is because patent holders prots are unambiguously higher if he chooses enforcement.
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entry and xed location Hotelling duopoly. It is found that the reasonable royalty
regime yielding symmetric equilibrium prices maximises static welfare and yields the
highest innovation incentives when enforcement is almost certain. The LP systemmay
deter infringement and yields the highest innovation incentives when enforcement is
less than certain and the products are su¢ ciently valuable. The UE regime yields
both low innovation incentives and low static e¢ ciency. Static welfare is maximal in
this set up under the reasonable royalty regime because prices are symmetric and all
consumers buy from the closest rm. However, with asymmetric prices (that always
occurs under the LP or the UE regime), some consumers do not buy from their closest
rm. As a result transportation costs are excessive. It is also argued that entry may
be deterred only under the LP regime19.
The literature just reviewed does not look at the core of trade secrets misappro-
priation. We provide a simple model to understand the market dynamics for trade
secrets misappropriation and the welfare implications of the lost prot and unjust
enrichment regimes. A comparison between two regimes is attempted to guide policy
makers in deciding the appropriate damage measure.
It is important to note that the study of a patent infringement and trade secret
misappropriation are qualitatively di¤erent. If a patent holder nds out that some-
body else is using her technology, the patent is infringed (patent infringement is a
strict liability o¤ence). In a trade secret case, it is often di¢ cult for the plainti¤ to
know whether the technology used by the defendant was misappropriated. In our
model, the owner of the secret is assumed to have a belief (probability) about the
19The intuition for this result is as follows. When a products value increases, the monopolist can
increase his price. But the prices in duoplody do not rise. For su¢ ciently high valued products,
expected damages would be high enough to make the expected prot of the imitator negative.
Damages in other regimes, on the other hand, are not high enough to deter entry of other rms.
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duplicator being a misappropriator. In addition, we assume that the courts can give
wrong judgements because it may be di¢ cult to nd evidence to prove misappropri-
ation. Thus, courts decide in favour of the owner of the secret with a probability less
than 1. We also assume that courts never punish a duplicator who developed the
secret formula independently.20
The basic ndings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. The owner of
the secret produces a greater quantity under the LP regime when compared to that
under the UE regime. Both kinds of duplicators (one who misappropriates and the
other who does not misappropriate the secret) produce a greater quantity under the
UE regime when compared to that under the LP regime.
The next section describes the model used in this paper.
3.4 The Model
The model used in this paper is inspired by the patent infringement literature. In
particular, the model used in this paper is close to the one used in Choi (2009), but
with asymmetric information. The model is described below.
We construct a model of a homogenous product market involving two rms. For
illustrative purposes, we use the fragrance market to illustrate the structure of the
model. The perfume is produced with a secret formula, which is known to rm 1 only,
the owner of the secret. Firm 2 duplicates the product and enters the market with
a perfume with exactly the same smell. Firm 1 does not know whether rm 2 has
introduced the product in the market by independently developing the secret formula
20Note that it may be quite di¢ cult for the owner of the secret to prove misappropriation against
the duplicator who has actually misappropriated the secret, it is almost impossible to prove mis-
appropriation against an innocent duplicator.
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or by misappropriating the secret of rm 1, using improper means. Firm 2, however,
obviously knows whether it discovered the formula independently or misappropriated
the secret of rm 1. Thus the model is characterised by asymmetric information on
one side. The world is characterised by two kinds of duplicators, misappropriators
(violators) and the ones who develop the formula independently, by legal means (non-
violators). The proportion of misappropriator duplicators in the population is given
by  and the proportion of independent developers of the secret formula is given by
1   : The owner of the secret believes that the duplicator has misappropriated the
secret with probability :
For simplicity, both misappropriation and independent creation of the secret are
assumed to be costless21. Further, the marginal cost of production is assumed to be
zero for this product for both rms. Thus, rm 2 can either steal the secret and
bear any potential damages, or avoid the potential damages by discovering the secret
formula on its own. The owner of the secret does not know whether the duplicator has
stolen the secret or has started producing the good by discovering the secret by proper
means. The owner of the secret decides to bring a suit against the duplicator22. Once
the suit is led, the court decides whether to award the damages to the owner of the
secret or not. However, the court makes the correct judgement only with a probability
: The parameter  represents the di¢ culty of nding evidence of misappropriation
of the secret, given that the secret was actually misappropriated. It should be noted
here that the burden of proof is on the owner. It is assumed that the duplicator who
21Note that the cost of obtaining the secret is assumed to be costless. However, the violator
faces the probability of being punished in the court. Thus, being a violator is costly for the
duplicator indirectly. The violator pays damages if he is caught and the owner of the secret proves
misappropriation in court.
22In our setup, the secret owner always litigates because of the assumption of costless litigation.
Our interest lies in post-litigation analysis.
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develops the product by legal means is never punished by courts.
Courts award damages if misappropriation is proved. For analytical purposes,
we use two measures of damages, namely, the LP and the UE regime, following the
literature on damages. Damages can be based on either the LP regime or the UE
regime. The objective of this chapter is to study the dynamics of market competition
in the case of misappropriation of a trade secret and compare the welfare implications
of di¤erent damage regimes thereof. We are also interested to compare the incentives
to misappropriate or steal the secret under two damage regimes, the LP regime and
the UE regime. To keep the model simple and tractable, the market demand is
assumed to be linear, and is given by p = 1   (q1 + q2); where q1 and q2 represent
the quantities produced by rm 1 and rm 2. Let duopoly prots be represented
by 1(q1; q2) and 2(q1; q2) for the owner of the secret and the duplicator when they
compete before any ruling by the court. Obviously the market outcome depends on
the expected payo¤s to the players, which involve damages. However, the expected
payo¤s to the players depend on the applicable damage regimes in those jurisdictions.
The possibility of award of damages a¤ects the quantities produced by the owner
of the secret and the duplicator. For instance, under the LP regime, the duplicator
(misappropriator) has to pay damages equal to the prots that the owner of the
secret loses due to misappropriation (with some probability). Thus, as compared
to the scenario where courts provide no protection of trade secrets, the duplicator
internalises the possibility of damages and contracts his output (so that the owner
of the secret has a lower loss as a result of misappropriation), and consequently the
owner of the secret increases his output. Under the UE regime, the owner of the secret
receives the prots of the duplicator with some probability, and thus he behaves in a
manner as if the owner has a partial ownership of the duplicator rm. This induces
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the owner of the secret to reduce his output (which will give him higher prot of
the duplicator in terms of damages) and consequently the duplicator responds by
increasing his output, as compared to the scenario with no protection.
We now analyse the market outcomes under the LP regime as well as the UE
regime.
3.4.1 The Lost Prot Regime
Here we look at the competition between the players under the LP regime of damages.
According to the LP regime, the owner of the secret can recover prots lost due to
misappropriation of the secret. It may be noted that rm 1 would have remained a
monopolist if the secret was not known to the other rm because the secret formula
was known only to rm 1. Hence the loss of prots is equal to the di¤erence between
the monopoly prot and the duopoly prot23. The expected payo¤ of the owner of
the secret under the LP regime can be represented as:
LP1 = (1(q1; q2v) + (m   1(q1; q2v))) + (1  )1(q1; q2nv) , or
LP1 = ((1  )1(q1; q2v) + m) + (1  )1(q1; q2nv) (3.1)
Firm 1 knows that the proportion of violators is given by ; so, with probability
 it earns duopoly prot plus the lost prots if the court makes the right decision
(with probability ): On the other hand, with probability (1   ); the duplicator
has discovered the secret formula by legal means and hence the owner of the secret
earns only the duopoly prots and gets no damages. The expression q2v represents the
23Note that this formulation of the lost prots regime has been extensively used in patent infringe-
ment literature (Anton and Yao (2007), Choi (2009)). Choi (2009) argues that this formulation
more or less reects how the rule is implemented in practice, in that the court usually determines
damages on the patentees hypothetical monopoly prot in the absence of infringement.
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quantity produced by the violator and similarly q2nv represents the quantity produced
by the non-violator.
The payo¤ of the duplicator includes the payment of the damages if he happens
to be a misappropriator and his guilt is proved in the court; otherwise, it is just the
duopoly prot. The expected payo¤s can be represented as
LP2v = 2(q1; q2v)  (m   1(q1; q2v)) (3.2)
for the violator, and,
LP2nv = 2(q1; q2nv) (3.3)
for the non-violator.
The violator pays damages equal to the lost prots of the owner of the secret
with probability : With probability 1   , the violator does not pay any damages.
The non-violator, on the other hand, does not pay any damages, and earns normal
duopoly prot24.
The equilibrium quantities of the players are given by25:
qLP1 =
1  
3  4 + 2 (3.4)
qLP2v =
2  (1 + 3)+ 22
6 + 2(  4) (3.5)
24Since we focus on a homogenous goods market, with zero marginal costs for both players, there
is no incentive for the secret owner to voluntarily share the secret with the duplicator.
25Please refer to the appendix (1) to see the calculations.
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qLP2nv =
2 + (  3)
6 + 2(  4) (3.6)
We observe that the owner of the secret produces a greater quantity as compared
to both kinds of duplicators. Further, the violator produces a lower quantity as
compared to the non-violator in view of potential damages.
Now we can calculate the expected payo¤s of the players as follows:
The owner of the secret
The expected prots of the owner of the secret can be evaluated by plugging in
the values of equilibrium quantities(eq. 3.4, 3.5, 3.6) in the payo¤ function(eq.3.1).
We have:
LP1 = ((1  )qLP1 (1  qLP1   qLP2v ) + 4 ) + (1  )(qLP1 (1  qLP1   qLP2nv))
or
LP1 =
4  3+ 62(  2)2 + 33(12  8+ 2)
4(3 + (  4))2 (3.7)
The expected payo¤ of the owner of the secret depends on both the probability
of facing a violator as well as probability of judgement in his favour given that there
was misappropriation of the secret. No monotonic relationship exists between the
expected prot of the owner of the secret and the probability of facing a violator, or,
the probability of judgement in favour of the owner of the secret.
The Duplicator
For the violator, we have(eq.3.2):
LP2v = 2(q1; q2v)  (m   1(q1; q2v))
= qLP2v (1  qLP1   qLP2v )  (14   qLP1 (1  qLP1   qLP2v ))
or
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LP2v =
(1  )(4  (1 + 12)+ 3(2 + 3)2   723 + 22)
4(3 + (  4))2 (3.8)
If the value of  is very close to one, the violators expected prot turns out to be
zero. Thus, in the world of perfect courts, the expected prot of the violator would
be zero.
The non-violator does not pay any damages and thus his expected prot(eq.3.3)
is:
LP2nv = 2(q1; q2nv)
= qLP2nv(1  qLP1   qLP2nv)
= (2+( 3+))
2
4(3+( 4+))2 ; or
LP2nv =
(2 + (  3))2
4(3 + (  4))2 (3.9)
Thus the expected prots of both duplicators depend on the parameters  and ;
that is, the probability of facing a violator and the probability of having judgement
in favour of the owner of the secret. Again, no monotonic relationship exists between
the expected prots of the violator and non-violator and the parameters  and :
We now examine the equilibrium quantities and prots under the Unjust Enrichment
(UE) regime of damages.
3.4.2 The Unjust Enrichment Regime
Under the UE regime of damages, the owner of the secret can recover the prots
made by the violator26. Thus the misappropriator would need to pay all his prots
26Again, the formulation of the UE regime follows the literature of patent infringement (see Choi
(2009)).
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attributable to use of the secret to the owner of the secret27. The expected prot of
the owner of the secret is given by:
UE1 = (1(q1; q2v) + 2(q1; q2v)) + (1  )1(q1; q2nv) (3.10)
With probability ; the owner of the secret expects to get damages equal to the
prots of the duplicator. However, no damages are awarded if the duplicator happens
to be a non-violator. The expected payo¤ of two kinds of duplicators are as follows:
UE2v = (1  )2(q1; q2v) (3.11)
for the violator, and
UE2nv = 2(q1; q2v) (3.12)
for the non-violator.
Under the UE regime, the payo¤ of the violator and the non-violator is similar,
the payo¤of the violator is just scaled down by (1 ). Thus, given any q1; the output
choice of both the violator and the non-violator would be same. Note that when the
value of  equals one, the expected prot becomes zero for the violator(eq.3.11). But
the non-violator does not pay any damages and thus he earns just the duopoly prot
(eq.3.12).
The equilibrium quantities of the players under the UE regime are given by28:
27Note that under the homogenous good market, the maximum prot possible is the monopoly
prot. Thus, the prot of the duplicator would make the secret owner, at the maximum, as well
o¤ as he was when there was no duplication, that is earning monopoly prot.
28Please refer to the Appendix (2) for calculations.
70
qUE1 =
1  
3   (3.13)
qUE2v =
1
3   (3.14)
qUE2nv =
1
3   (3.15)
It is interesting to note that the owner of the secret produces a lower quantity
as compared to both kinds of duplicators. It is in sharp contrast to the behavior of
the owner of the secret under the LP regime. The intuition behind this result is as
follows. The owner of the secret gets the prots of the violator in the case of the UE
regime with some probability, so he internalises this information. This internalisation
induces the owner of the secret to produce a lower output as compared to the standard
oligopoly output. This may be thought of as an inward shift of the reaction curve of
the owner of the secret. As a result, the duplicators output is higher as compared to
the standard oligopoly output (his reaction curve would shift outward). Under the
LP regime the violator internalises the expected damages to be paid in form of lost
prots of the owner of the secret (the monopoly prots minus the actual prots of
the owner of the secret). Here, the violator produces a lower quantity as compared to
the standard oligopoly output. As a result the owner of the secret produces a higher
quantity (his reaction curve shifts outward) as compared to the standard oligopoly
output. Thus, the owner of the secret produces a lower quantity than both the violator
and the non-violator under the UE regime as compared to that under the LP regime.
The expected payo¤s under the UE regime are:
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The owner of the secret
We plug in the equilibrium quantities(eq.3.13,3.14,3.15) in the expected payo¤
function of the owner of the secret(eq.3.10).
UE1 = (1(q1; q2v)+2(q1; q2v))+ (1  )1(q1; q2nv) = [(qUE1 (1  qUE1   qUE2v )+
q2v(1  qUE1   qUE2v )] + (1  )(qUE1 (1  qUE1   qUE2nv)) = 1( 3)2 , or
UE1 =
1
(3  )2 (3.16)
Similarly we nd the equilibrium expected prots of the violator and non violator.
The duplicator
For the violator, the expected payo¤(eq.3.11) is given by
UE2v = (1  )2(q1; q2v) =
1  
(3  )2 (3.17)
,and for the non violator(eq.3.12)
UE2nv = 2(q1; q2nv) =
1
(3  )2 (3.18)
Now, we move on to compare the two regimes in terms of quantities produced and
the expected payo¤s of the players.
3.4.3 The Lost Prot Vs Unjust Enrichment Regime: A comparison
Comparison between quantities under two regimes
In this section we are interested in comparing equilibrium quantities and expected
prots of the players under the LP regime and the UE regime of damages.
The owner of the secret
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Firstly we compare equilibrium quantities produced by the owner of the secret.
The quantities produced under the LP and the UE regime are:
qLP1 =
1 
3 4+2
qUE1 =
1 
3 
We note that the owner of the secret produces a greater quantity under the LP
regime as compared to that under the UE regime (Appendix 4).29
Similarly we can look at the quantity produced by the violator under two regimes
of damages. The equilibrium quantities under two regimes are given by
qLP2v =
2 (1+3)+22
6+2( 4)
qUE2v =
1
3 
It turns out that the violator produces a lower quantity under the LP regime as
compared to that under the UE regime (Appendix 5)30.
We also investigate whether there is a di¤erence in the quantity produced by a non-
violator under two damage regimes. If yes, what is the direction of the di¤erence?
Does he produce a greater quantity under the LP regime as compared to the UE
regime? The quantities, under the LP regime and the UE regime respectively, are
given by
qLP2nv =
2+( 3)
6+2( 4)
qUE2nv =
1
3 
As shown in Appendix 6, the non-violator too produces a greater quantity under
the UE regime as compared to that under the LP regime.
Proposition 1: The owner of the secret produces a greater quantity
under the LP regime whereas both kinds of duplicators produce a greater
29This result is summarised in Proposition 1. The intuition behind this result is presented there.
30This result is also summarised in Proposition 1. The intuition behind this is presented there.
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quantity under the UE regime.
The intuition behind this result can be described as follows. Under the UE regime,
the owner of the secret receives prots of the violator as damages with some prob-
ability. This implies that the owner of the secret has a partial ownership in the
duplicators rm. Thus, the owner of the secret internalises this information and pro-
duces a lower quantity accordingly (and allow the duplicator to produce more), which
provides him higher payo¤. This leads the owner of the secret to produce a quantity
lower than the standard oligopoly output. Under the LP regime, however, the role
reverses for the violator. The violator expects to pay the lost prots of the owner of
the secret, with some probability, and hence lowers his quantity by internalising this
information (so that he pays lower damages if misappropriation is proved in court).
Therefore the owner of the secret produces a greater quantity under the LP regime
and both kinds of duplicators produce a greater quantity under the UE regime.
It is more informative to compare the expected payo¤s to the players, rather than
just comparing the quantities. Thus, we look at the comparison of expected payo¤s
now.
Comparison between expected payo¤s under two regimes
In this section we investigate the di¤erence between expected prots of players under
two regimes of damages. Under the LP regime we have:
LP1 =
4 3+62( 2)2+33(12 8+2)
4(3+( 4))2 , whereas the expected prot of the owner
of the secret under the UE regime is given by
UE1 =
1
( 3)2
We are interested in comparing the expected prots of the owner of the secret under
two regimes. As shown in Appendix 7, the owner of the secret gets a higher expected
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payo¤ under the LP regime. This is quite intuitive and follows as a consequence
of having a homogenous goods market. Under the homogenous goods industry, the
monopoly prot is the highest prot that a rm can earn and hence the LP damages
give the owner of the secret prots equal to the monopoly prot. Thus, we infer
that the expected payo¤ of the owner of the secret is higher under the LP regime as
compared to that under the UE regime.
Similarly we can see whether the violator and the non-violator earn greater prot
under the LP regime as compared to that under the UE regime. The violators
expected payo¤s under the LP regime and under the UE regime are given by
LP2v =
(1 )(4 (1+12)+3(2+3)2 723+22)
4(3+( 4))2 ; and
UE2v =
1 
( 3)2
As shown in Appendix 8, the payo¤ under one regime as compared to the other
for the violator can be higher or lower, depending on the values of the parameters of
the model, that is,  and : To visualise the range of values over which the di¤erence
(LP2v  UE2v ) is negative or positive, we draw a contour diagramwhich clearly separates
the region where the di¤erence is negative from the region where the di¤erence is
positive. We make a contour diagram on a 2D space assuming LP2v  UE2v = 0: Note
that this contour represents all those points where the violator earns same level of
prots under both regimes. This also gives us the range of values of parameters  and
 where the di¤erence is positive and where it is negative. All the points above this
contour represent higher prots for the violator under the LP regime and all points
below this contour represent higher prots for the violator under the UE regime.
The diagram(ref. Figure 3.1) shows that the di¤erence can be positive for a very
high value of  and correspondingly high value of : Thus the expected payo¤ of the
violator under the LP regime can be higher or lower than the payo¤ under the UE
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Figure 3.1: The curve showing equal prots for the violator under both damage
regimes. All points above the curve represent higher prots under the LP regime,
and all points below the curve represent higher prots under the UE regime.
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regime depending on the values of parameters; the probability of duplicator being a
violator and the probability of correct judgement, given misappropriation. It is an
interesting result, as it shows that for the violator, under non-extreme situations,
given by non-extreme values of the parameters, the UE regime is better.
Finally, we also look at the payo¤ of the non-violator under two damage regimes
and investigate which gives the highest payo¤ to him. The expected payo¤s of the
non-violator under the LP regime and under the UE regime respectively are given
by
LP2nv =
(2+( 3))2
4(3+( 4))2 ; and
UE2nv =
1
( 3)2
We nd that the non-violator earns a higher payo¤ under the UE regime (see
Appendix 9). The intuition behind this is explained by the nature of information
asymmetry. Since the owner of the secret does not know for sure whether the dupli-
cator he faces is a violator or a non-violator, he behaves as if he has a partial ownership
in the duplicators rm (because, with some probability, the owner expects to receive
the prots of the duplicator). This induces the owner of the secret to compete less
aggressively and reduce his output level. Consequently, this allows the non-violator
to increase his output level. Under the UE regime, the non-violator does not pay
damages. However, the owner of the secret would have a higher output as compared
to the standard oligopoly output because he does not know whether the duplicator
is a non-violator or a violator31. This results in a higher payo¤ of the non-violator
under the UE regime than under the LP regime.
Proposition 2: The owner of the secret is better o¤under the LP regime;
the non-violator is better o¤ under the UE regime whereas the violator
31The owner of the secret expects the duplicator to be a violator with some probability, and hence
produces a higher amount. Refer to the explanation of Proposition 1 for more details.
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can be better o¤under any of the damage regimes depending on the values
of the parameters  and :
3.4.4 Incentives to misappropriate under di¤erent regimes of damages
Another interesting issue to investigate is which damage regime exhibit higher in-
centives to misappropriate a secret. To answer this question we take the di¤erence
in the relative incentives to misappropriate between two damage regimes. We cal-
culate the di¤erence between payo¤s of the violator and the non-violator under the
LP regime as well as under the UE regime and then compare them. The relative
incentives to misappropriate are the di¤erence between the payo¤ of the violator and
the non-violator and is given by LP2v   LP2nv under the LP regime and by UE2v   UE2nv
under the UE regime. If the di¤erence between them turns out to be positive, i.e.
(LP2v   LP2nv)   (UE2v   UE2nv) > 0; the incentives to misappropriate a secret, rather
than discovering it independently, are higher under the LP regime as compared to
that under the UE regime. We have
LP2v   LP2nv
= (1 )(4 (1+12)+3(2+3)
2 723+22)
4(3+( 4))2   (2+( 3))
2
4(3+( 4))2
=
(623 1122+2 62+14+ 5)
4(2 4+3)2 ; or
LP2v   LP2nv =

 
623   1122 + 2  62 + 14 +   5
4 (2   4 + 3)2 (3.19)
and, under the UE regime we have,
UE2v   UE2nv =
1  
(  3)2  
1
(  3)2 =  

(  3)2 (3.20)
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Then we take the di¤erence between them, that is,
(LP2v   LP2nv)  (UE2v   UE2nv)
=
(623 1122+2 62+14+ 5)
4(2 4+3)2   (  ( 3)2 )
=
(645 1144+43 4234+8033 632+424+5923 12422+92 362+60+9 9)
4(9 23+422+32 15)2
;
or
(LP2v   LP2nv)  (UE2v   UE2nv) =

0B@ 645   1144 + 43   4234 + 8033   632 + 424
+5923   12422 + 92  362 + 60 + 9  9
1CA
4
 
9  23 + 422 + 32   152 (3.21)
Incentives to misappropriate may be higher or lower under one of the damage
regimes as compared to the other depending on the values of parameters. For in-
stance, consider a combination of parameters such that (; ) = (0:2; 0:5):With these
values of parameters, the di¤erence, (LP2v  LP2nv)  (UE2v  UE2nv) is negative whereas
for values (; ) = (0:5; 0:5); the di¤erence is positive. Thus, the incentives to mis-
appropriate the secret rather than discovering it independently may be higher under
the LP regime for relatively higher values of  and ; and vice versa. We draw this
di¤erence in a contour diagram(ref. Figure 3.2), keeping the di¤erence equal to zero,
so that for all the values above the curve, the di¤erence is positive and for all the
values below the curve, the di¤erence is negative.
From the diagram it is clear that when both the parameters,  and ; are low so as
to be in the region below and to the left of the curve, the incentives to misappropriate
under the UE regime are higher as compared to that under the LP regime. On the
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Figure 3.2: The curve showing equal incentives to misappropriate under the LP as
well as the UE regime. For all points above the curve, the LP regime provides higher
incentives to misappropriate a secret, converse is true for all points below the curve.
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other hand, for the points above and to the right of the curve, the LP regime exhibit
higher incentives to misappropriate the secret as compared to the UE regime. This
has important implications for real world markets. Markets that are characterised
by high incidence of trade secrets theft (relatively high ), even with a relatively
low enforcement by courts, meaning a relatively lower ; the LP regime of damages
provide higher incentives to misappropriate a secrets compared to the UE regime.
Proposition 3: Incentives to misappropriate under the LP regime are
higher as compared to that under the UE regime for su¢ ciently high values
of parameters  and : The reverse holds for su¢ ciently low values of
parameters  and :
If the value of  is very low, with any level of ; the UE regime provides higher
incentives to misappropriate. If courts make correct decisions about the guilt of a
violator half of the times, i.e.  = 0:5, the LP regime provides higher incentives to
misappropriate for a big range of values of 32: These insights can be very helpful in
analysing real world situations and can help decide a particular damage regime for
some markets.
3.4.5 Welfare under di¤erent damage regimes
In this section we investigate which of the damage regimes exhibits higher welfare.
We calculate the welfare under di¤erent regimes and compare which of the damage
regimes generates higher welfare. Total social welfare (SW ) may be dened to be the
sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, that is prots of the innovator and the
duplicator.
32It may be noted that  is assumed to be a xed belief, that is, it is not a¤ected by :
Further, the quantity actually produced by the duplicator can signal the duplicators type, how-
ever, this piece of information can not be used in court by assumption.
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SW = ConsumerSurplus+ ProducerSurplus
Since we do not know whether the duplicator would be a misappropriator or not,
we do not know what would be the quantity produced by the duplicator. It is known,
however, that with probability , the duplicator would be a misappropriator of the
secret, and with probability (1  ); he would be an independent researcher. Thus we
can write the expected quantity as q2 = q2v + (1  )q2nv:
Note that the maximisation of the social welfare is equivalent to minimisation of
the social loss, or deadweight loss. The total area under the demand curve is divided
among the consumer surplus, the producerssurplus and the deadweight loss. Hence
we can directly compare the deadweight loss under the two damage regimes, and
investigate which damage regime produces higher welfare.
The demand function is linear here, p = 1  q1  q2:We can also write p = 1 Q;
where Q = q1 + q2:
Since the demand function is linear, the deadweight loss area is a right angle
triangle, with 1 Q as base and the price as height (p): So we can write the deadweight
loss as
DL =
1
2
(1 Q)p = 1
2
(1 Q)2 (3.22)
We now calculate the deadweight loss under two damage regimes and compare
them. However, we need to know the expected total quantities under two regimes.
Total expected quantities under the LP and the UE regimes are calculated below.
Under the LP regime, we have
qLP1 =
1 
3 4+2
qLP2 = q
LP
2v + (1  )qLP2nv
= (2 (1+3)+2
2
6+2( 4) ) + (1  )( 2+( 3)6+2( 4))
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= 1
22 8+6
 
22 + 2   4+ 2
Thus the total quantity can be written as
QLP = qLP1 + q
LP
2 =
1 
3 4+2 +
1
22 8+6
 
22 + 2   4+ 2
= 
22+2 6+4
22 8+6 ; or
QLP =
22 + 2   6+ 4
22   8 + 6 (3.23)
Under the UE regime, we have
qUE1 =
 1
 3
qUE2 = q
UE
2v + (1  )qUE2nv = 13 
Thus the total quantity can be written as
QUE = qUE1 + q
UE
2
=  1
 3 +
1
3 
= 2 
3  ; or
QUE =
2  
3   (3.24)
By comparing QLP and QUE, we recognize that the quantities are not same under
two regimes and hence the welfare must be di¤erent under two damage regimes. We
plot the quantities under di¤erent damage regimes (Figure 3.3), xing the value of
 = 0:533:
We now calculate the deadweight loss associated with the LP regime and the UE
regime and compare them.
From (3.22), we can compare the deadweight losses as follows.
33Note that for any other value of  the result remains the same. The value 0.5 implies that courts
make correct judgement 50% of the times.
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Figure 3.3: Total quantities produced under two regimes.
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DLLP =
1
2
(1 QLP )2
DLUE =
1
2
(1 QUE)2
DLLP > DLUE  ! 1
2
(1 QLP )2 > 1
2
(1 QUE)2; or,
1 QLP > 1 QUE; or,
QUE > QLP (3.25)
Therefore the deadweight loss under the LP regime is higher than that under the
UE regime if the quantity supplied under the UE regime is higher than the quantity
under the LP regime. We can just check whether condition (3.25) is satised or not.
We nd that the total production under the UE regime is higher34 (Appendix 10),
implying that the deadweight loss under the LP regime is higher relative to that
under the UE regime (refer to 3.25). In sum, the welfare and the industry output,
both are higher under the UE regime.
Proposition 4: The welfare and the industry output are higher under
the UE regime than under the LP regime.
34Note that Figure 3.3 presents total quantities under two regimes keeping  = 0:5: However,
total production under the UE regime is higher than under the LP regime for all values of the
parameters  and :
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter looks at two central damage regimes for misappropriation of a trade
secret, the LP regime and the UE regime. A simple model of asymmetric information
is developed where the trade owner of the secret does not know whether the duplicator
has developed the competing product by independent research or has misappropriated
the secret somehow. It is shown that the owner of the secret is better o¤ under the
LP regime whereas the duplicator who develops his product by independent research
is better o¤ under the UE regime. However, the duplicator who misappropriated the
secret may be better o¤ or worse o¤ in any of the damage regimes, depending on the
values that parameters take. The incentives to misappropriate are greater or lower
under the LP regime as compared to that under the UE regime depending on the
parameters of the model. The social welfare under the UE regime is higher than that
under the LP regime.
3.6 Appendix
(1) Equilibrium quantities under the LP regime of damages:
If there was no duplicator, the owner of the secret would have been a monopolist,
with the demand function p = 1  q. The monopolist maximises m = pq = q(1  q);
which gives equilibrium quantity qm = 12 ; and equilibrium prot m =
1
4
: However,
with the entry of the second rm in the market, the owner of the secret loses his
monopoly and earns the duopoly prot. The rms are assumed to compete in Cournot
fashion, that is, they compete in quantities.
We have:
LP1 = ((1  )1(q1; q2v) + m) + (1  )1(q1; q2nv)
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= ((1  )q1(1  q1   q2v) + 4 ) + (1  )(q1(1  q1   q2nv)):
The owner of the secret chooses the quantity by maximising LP1 w.r.t. q1;the rst
order condition is given by @
LP
1
@q1
= 0: From the rst order condition, we derive the best
response function of the owner of the secret, given by q1 =
+q2v q2v+q2nv q2nv 1
2( 1) :
The expected payo¤ of the violator is given by
LP2v = 2(q1; q2v)  (m   1(q1; q2v))
= q2(1  q1   q2v)  (14   q1(1  q1   q2v)):
The violator maximises his expected payo¤ LP2v w.r.t. q2v; which gives the rst
order condition as @
LP
2v
@q2v
= 0: The best response function can thus be calculated as
q2v =
1 (+1)q1
2
: The non-violator discovers the secret formula by independent research,
hence does not pay any damage and thus damages do not appear in his expected payo¤
function. His payo¤ function is given by
LP2nv = 2(q1; q2nv)
= q2nv(1  q1   q2nv):
The rst order condition is given by @
LP
2nv
@q2nv
= 0 and the best response function is
simply q2nv =
1 q1
2
:
Thus we have three best response functions here,
q1 =
+q2v q2v+q2nv q2nv 1
2( 1) ;
q2v =
1 (+1)q1
2
;
q2nv =
1 q1
2
for the owner of the secret, the violator and the non-violator respectively. By
solving these three best responses, we can derive the equilibrium quantities of the
owner of the secret, the violator and the non-violator as:
qLP1 =
1  
3  4 + 2
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qLP2v =
2  (1 + 3)+ 22
6 + 2(  4)
qLP2nv =
2 + (  3)
6 + 2(  4)
We may want to investigate who supplies a greater quantity in this market, the
owner of the secret or the duplicator? For instance, if the duplicator is a violator,
who produces a greater quantity under the LP regime, the owner of the secret or
the duplicator? To see this, we look at the di¤erence between the quantity produced
by the violator from the quantity produced by the owner of the secret. We have
qLP1  qLP2v = 12 ( 2+1)3 4+2 ; which is positive for all values of  and  such that 0 < ;  <
1: Thus the owner of the secret produces a greater quantity as compared to a violator.
We can also compare the quantity of the owner of the secret with the quantity of non-
violator. Again, we look at the di¤erence between the quantity produced by the owner
of the secret and the quantity produced by the non-violator. We have qLP1   qLP2nv =
1
2
(1 )
3 4+2 > 0 for 0 < ;  < 1. Thus the owner of the secret produces more as
compared to the duplicator, no matter whether it happens to be a violator or non-
violator. Note that all these quantities depend on two parameters, ; the proportion of
violators, or in other words, the probability that the duplicator has misappropriated
the secret, and ; the probability that courts punish the misappropriator.
We can also investigate whether the violator produces a lower quantity than the
non-violator. We have qLP2v   qLP2nv = 2 (1+3)+2
2
6+2( 4)   2+( 3)6+2( 4) = ( 1)2(2 4+3) < 0 for
all values of 0 < ;  < 1: Thus, the violator produces a lower quantity relative to a
non-violator, in view of payment of potential damages.
(2) Equilibrium quantities under the UE regime of damages:
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To nd equilibrium quantities produced by the players under the UE regime, we
plug in the market demand function in this set up. The market demand is given by
p = 1  (q1+ q2): The owner of the secret maximises his expected prot UE1 w.r.t q1:
Thus we have
UE1 = (1(q1; q2v) + 2(q1; q2v)) + (1  )1(q1; q2nv)
= [(q1(1  q1   q2v) + q2v(1  q1   q2v)] + (1  )(q1(1  q1   q2nv))
The rst order condition is given by @
UE
1
@q1
= (1  2q1   q2v   q2v) + (1  )(1 
2q1  q2nv) = 0:We can then derive the best response function of the secret holder as
q1 =
1
2
(1  q2v   q2v   q2nv + q2nv)
= 1
2
(1  (1 + )q2v   (1  )q2nv):
The expected payo¤ of the violator is given by UE2v = (1  )2(q1; q2v)
= (1  )q2v(1  q1   q2v):
The maximisation condition is @
UE
2v
@q2v
= (1 )(1  q1 2q2v) = 0: Given  < 1; we
can write the best response function of the misappropriator duplicator as q2v =
1 q1
2
:
The non-violator simply maximises UE2v = 2(q1; q2nv) = q2nv(1   q1   q2nv) w.r.t
q2nv: From rst order condition
@UE2nv
@q2nv
= 0; we derive the best response function as
q2nv =
1 q1
2
:
Thus we have three best response functions here,
q1 =
1
2
(1  (1 + )q2v   (1  )q2nv);
q2v =
1 q1
2
;
q2nv =
1 q1
2
for the owner of the secret, the violator and the non-violator respectively under
the UE regime of damages. By solving these three best responses, we derive the
equilibrium quantities of the owner of the secret, the violator and the non-violator as:
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qUE1 =
1  
3  
qUE2v =
1
3  
qUE2nv =
1
3  
Again, we investigate who produces a greater quantity in equilibrium under the
UE regime, the owner of the secret or the duplicator. The quantity produced by
the duplicator is same under the UE regime independent of his type, that is, both
kinds of duplicators produce the same quantity in equilibrium. We have qUE1   qUE2v =
qUE1   qUE2nv = 1 3    13  =   3 < 0; which implies that the quantity produced
by the owner of the secret is lower than the quantity produced by the violator, or
the non-violator under the UE regime. This is an interesting result. Under the
LP regime, the owner of the secret supplies a higher quantity in the market than
the duplicator while under the UE regime, the duplicator, whether violator or not,
produces a higher quantity as compared to the owner of the secret.
(3) How to sign a quadratic and cubic function?:
Suppose we have a quadratic function of the following form:
f(x) = ax2 + bx+ c
where a; b; c are parameters.
i) If b2   4ac = 0; we have the "double root" case with a single real root, x =  b
2a
:
In this case, we have ax2 + bx+ c = a(x+ b
2a
)2; and the function f(x) has the sign of
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the parameter a:
ii) If b2   4ac > 0; we have two distinct roots of the function f(x): We have
ax2 + bx+ c = a(x  x1)(x  x2); where x1 and x2 are the two real roots, x1 < x2: It
is easy to note that (x  x1)(x  x2) is always positive for x < x1 and when x > x2:
However it is always negative for x1 < x < x2: Therefore f(x) has the same sign as of
parameter a when x < x1 or x > x2; and has the sign opposite of parameter a when
x1 < x < x2:
iii) If b2  4ac < 0; we have complex roots, and the sign of f(x) is same as that of
a:
In a similar fashion, we have three roots in the case of a cubic function, which
draw the area where the function takes positive or negative values. Thus we can sign
a cubic function easily.
(4) The quantity comparison of the owner of the secret between two
regimes:
To compare them, we take their di¤erence, qLP1   qUE1 = 1 3 4+2   1 3 
= ( 3)( 1)
9 23+422+32 15 ; or
qLP1   qUE1 =
 (  3) (  1)
9  23 + 422 + 32   15 (3.26)
The sign of eq. (3.26) depends on the sign of the denominator because for all
values of 0 < ;  < 1; the numerator is positive. We have
qLP1   qUE1 =
+vez}|{

+vez }| {
(3  )
+vez }| {
(1  )
(42   3)2 + (32   15) + 9| {z }
Quadratic function of 
(3.27)
We have written the denominator as a quadratic function of  to sign the denomi-
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nator (See Appendix (3)). This function has two real roots of  in terms of ; 1 = 3
and 2 = 3(4 ) : Both of the roots are positive and higher than 1 for the valid values
of parameter ; with 1 > 2 : The sign of the denominator (a quadratic function)
depends on the interval determined by the factors and the sign of the term with 2;
which is 42   3 = 42(1   ) > 0 for all valid values of : It turns out that the
sign of the denominator is positive for all values below 2 and all values above 1; and
negative for all values between 1 and 2: The range of values of interest to us is the
interval between 0 and 1: Thus we note that the sign of the denominator is positive
here, and hence (3.26) turns out to be positive. In other words, the owner of the
secret produces a greater quantity under the LP regime as compared to that under
the UE regime.
(5) The violators quantity comparison between two regimes:
We take their di¤erence as qLP2v   qUE2v = 2 (1+3)+2
2
6+2( 4+)   13 
=  1
2
 2
22 32 5+3+3
9 23+422+32 15 ; or
qLP2v   qUE2v =  
1
2

222   32  5+ 3 + 3
9  23 + 422 + 32   15 (3.28)
The eq.(3.28) can be re-written as quadratic functions in both numerator and the
denominator (refer to eq.3.29). We have
qLP2v   qUE2v =
1
2

(3  22)2 + (5  3)   3
(42   3)2 + (32   15) + 9 (3.29)
Note that the denominator of eq.(3.29) is the same as that of eq.(3.27). We already
know that the sign of the denominator is positive, as found before. Thus the sign of
function depends on the sign of the numerator. We can sign the numerator in the
similar fashion by nding out the roots of  in terms of : We get two real roots of
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the function (3  22)2+(5  3)  3 as 1 = 1 and 2 = 32 3 : It is easy to check
that 1 > 2 for all valid values of ; 0 <  < 1: Further the minimum value of 1 is
1 in limit, and the minimum and the maximum values of 2 are  3 and  1 in limit.
The sign of the numerator depends on the interval and the sign of the term with 2
(given by 3   22 = (3   2) > 0): This quadratic function is positive (that is,
the same sign as that of (3  22)) for all values of  > 1 and  < 2 and negative
for the range 1 >  > 2: We know that  actually lies between 1 and 2 for all
; 0 <  < 1; thus the function (3   22)2 + (5   3)   3 is negative here. It
implies that the whole expression is negative; therefore the violator produces a lower
quantity under the LP regime as compared to that under the UE regime.
(6) The non-violators quantity comparison between two regimes:
The di¤erence between the quantity under the LP regime and the UE regime is
qLP2nv   qUE2nv = 2+( 3)6+2( 4)   13 
= ( 3)(1 )
2(9 23+422+32 15) ; or
qLP2nv   qUE2nv =
 (  3) (1  )
2(9  23 + 422 + 32   15) (3.30)
Eq.(3.30) can also be written as eq.(3.31) which is easier to sign.
qLP2nv   qUE2nv =
+vez}|{

 vez }| {
(  3)
+vez }| {
(1  )
2((42   3)2 + (32   15) + 9)| {z }
Quadratic function of 
(3.31)
It is clear from eq.(3.31) that the sign of the whole expression is negative because
of one negative term (   3): Note that the denominator is the same as in eq.(3.27)
and we have already proved that this is positive. Thus the non-violator produces a
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higher quantity under the UE regime than under the LP regime.
(7) Expected payo¤ of the owner of the secret under two regimes:
Reducing the payo¤under the UE regime from that under the LP regime, we get:
LP1   UE1 = 4 3+6
2( 2+)2+33(12 8+2)
4(3+( 4))2   1( 3)2
=
( 1)2(24 823+1222 43+382 60 24+45)
4(9 23+422+32 15)2
; or
LP1  UE1 =
 (  1)2  24   823 + 1222   43 + 382   60  24+ 45
4
 
9  23 + 422 + 32   152
(3.32)
Eq.(3.32) can be rewritten as
LP1  UE1 =
+vez}|{

+vez }| {
(  1)2
Quadratic function of z }| { 
(4   83 + 122)2 + (382   43   60) + 45  24
2
4
 
9  23 + 422 + 32   15| {z }
+ve
(3.33)
Note that the sign of the expression in eq.(3.33) depends on the sign of the
quadratic function of  because all other terms are positive. To know the sign of the
quadratic function, we follow the same procedure as before. We nd out the factors
of  in terms of : By solving this quadratic function, we get two real factors;
1 =
13 192+23 2p902 1233+614 135+6
122 83+4 ; and
2 =
13 192+23+2p902 1233+614 135+6
122 83+4
where 1 < 2: Again we nd out that the minimum value that 1 takes is higher
than 1 for values of ; 0 <  < 1 and thus the sign of the quadratic function would be
same as the sign of the term with 2; which is 4 83+122 = 2(2 8+12) > 0
for all ; 0 <  < 1: Thus the sign of the whole expression in eq.(3.33) is positive,
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implying that the expected prot of the owner of the secret is higher under the LP
regime as compared to that under the UE regime.
(8) Expected payo¤ of the violator between two regimes:
To know which one is higher, we take their di¤erence as, LP2v   UE2v
= (1 )(4 (1+12)+3(2+3)
2 723+22)
4(3+( 4+))2   1 ( 3)2
=
( 1)(744 1043 4833+7232+423+6822 1022 36+36+9)
4(9 23+422+32 15)2
; or
LP2v   UE2v =
(  1)  744   1043   4833 + 7232 + 423 + 6822   1022  36+ 36 + 9
4
 
9  23 + 422 + 32   152
(3.34)
We can draw this as a 3D diagram(ref. Figure3.4) again.
We observe from Figure 3.4 that the di¤erence can be both positive and negative
depending on the values of the parameters  and : For instance, for combination
of (; ) = (0:95; 0:80), the di¤erence LP2v   UE2v ; is positive. In fact for a range of
high values of parameters  and ; the violator earns higher prots under the LP
regime as compared to that under the UE regime. But for smaller values, for eg.
(; ) = (0:5; 0:5) the di¤erence LP2v   UE2v is negative, implying that the violator
earns a lower prot under the LP regime as compared to that under the UE regime.
(9) Expected payo¤ of the non-violator under two regimes:
The di¤erence between two payo¤s is given by:
LP2nv   UE2nv = (2+( 3+))
2
4(3+( 4+))2   ( 1( 3+)2 )
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Figure 3.4: The expected prot of the violator duplicator under the LP regime minus
that under the UE regime
=
( 3)(34 333 623+2222+52 31+12)
4(9 23+422+32 15)2
; or
LP2nv   UE2nv =
+vez}|{

 vez }| {
(  3)
Cubic function of 
(
 
4   33)3 + (222   63)2 + (52   31) + 12
4
 
9  23 + 422 + 32   152| {z }
+ve
(3.35)
Note that the sign of (3.35) would depend on the cubic function of  because we
already know the signs of other terms. If we nd that the sign of the cubic function
is positive, then we can be sure that the di¤erence is negative, because of the term
( 3); which is negative. We solve the cubic function (4 33)3+(222 63)2+
(52  31)+12 = 0 and nd the factors of this equation. We get three real factors,
as, 1 = 1 ; 2 =
52 19 p217 142+252
2(3 32) ; 3 =
52 19+p217 142+252
2(3 32) : The minimum
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values of all the factors for 0 <  < 1 are above 1, and thus the sign of the cubic
function for all the values of  lower than 1 would be same sign. Thus we can just
check the sign of the cubic function for any value of 0 < ;  < 1; which turns out to
be positive. Hence, the sign of the expression in (3.35) is negative, implying that the
non-violator earns a higher prot under the UE regime as compared to that under
the LP regime. Thus the duplicator who discovers the secret independently earns a
higher payo¤ under the UE regime.
(10) Total Production under two damage regimes:
We have
QUE  QLP = 1
2
+vez}|{
2
+vez }| {
(1  )
+vez }| {
(1  )
(42   3)2 + (32   15) + 9| {z }
Quadratic function of 
(3.36)
Note that all the terms in the numerator in (3.36) are positive and in the denom-
inator we have the quadratic function of ; which is already proved to be positive in
the discussion of (3.27). Therefore, the total quantity produced under the UE regime
is higher.
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Chapter 4
INFORMATION DIFFUSION AND
MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS: AN
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
This chapter undertakes an empirical investigation to analyse the impor-
tance of trade secrets to companies using a sample of rms in European
countries, "Survey on trade secrets and condential business information
in the internal market", prepared by Baker & McKenzie (BKM) (2013)
for the European Commission to understand the trade secret information
sharing and misappropriation incidences. A relationship between impor-
tance of trade secrets for the rms, information sharing and misappropri-
ation behavior is established. We nd that rms that share trade secrets
information with third parties, are more likely to face acts/attempts of
misappropriation of their trade secrets. We also nd that rms are more
likely to nd secrecy important for their inventive knowledge, technical in-
formation and business information if they make high usage of patents,
which points towards possible synergy between patents and secrecy. This
is in line with recent research on the complementary nature of patents and
trade secrecy.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to analyse the possible relationship between information sharing
and chances of misappropriation of trade secrets. There is little empirical work on
trade secrets as compared to other forms of intellectual property. In the existing
literature, trade secrets have mostly been studied with reference to patents. In this
chapter, however, we look at the BKM survey data, focused mainly on trade secrets.
We look at the possible relationship between the importance of trade secrets for the
rms and their trade secrets information sharing behaviour with other parties in the
industry. A relationship between trade secrets information sharing and misappropri-
ation of trade secrets is established later in this chapter.
It is well documented that secrecy1 is probably the oldest form of protection of
innovative knowledge (Jorda 2008). Trade secrets management is a tough task, which
involves not only keeping the secret knowledge safe within the organisation but also
safe transfers and sharing of the secret knowledge with external parties. Informa-
tion sharing is very important for technological and business needs of the rms in
this world of cutting edge technological advancements. It has long been argued that
corporates are not capable of going alonein terms of technological advancements,
especially in the markets where technologies are inherently interdependent (Quin-
tas et. al., 1997). Firms regularly need to acquire external information in order to
continuously innovate e¤ectively. In transferring and receiving knowledge across the
organisational boundaries, the rms need to balance two objectives; rstly they need
to be open to receive the information from the networks and external sources, and
secondly they need to protect their own intellectual capital from misappropriation,
and maintain secrecy of its trade secrets portfolio. Quintas et. al. (1997), call the
1We use the words trade secrets and secrecy interchangeably in this paper.
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risk associated with information sharing as a "boundary paradox"alliance partners
seeking knowledge and capabilities from external sources, while simultaneously fac-
ing the risk of exposing their own vital internal knowledge. Another problem with
information sharing is known as Arrows information paradox, which refers to the
situation where the sellers do not disclose information to buyers if there is no legal
protection, and therefore buyers are unable to value that information (Arrow, 1962).
Thus, the legal setup determines the ease with which rms can do the knowledge
transfer without facing misappropriation.
Corporations, especially in high-tech industries, are entering into an increasing
number of alliances for various compelling reasons (Norman, 2001). Firms may gain
many competitive advantages by having alliances with other rms in their industry, for
example, lower costs, shared risks and speedier entry into the market. Firms may also
gain access to external management and marketing technology. However, a potential
partner may also be hoping to gain access to a rms trade secrets knowledge and
capabilities. Norman (2001) presents an example which helps us to understand the
risk associated with vital information sharing with external parties. Apple engaged
Microsoft to develop several tools for the Mac, such as spreadsheet, database, and
graphical applications from 1982 to 1984. During this cooperation period, Microsoft
acquired critical knowledge about Graphical User Interface (GUI) products of Apple,
which probably helped Microsoft to develop the Windows operating system. Apple
had brought a suit against Microsoft after realising this loss of critical knowledge,
however it was unsuccessful.
This example points toward a distinction of the knowledge desired to be shared
and the knowledge that is probably appropriated unlawfully. Thus, there seems to be
a need for legal provisions to protect trade secrets information from misappropriation,
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and at the same time, for smoother sharing of the information that is desired to be
shared. The essence of the argument is that rms may not want to share all of their
trade secrets knowledge, but just a part of it. In that case, the law should protect
the interests of the parties who want to share some information, without the loss of
other information.
On the policy frontier, the European Commission (2013) has enacted a proposal
for a trade secrets Law Directive (IP/13/1176) on the protection of undisclosed know-
how and business information (trade secrets) against unlawful acquisition, use and
disclosure. It clearly shows that policymakers in the European Union (EU) are con-
cerned about unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of the secret information. The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), ratied by most of the states, protects secret
information in the United States (US). It has provisions to protect trade secrets of
the rms against improper means of appropriation by other parties. It may be noted
that there is no uniform law dealing with secrecy across the EU. However the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement provides for pro-
tection of trade secrets at a global level.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate a possible relationship between sharing
of trade secrets among rms and the chances of misappropriation of the secrets of the
involved parties. We investigate this relationship with the help of the BMK survey,
used for the report on trade secrets for the European Commission (2013). In particular
we look at correlations between trade secrets information sharing and the incidences
of misappropriation of secrets of the rms surveyed. We also look at the synergies
between usage of patents and the importance of secrecy for the rms surveyed. In
the next sections we present the relevant literature to motivate the discussion, the
data and survey technique used in the sample, econometric methodology used, and
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the econometric exercise respectively.
4.2 Related Literature
Traditionally economics literature on intellectual property management has focused
on patents. Trade secrets law was termed as a neglected orphan in economic analysis
(Friedman et al, 1991). It was documented that despite its importance for business
entities, trade secrets has not caught attention of economics scholar. However, many
researchers have worked in this area over the last two decades.
One of the most important papers where trade secrets and patents are compared
is Anton and Yao (2004). Their ndings suggest that rms use secrecy to protect
their big innovations and they patent only small innovations. Refer to section 1.1.2
from Chapter 1 to have a relook at the patents-secrecy mix theoretical literature.
Other than these theoretical advancements, several empirical studies have looked
at rms preferred choice of protection of their intellectual property portfolio. In
general, the results clearly point towards a high importance of trade secrets and other
non-patent protection mechanisms when compared to patents. Some of the empirical
papers are presented below.
A recent study on the usage of patenting by the United Kingdom (UK) rms brings
out interesting results. It is found that only 1.6% of all registered rms in the UK
engage in patenting (Hall et al. 2013). Furthermore, only 4% of the rms that report
engaging in R&D have applied for a patent in the UK or the European patent o¢ ce
during 1998-2006. They report that even for hi-tech manufacturing sectors, hardly
10% of the rms engage in patenting behaviour. They argue that this suggests that
rms do not patent all their patentable inventions automatically. Further, some rms
do not patent at all because of the perception of not having any additional benet by
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patenting, whereas some rms do not patent because of unpatentable inventions.
This highlights the importance of non-patent and unregistered protection mech-
anisms. In this section we present the ndings of other researchers regarding the
preferences of R&D rms among di¤erent appropriation mechanisms2. There have
been several studies based on European countries. They are summarised below.
Focusing on Swiss rms, Harabi (1995) found that patents were generally the least
e¤ective method of appropriation for both process as well as product innovations. His
results are based on a survey of 358 R&D executives of selected rms. He argues that
possibilities of inventing around and the perception that too much information is
disclosed in patent documents explain why patents are not considered e¤ective means
of appropriation. He points out that except in a few industries3, patents are not used
to appropriate technological innovations.
Arundel (2001) studies the relative e¤ectiveness of patents and secrecy as an ap-
propriation tool in Europe. He analyses data from the 1993 European Community
Innovation Survey4 (CIS) for R&D performing rms to observe the relative impor-
2Appropriation mechanisms include various options available to the rms to protect their innov-
ative knowledge. It may include secrecy, patenting, copyrights etc.
3In chemicals, including drugs, and sometimes the machinery and electrotechnics industries are
found to use patents as appropriability mechanisms.
4The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is a survey of innovation activity in enterprises
encompassing EU member states, EU candidate countries, Norway and Iceland. CIS provides
information on the characteristics of innovation activity at the enterprise level. Among various
other objectives, it serves to describe the innovation process, measure its economic inuence,
evaluate its e¤ects and assess its mechanisms. The survey concepts are in line with the recom-
mendations of the Oslo Manual (2d edition 1997). As part of the 1993 CIS, the questionnaire
asked respondents to appraise the e¤ectiveness of various protection methods for both product
and process innovations of patents, registration of design, complexity of process design, lead
time advantage over competitors, and secrecy. However questions related to preferred protection
mechanisms were eliminated in later CIS.
CIS information can be reached at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/cis
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tance of secrecy vs. patents5. His results show that in all size classes of rms, secrecy
is considered more important than patents. The authour studies two kinds of innova-
tions, namely product innovation and process innovation. He performed an ordered
logit analysis and discovered that as the size of the rm increases, the probability
that rms rate secrecy as more valuable than patents diminishes for product innova-
tion, while there exists no signicant association of such kind in the case of process
innovation. Further the rmsR&D intensity has no signicant e¤ect on the relative
value of secrecy and patents. Overall, it is found that secrecy is more important for
all size classes of rms for product innovation as well as for process innovations.
Hussinger (2005) studies the importance of patents vs. secrecy from a di¤erent
angle. Instead of looking at the rmsopinion about the relative importance of secrecy
and patents, she uses the protected inventions success (in terms of sales associated
with that invention) to assess the relative importance of patents and secrecy. She
uses the data of 389 German manufacturing rms from 1992 to 2000, and nds that
patents are more important than secrecy for product innovating rms. She nds a
positive correlation between patenting and proceeds from new products whereas no
such signicant relation exists for secrecy. Hussinger argues that rms might be using
patents more for the protection of product innovations, which may be subject to re-
engineering, whereas secrecy may be more useful to protect process innovations. She
suggests that the frequent use of secrecy may be interpreted as a useful tool to protect
the innovation in the early stages.
Gonzalez-Alvarez and Nieto-Antolin (2007) investigate the choice of protection
mechanisms using a sample of 258 Spanish manufacturing companies. Protection
mechanisms such as patents, industrial secrets, cost and time for imitation, and con-
5The survey was conducted in Norway together with six other EU countries: Germany, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland.
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tinuous innovation are considered. Knowledge is classied in two types: explicit and
tacit. Explicit knowledge is knowledge that is codied and can be reduced to specic
information such as formulas, diagrams, numbers, or words. Tacit knowledge cannot
be easily codied and resides essentially in the minds of individuals and patenting this
knowledge requires precision and the procedures can be extremely costly for compa-
nies. Their empirical analysis substantiate the stand that companies that mostly use
explicit knowledge are likely to choose patents as a protection mechanism, whereas
companies that hinge on tacit knowledge are likely to use trade secret protection more
intensively.
Moser (2007) presents an analysis of historic inventions and how inventors use
alternative appropriation methods. She examines a novel data set of around 7,219
American and British innovations, with and without patents, from four worlds fairs
between 1851 and 1915. It is argued that the possibility of keeping a secret may
explain the patenting decisions of rms and that inventors are likely to avoid patents
for innovations that can be kept secret. Scientic breakthroughs, which are likely to
be reverse-engineered by competitors, increase the propensity to patent an innovation.
Based on the exhibition data, the author derives insights as to when innovations are
likely to be patented, as well as the situations when scientic advances, which might
help reverse-engineering, weaken secrecy and encourage patenting. One of the ndings
is that rms patented just a small proportion of innovations. For instance in 1851, just
11% of British innovations were patented while the proportion was 15% for American
rms. This signies the importance of non-patent mechanisms of protection. It is also
found that the patenting rates signicantly di¤er among di¤erent industries. Urban
inventors are found to rely on patents relatively more.
Pajak (2010) studies whether large innovative rms rely on big secrets. Using the
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French part of CIS 4 dataset he analyses what kind of innovation is protected by
which kind of protection mechanism. He uses a bivariate probit model and nds that
in the intermediate goods industry, small innovations are patented while secrecy is
used to protect large ones. His ndings support the view that rms regard patents not
more useful than secrecy, and the higher use of secrecy limits di¤usion of knowledge
in society.
There are some other studies focusing on the US where they show that manufac-
turing rms rate secrecy more than patents for both product innovation as well as
process innovation. However there is one exception: In Japan rms give more rating
to patents for product innovation whereas secrecy is preferred in the case of process
innovation (Cohen et. al., 2000).
Levin et. al. (1987) present the empirical analysis based on a survey of US
high level R&D executives. Analysis of the survey data reveals that rms in many
industries regard appropriability mechanisms other than patents more e¤ective in ap-
propriating returns from innovation. For instance, lead time, speed down the learning
curve, and sales and service e¤orts are all found to be more e¤ective than patents
with respect to both process and product innovations. Secrecy is regarded more ef-
fective than patents for process innovations, but slightly less e¤ective than patents
for product innovations.
Cohen et. al. (2000) also analyse the e¤ectiveness of appropriation mechanisms.
Based on a survey questionnaire directed to 1478 R&D labs in the U.S. manufacturing
sector in 1994, they show that rms typically protect their invention with a range of
mechanisms, including patents, secrecy, lead time advantages and the use of com-
plementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities. But out of these alternative
mechanisms, the majority of manufacturing industries emphasize secrecy more than
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patents. They also argue that with a comparison to Levin et. al. (1987), the use of
secrecy has increased over time for most industries for product innovations.
Almeling et. al. (2010) presented the rst ever statistical analysis on trade secrets
litigation in federal courts in the US. They report ndings from 394 cases brought
under trade secrets law, in which courts issued a written opinion between 1950 and
2008. The focus of their analysis was on questions such as: what type of secret was
lost, who was the alleged misappropriator and what law did the courts apply. Some
of their ndings can be summarised as: i) Trade secrets litigation cases have grown
exponentially (trade secret cases doubled in the seven years from 1988 to 1995, and
doubled again in the nine years from 1995 to 2004) ; ii) In over 85% of the cases,
the owner of the secret knew the alleged misappropriator (either an employee or a
business partner), iii) The chances of trade secrets owners prevailing on a motion for
preliminary relief were better when they sued their employees as compared to when
they sued their business partners. This study provides the basic understanding of
trade secrets litigation in the US; however, it remains a descriptive statistical analysis.
The purpose of the current chapter is to understand the possible relationship be-
tween the sharing of trade secrets of the rms and the possibility of misappropriation
of its secrets, using the BMK sample of European rms. In the EU, the European
Commission has taken the issue of misappropriation seriously and has brought a pro-
posal for a uniform and strong protection across the EU. The European Commission
wants to bring a strong law to protect the secrets of European rms against unlawful
appropriation. This study may provide some policy advices in the process of modify-
ing the law. If it is found that rms that share their secret information with external
parties, are more likely to face misappropriation of their secret knowledge, it may in-
dicate possible problems with existing law governing technology transfers. With this
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information, the law makers would be in a better position to hit the target of pro-
tecting trade secrets of the rms in the EU. Therefore, our study has a direct policy
relevance. It may be noted here that after Arundel (2001), no study has been carried
out on trade secrets based on multiple countries in the EU. This chapter throws fresh
light on the importance of trade secrets knowledge of the rms, the synergy between
the usage of patents and secrecy, and the information sharing behaviour of the rms
in Europe.
4.3 Data and Survey Methodology
This chapter uses the data of the BMK survey for the EU report on trade secrets.
The methodology of data collection is based on the guidelines of the OSLO manual
3rd edition (2005) which is generally used to collect and interpret data on innovation,
developed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and EUROSTAT. This manual is used as a reference for empirical research on innova-
tion. It may be noted that the CIS, the biggest survey on innovation across Europe,
follows this manual for data collection. Trade Secrets have a much broader reach than
innovation because its scope goes beyond innovation6. The target population of the
survey was a subset of the EU business enterprise sectors which include both goods
producing and services producing industries (except public enterprises).
According to the OSLO manual, the enterprise is generally the most appropriate
statistical unit for the innovation data collection (Oslo manual, Chapter 4). The
enterprise is dened by the OSLO manual, Chapter 4, as the smallest combination
of legal units that is an organisational unit producing goods or services, which benets
from a certain degree of autonomy in decision making, especially for the allocation of
6For instance, customers lists can be trade secrets, even when there is no innovation involved.
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its current resources. It may carry out one or more activities at one or more locations
and it may be a combination of legal units, one legal unit or part of a legal unit.The
multinational corporations in the survey are considered as local independent branches.
Economic activities are classied in accordance to the NACE 7 rev. 2. The
selection of the economic sectors follows the CIS 2008 closely. However, not all the
sectors make intensive use of trade secrets8, thus, the survey was designed to include
the sectors with due consideration to the usage of trade secrets.
Only one person was in charge for responding to the questions in the survey,
the chief executive o¢ cer (CEO) or the managing director for small and medium
enterprises and the General Counsel for the large enterprises. The respondent might
have been the chief intellectual property counsel or the head of R&D department as
well.
The survey frame included the following countries; Austria, Belgium, Czech Re-
public, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The survey was carried out during November
14, 2012 to December 4, 2012, using web interviews and telephone interviews. The
sample was stratied so as to include at least two respondents for each activity and
each country: one small-medium and one large enterprise9.
7NACE (Nomenclature des Activités Économiques dans la Communauté Européenne) represents
a European industry standard classication system, which is similar to other standards like Stan-
dard Industry Classication (SIC) and North American Industry Classication System (NAICS)
for classifying business activities. This kind of classication allows us to compare rmseconomic
activities on a statistics basis.
8Some sectors do not make intensive use of trade secrets (the French CIS 2004 and 2006). For
instance, Mining and Quarryin, Wholesale trade, Transportation and storage, and Information
sevices activitesreport a low usage of trade secrets. For more information, refer to the report,
"Survey on trade Secrets and condential business information in the Internal Market (2013)".
9The EU report uses a total sample of 537 respondents. Among these 537 observations, there
were 51 observations of the companies which themselves chose to participate in the survey. In this
paper, we remove those self selected responses, therefore our sample size is 486.
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Business Sector Share (%)
Manufacturing: Textiles 6.79
Manufacturing: Chemicals and chemical 4.53
Manufacturing: Basic pharmaceutical 3.91
Manufacturing: Computer, electronic, optical 5.14
Manufacturing: Machinery and equipment 7.61
Manufacturing: Motor vehicles 3.50
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 4.12
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 0.82
Publishing activities 5.76
Telecommunications 2.26
Fast moving consumer goods 6.38
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 6.58
Financial and insurance activities 6.79
Scientic research and development 7.41
Legal and accounting activities 5.56
Biotech 0.00
Wholesale trade 4.53
Retail trade 0.21
Other 18.11
Table 4.1: Business Sectors Sampled and their relative shares in the sample
The survey process was as follows: the demographics of the sample were extracted
using systematic sampling with random numbers. The survey technique used was
structured questionnaire. The companies were contacted by phone and were informed
about the European statistical survey and that they had been chosen completely
random. They were asked to ll in the online survey then, with the credentials
provided to them. The questions were translated to the local languages for the specic
country in question. To monitor the data collection, three E-mail reminders and two
phone call reminders were used. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 present the share of di¤erent
industry sectors surveyed and share of countries surveyed.
We can gain many important insights related to the protection of trade secrets
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Countries Share (%)
Austria 7.82
Belgium 7.61
Czech Republic 7.82
Denmark 0.21
Finland 0.21
France 5.76
Germany 6.38
Hungary 8.85
Italy 12.14
The Netherlands 6.79
Poland 6.79
Slovenia 0.21
Spain 8.02
Sweden 8.02
Switzerland 7.00
United Kingdom 5.56
Ireland 0.21
USA 0.62
Table 4.2: Share of Firms in the sample by country
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among the European rms with this survey because of its richness. To understand
the data better, we present several summary characteristics of the variables used
in this study. We also analyse some other closely related issues. For instance, we
look at the synergy between the importance of trade secrets and usage of patents by
the rms. It has been argued that rms do not necessarily choose either secrecy or
patents, but might want to choose both of them (Ottoz and Cugno, 2008). We look
at the relationship between the importance of secrecy and importance of patents of
the surveyed rms.
Responses of rms to the question regarding the importance of trade secrets with
respect to technical information, business information and competitiveness and inno-
vative growth are presented below (Refer to Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3).
The gures clearly show a high importance of trade secrets in general for most cat-
egories. In particular, rms give a high value to secrecy for protection of product
technology, process know-how and R&D data in the technical information eld, and
nancial information and business planning, commercial bids and customer list in
the business information eld. For innovative growth and competitiveness of rms,
around 33% of the rms value secrecy highly, and 42% of the rms value secrecy to
be of medium importance.
Now we look at the issues of usage of patents by the rms, the trade secrets sharing
behaviour of rms and the misappropriation of secret information during the last 10
years, both inside the EU and outside the EU. Figure 4.4 represents the extent of
usage of patents of the rms surveyed. It comes from one of the questions in the
survey which asked ,"To what extent does your company rely on other intellectual
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Figure 4.1: Importance of TS for Technical Information
Figure 4.2: Importance of TS for Business Information
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Figure 4.3: Importance of TS for innovativeness and competitiveness
property rights10?" It is worth noting that most of the rms in the sample put a very
low emphasis on patents. Approximately 25% of the rms report having a high usage
of patents whereas nearly 20% rms report medium level usage of patents. However,
most rms put a low reliance on patents (nearly 28%). This is in line with the ndings
of all other studies discussed in the literature in the Related Literature section.
The question on the use of other intellectual property rights can be understood
better with the responses of the surveyed rms regarding the reasons to protect their
knowledge with secrecy as compared to other intellectual property rights. Most of
the rms report unwillingness to disclose information as the main reason to protect
their knowledge with secrecy. Referring to Figure 4.5 , we note that the second most
important reason is lack of eligibility of other protection measures whereas the third
10Other intellectual property rights included patents, copyrights, trademarks and designs in the
BKM survey questionnaire.
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Figure 4.4: Reliance of rms on patents
one is uncertainty of granting of other intellectual property rights11. Costs to manage
other intellectual property rights is also a consideration for the rms. Finally, some
rms think that the protection with other measures is not adequate when compared
to trade secrecy.
Figure 4.6 shows trade secrets sharing of the rms with third parties through
contracts or other arrangements, for e.g. know-how transfer, services know-how and
transfer or licensing of unpatented technology. We note that nearly 15% of the rms
share information regularly with other rms. Around 42% of the rms share infor-
mation occasionally whereas around 43% rms report no information sharing. In the
empirical section we look at the relationship of information sharing behaviour with
various variables such as the importance of secrecy, size of the rm, etc.
The question of information sharing was further supported by a question on the
reasons for not sharing information. Figure 4.7 represents the responses by the rms
11Please note that multiple answers were allowed, so we see that sum of all the options does not
sum upto 100 percent. For some other questions later, the same explanation applies.
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Figure 4.5: Reasons to use Secrecy as compared to other IP rights
Figure 4.6: Information Sharing with third parties
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Figure 4.7: Reasons for not sharing TS with other parties
for not sharing trade secrets information. Most of the rms consider "other strategic
reasons" to be the prime reason for not sharing, followed by fear of losing the secret
in the process of sharing information. Approximately 28% of the rms report having
no market for their know-how.
The rms were also asked about the ways in which rms in their business sector
obtain information about products, services and strategies of other market players. It
was an important question in the survey, as one of the options to this was espionage. It
may reveal some of the misappropriated ow of information among the rms indirectly.
Figure 4.8 shows the responses. Clients are the most important source to obtain
information, closely followed by suppliers of equipment. Firms also obtain information
through reverse engineering and employee mobility. It may be stressed here that there
may be restraints on employee mobility in some countries such as "covenants not to
compete" agreements. It is interesting to nd that rms report using espionage to
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Figure 4.8: In general, how do rms get information about products of other players
in your industry?
acquire knowledge, which point towards illegal transfers of knowledge in the market
more generally.
We also look at who may generally be responsible for acts of misappropriation of
rmssecrets. In other words, who poses a risk of leakage of secret knowledge for
the rms surveyed? Figure 4.9 presents the risk of leakage of trade secrets posed by
various players. It can be seen that competitors and former employees pose a high risk
to the rms, followed closely by current employees and clients of the rms. Overall,
almost all rms report having medium to high risk from employees, both former and
current, competitors, clients, internal and external consultants.
Figure 4.10 reveals the attempts/acts of misappropriation of secrets during last 10
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Figure 4.9: To what extent do the following pose a risk of leakage of TS to your rm?
years, both inside the EU and outside the EU region. It is observed that around 20% of
the rms surveyed had faced attempts/acts of misappropriation, out of which around
4% of the rms have experienced it more than 5 times. Further, rms have faced a
higher incidence of misappropriation behaviour inside the EU region as compared to
that of outside the EU region. It may be noted here that around 38% of the rms
surveyed report to be multinational entities.
The attempts/acts of misappropriation of secrets were carried out mainly by com-
petitors, former employees and customers for the rms surveyed. Figure 4.11 presents
the parties that were involved in acts or attempts of misappropriation of secrets of
the rms. Former employees are the second most reported cause of misappropriation
behavior. At this point, we may note that misappropriation behaviour by former
employees might be partly deterred by the imposition of "covenants not to compete"
clauses in employee contracts.
Finally, we look at the consequences of attempts/acts of misappropriation in terms
119
Figure 4.10: Misaapropriation of TS
Figure 4.11: Attempts/Acts of misappropriation carried out by di¤erent players
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Figure 4.12: Consequences of attempts/acts of misappropriation
of its e¤ects on sales of the nal products, changes in internal costs of protection,
litigation and negotiation costs.
Figure 4.12 presents the consequences of attempts/acts of misappropriation. We
nd that loss of sales, clients and contracts is the most important consequence of
misappropriation of trade secrets, as reported by the rms surveyed. Costs for in-
ternal investigation, costs for negotiations and settlement and costs of litigating have
also been reported to be consequences of misappropriation of trade secrets. Finally,
increased expenditure on protection measures is also reported to be a consequence of
misappropriation behaviour.
The summary statistics of the variables used in this study are presented in Table
4.3.
We looked at various variables of interest in this section, which we further analyse
with econometric analysis later. We found that most rms consider trade secrets
to be critical for their technical information, business information and innovative
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Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Multinational dummy 486 0.381 0.486 0 1
Short Lifecycle dummy 486 0.364 0.482 0 1
Manufacturing dummy 486 0.315 0.465 0 1
Small firms dummy 486 0.416 0.493 0 1
Medium firms dummy 486 0.210 0.408 0 1
Medium Patent Usage dummy 368 0.280 0.450 0 1
High Patent Usage dummy 368 0.342 0.475 0 1
Medium importance of Secrecy for
innovativeness and competitive growth
433 0.464 0.499 0 1
High importance of secrecy for
innovativeness and competitive growth
433 0.356 0.479 0 1
Medium importance of Secrecy of
technical information
486 0.247 0.432 0 1
High importance of secrecy of technical
information
486 0.638 0.481 0 1
Medium importance of Secrecy of
business information
486 0.243 0.429 0 1
High importance of Secrecy of business
information
486 0.689 0.463 0 1
Occasional information sharing dummy 486 0.418 0.494 0 1
Regular information sharing dummy 486 0.156 0.364 0 1
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in Empirical Analysis
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knowledge. It was found that the prime reason for the rms to protect their knowl-
edge with trade secrets as compared to other intellectual property rights was their
non-willingness to disclose their knowledge, followed by lack of eligibility of other in-
tellectual property rights and the costs to manage other intellectual property rights.
We also found that rms regularly share their trade secrets with external parties,
nearly 42% of them share their trade secrets occasionally, and nearly 16% of the rms
do it regularly. Finally, we found that signicant incidences of misappropriation of
trade secrets were reported by the rms, both inside the EU and outside the EU.
In the next section, we look at some other related issues that were analysed in
the BKM survey. The issues in the next section are not econometrically analysed
in the present chapter, but give important insights on the issues closely related to
the research questions of this chapter. For instance, we look at the risk of misap-
propriation of trade secrets during the last decade, the problems associated with no
uniformity in the rules of protection of trade secrets across the EU. We also look at
rmsinclination for a common protection regime for trade secrets in the EU and the
perceived e¤ects of a uniform legal structure dealing with trade secrets.
4.4 Other Related Issues Analysed in The Survey
In this section, we present several other related questions from the survey. The
related questions which will be covered in this section are not analysed in empirical
detail because they are not intrinsically related to the research question. However,
these issues do illustrate the context in which the survey was conducted and provide a
reective foundation from which to consider associated issues for future research. The
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Figure 4.13: During the last decade, what is the change in the risk of exposure to TS
misappropriation for the rms.
other issues from the survey relate to topics such as: the risk of misappropriation12
during the last decade, the problems faced by the rms during legal proceedings in the
EU, and the desirability of having a common framework of trade secrets protection
in the EU13.
One of the questions in the survey was whether the risk of misappropriation of
trade secrets has increased, remained constant, or decreased during the last 10 years.
We note that nearly 10% of the rms report signicantly increased risk of exposure
to trade secrets misappropriation and 4% report a moderate increase in the risk,
whereas nearly 45% of the rms report having no change. Nearly 24% report a
12Note that in our empirical analysis, we look at the actual incidence of misappropriation. In this
section, however, we report the responses of the rms about the perceived risk of misappropriation
of their trade secrets.
13The gures presented below are made from the rened survey data. Please read the "Data and
Survey Methodology" section for a discussion of how the data was rened from the BKM survey.
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Figure 4.14: Whether companies apply di¤erent TS protection measures in di¤erent
countries (in the EU)
reduced risk of exposure to trade secrets misappropriation. Thus, for most rms, the
risk has either increased or has remained constant during the last decade. One of
the main purposes of the survey was to understand the potential problems faced by
companies in the EU in protecting their trade secrets in the member states. Since
there is no uniform system dealing with secrecy in the EU, rms that operate in many
member states may nd it di¢ cult to manage their trade secrets portfolio (possibly
due to di¤erent rules and regulations in di¤erent member states). The rms were
asked whether they applied di¤erent protection measures in di¤erent countries in the
EU.
Figure 4.14 presents the responses of the rms to this question. Around 16%
of the rms apply di¤erent trade secrets protection measures in di¤erent countries,
around 31% of the rms do not apply di¤erent protection measures, nearly 10% of the
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rms have no opinion and, nally, around 30% of the rms report having no concern
with this question. Thus, rms do not seem to apply di¤erent protection measures in
di¤erent member states. In fact, most of them are not even concerned with the issue.
Another important aspect is to look at what happens when rms go to courts in the
cases of misappropriation of their trade secrets. The rms were asked whether they
sought legal remedies before courts located in the EU if they faced misappropriation
of their trade secrets during last 10 years. Around 10% of the rms, which faced
misappropriation, reported seeking legal remedies in the EU courts always, whereas
around 20% of them seek legal remedies in some cases only (Figure 4.15). Around
10% of the rms litigated outside the EU only. What is interesting to note is that
most rms just did not use legal remedies in cases of misappropriation of their trade
secrets.
Further, the rms were asked whether they were able to obtain specic remedies
or not, if they sought legal remedies against misappropriation of trade secrets within
the EU.
Figure 4.16 shows the responses of the rms regarding the remedies they could
obtain in misappropriation cases. Nearly 35 % of the rms that sought remedies in the
courts in the EU got criminal sanctions against the perpetrator, around 33% of them
report award of damages, and nearly 30% could get court orders to search and secure
evidence of misappropriation. Around 22% of the rms were able to obtain court
orders stopping the unlawful use of the misappropriated secret, nearly 15% report of
having none of the given remedies and nearly 15% could obtain monetary nes for
the organisations involved in misappropriation. Nearly 13% of the rms got orders
for the destruction of goods that were manufactured using the misappropriated trade
secrets, around 13% publication of the court decisions in the press, and lastly, nearly
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Figure 4.15: Did your company seek legal remedies before courts located in the EU
if it faced misappropriation of TS during last 10 years?
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Figure 4.16: Whether the rms were able to obtain remedies if they sought legal
remedies against misappropriation of TS in the EU.
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Figure 4.17: In case of litigation within the EU, if a company obtains an order from a
national court to stop the use of misappropriated TS in the territory of that Member
State, does it try to enforce this order in other Member States?
4% could obtain court orders for customs to seize goods at the EU border.
In case of litigation within the EU, if a rm obtains an order from a national
court to stop the use of misappropriated trade secrets in the territory of that member
state, can the rms then enforce this order in other member states as well? This has
implications for the rms that operate in multiple countries. Further, this is useful
to understand the need of a uniform trade secrets protection system in the EU.
Figure 4.17 presents the responses of the rms regarding the enforcement of court
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orders of one member state in the other member states. Most rms (around 28%)
reported that they tried to enforce the court orders in other member states but were
not successful in all member states in the EU. Nearly 21% of the rms reported using
the same court orders in all member states and they were successful in applying the
orders in all the member states. Around 15% of them preferred to start separate legal
actions in di¤erent countries, according to the relevant legal system, nearly 13% did
not try to enforce the same court orders in other countries because of the uncertainty
of the results in other member states, and around 10% were not concerned because
the case concerned only one member state. Finally, some rms (nearly 3%) thought
it too costly to seek legal protection in other member states, so they did not try to
enforce the court orders across multiple member states.
The rms were also asked about the reasons for not seeking remedies against
misappropriation in the EU. Figure 4.18 presents their responses.
We note that most rms (nearly 44%) nd it di¢ cult to collect evidences in mis-
appropriation cases, around 33% consider litigation costs to be the reason behind
not seeking legal remedies in the EU, almost 30% dont indulge in the legal proceed-
ings because they think that initiating legal action would bring the case to public
attention, and around 28% report inability to quantify damages as the reason. Some
rms also nd the expected duration of the litigation (28%), low value of the trade
secret in question or of damages caused (28%), lack of e¤ective legal remedies (22%),
preference for out-of-court settlement (22%), low probability of collecting awarded
damages (18%) and inability to identify the o¤ender (16%) to be deterrents for the
rms seeking legal remedies in the EU. Finally, lack of trust in the judicial system of
the relevant member state (13%) and the fear of losing the trade secret in court pro-
ceedings are the reported reasons. These responses highlight the perceived problems
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Figure 4.18: The reasons behind the rms not seeking legal remedies in the EU against
misappropriation
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that trade secrets owners face while deciding about carrying out legal proceedings in
the EU. It points out the possible shortcomings of the existing legal system in dealing
with trade secrets misappropriation.
Lastly we look at a set of questions revolving around the desirability of having
a uniform legal system of protection of trade secrets across the EU. The survey in-
cluded a question about the desirability of a new law ensuring that the national rules
providing relief against misappropriation of trade secrets also provide e¤ective and
equivalent protection across the EU. Almost 65% of the rms believe that the EU
should propose an EU legislation that ensures the uniformity of protection against
the misappropriation of trade secrets across the EU ( 30% of these rms do it pro-
vided that it does not lower the level of protection of trade secrets in countries where
their company is seated or operates). Figure 4.19 presents the responses of the rms
for the desirability of this proposal. Nearly 16% of the rms do not want the new
legislation whereas around 14% of the rms do not have any opinion.
The rms were asked directly whether they would benet from an EU legislation
establishing common rules for protection of trade secrets across all members. Figure
4.20 presents their responses on this issue.
Most rms want more clarity on what are the trade secrets to be protected by the
law (50%), and prohibition of acts of misappropriation of trade secrets and a den-
ition of such acts (40%). Thus, rms want clarity on what is protected and which
acts are prohibited by law regarding misappropriation of trade secrets. Firms also
want clear rules on criminal sanctions and/or nes for individuals and organisations
responsible for misappropriation of trade secrets (30%), rules on calculation of dam-
ages (30%), and rules ensuring the condentiality of the trade secrets during the court
proceedings (30%). Further, they want uniform contractual rules on non-compete and
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Figure 4.19: Should the European Commission should propose an EU legislation with
a view to ensuring that the national rules providing relief against the misappropriation
of TS provide e¤ective and equivalent protection across the EU?
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Figure 4.20: Whether companies benet from common legal rules on protection of
TS in the EU
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non-disclosure clauses between the trade secret owner and his/her employees (30%)
and applicability of national court orders to stop the unlawful use of the misappro-
priated trade secrets in the whole of the EU (28%). Lastly, they want national court
orders requiring all custom authorities in the EU to stop the movement of products
using misappropriated trade secrets at the borders (22%).
We look at the perceived positive and negative e¤ects for companies from possible
EU common rules on the protection of trade secrets from misappropriation. Figures
4.21 and Figure 4.22 present the perceived positive and negative e¤ects from common
EU rules for the rms.
On the positive side of having common rules, the rms believe that their trade
secrets would be better protected as the new rules are expected to be a deterrent to
misappropriation (45%), they also think that they will have greater legal certainty
and lower costs of litigation in other member states (39%). However, around 21%
of the rms perceive no positive e¤ects of having a common law. Some rms also
think that they would spend less resources for their company specic trade secrets
protection measures with the possible EU common rules (20%). Further, they perceive
having better opportunities to cooperate with other players for R&D and innovation
processes, i.e. network/collaborative innovation as opposed to in-house innovation
(18%), and they expect higher incentives to invest in R&D and innovation due to a
safer business environment (16%). Around 15% of the rms believe that they would
have greater returns from sharing, licensing or transferring know-how and nearly 11%
of the rms expect better conditions for accessing funding and venture capital if
the proposed common law for protection of trade secrets against misappropriation is
created.
Finally, we look at the perceived negative impacts from the possible EU common
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Figure 4.21: Perceived positive e¤ects for companies from possible EU common rules
on the protection of TS from misappropriation
136
Figure 4.22: Perceived negative e¤ects for companies from possible EU common rules
on the protection of TS from misappropriation
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rules. Figure 4.22 presents the responses of the rms. Most rms have no opinion
regarding the negative impacts (28%), around 23% of the rms perceive no negative
e¤ects from the common rules, nearly 22% of the rms think that the competing trade
secret holders may try to raise market barriers by carrying out abusive litigation, and
nearly 18% of the rms fear di¢ culty in carrying out incremental innovation due to
the possible common rule in the EU. Some rms also think that it may lead to waste
of resources on duplicative research (15%) and believe that it may lead to less labour
mobility as well (6%).
We looked at the questions of risk of misappropriation of trade secrets, di¢ culties
in proceeding legal actions due to di¤erent rules in di¤erent countries, reasons for
not using courts in EU member states, and the potential advantages/disadvantages
of having a common EU legislation for the protection of trade secrets. The risk
of misappropriation is reported to have remained constant during last 10 years for
most of the rms. Only a small fraction of the rms apply di¤erent trade secrets
protection measures in di¤erent countries (15%). Interestingly, most of the rms did
not seek legal remedies if they faced misappropriation in the last 10 years, whereas
approximately one third of them sought legal remedies in courts located in EUmember
states. The rms which sought legal remedies within the EU were able to obtain
criminal sanctions against perpetrators, award of damages and court orders stopping
the unlawful use of the misappropriated secrets. Most of the rms that obtained
protection from one member state were able to enforce protection in other member
states as well. However, some of the rms could not enforce the decision granted by
one member state in other member states because of the uncertainty of the results in
other member states. The reasons for rms not seeking legal remedies in the EU region
are mostly represented by the di¢ culties in collecting evidences, litigation costs, the
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fear of public attention and inability to quantify damages etc. We also note that rms
consider it benecial to have a potential uniform legal protection across all member
states in the EU, specially in terms of having clarity on what kind of trade secrets
can be protected, denition of acts of misappropriation of trade secrets, clear rules for
calculation of damages etc. However, some rms have expressed concerns over some
of the potential negative impacts too. For instance, rms fear abusive litigation,
di¢ culty in carrying out incremental innovation, waste of resources on duplicative
research and a lower labour mobility. These details point towards a need to build a
better legal system for the protection of trade secrets against misappropriation in the
EU.
The description of the issues described in this section provided detailed charac-
teristics of the themes closely related to the central theme of this chapter, i.e. trade
secrets sharing and misappropriation. This provided a clearer picture of rmsper-
ceived risk of misappropriation during the last decade. This description also provides
the rmspreferences for a common and stronger protection framework for trade se-
crets. This shows that rms feel the need of a stronger protection across the European
Union.
In later sections we look at the relationship between the importance of trade
secrets for their technical, business and innovative information and their reliance
on patents. We also look at the possible relationship between information sharing
and the importance of trade secrets for the rms. Finally, we try to understand
the potential relationship between trade secrets information sharing of the rms and
misappropriation of its secret knowledge.
The next section presents the methodology used for the econometric analysis.
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4.5 Econometric Methodology
Since most of the questions asked in the questionnaire are qualitative, where the
respondents had to choose between di¤erent categories, we may use an ordinal logit
model for econometric analysis. For instance, one of the questions to focus on here
is about the importance of trade secrets for the competitiveness/innovative growth
performance of the companies, where the responses can be: low, medium and high.
These responses are ordinal in nature, and hence we use an ordinal logit model to
analyse this dataset.
The ordinal logit model is widely used to analyse the responses of opinion surveys,
involving responses in categories which are ordinal in nature (Zavoina and Mckelvey,
1975). For instance, when the outcome of the opinion survey is coded as 0, 1, 2 ,3 etc.,
simple linear regression would treat the di¤erence between any two answers as equal,
whereas they are just ranking. For these responses we may use ordinal logit model.
The model is built around a latent regression in the following way (see Greene W,
2003 and Wooldridge J, 2002). Let y be an ordered response with values, f1; 2; 3::Jg
for some unknown integer J . We may then derive the standard ordered logit model
as follows:
y = x + 
where y is unobserved. Let 1 < 2::: < J be the unknown threshold parameters,
and dene
y = 0 if y  1
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y = 1 if 1 < y  2
y = 2 if 2 < y  3
::::::::
= J if y > J
which is a kind of censoring. It may be noted that for three categories, 0; 1; 2; we
would have two threshold points, 1 and 2: The respondents have their preferences
over the alternative categories of responses, which depend on certain observable fac-
tors x; and some unobservable factors  (with logistic distribution). The respondents
cannot report their y directly in the survey because there are given ordinal scales,
so they choose the one which is close to their own opinion, y:
In total, we estimate 9 models, which are as follows:
The independent variables for the rst three models are the same, and the de-
pendent variables are the importance of trade secrets for the rms competitive-
ness/innovative growth, technical information and their business information. The
dependent variables for models (1), (2) and (3) are as follows:
(1) For the rst model, IMPinnov = x + ; where IMPinnov represents the
importance of trade secrets for competitiveness/innovative growth performance of the
rms, which takes on the value 1 for low importance, 2 for medium importance and
3 for high importance.
141
(2) For the second model, IMPtech;= x + ; where IMPtech represents the
importance of trade secrets for technical information of the rms, which takes on the
value 1 for low importance, 2 for medium importance and 3 for high importance14.
(3) For the third model, IMPbuss = x + ; where IMPbuss represents the
importance of trade secrets for business information of the rms, which takes on the
value 1 for low importance, 2 for medium importance and 3 for high importance15.
The independent variables for these three models are the following:
a) Medium Patent Usage Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if the rms report
medium reliance on patents, else zero.
b) High Patent Usage Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if the rms report high
reliance on patents, else zero.
c) Multinational Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if the rm happens to be multi-
national, else zero.
d) Short Life-Cycle Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if rms produce the products
having a short life (less than 2 years).
e) Manufacturing Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if the rms principal activity
happens to be manufacturing (all kinds of manufacturing from Table 4.1), else zero.
f) Small Firms Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if rm has less than 50 employees,
14We constructed the variable importance of TS for technical information based on the sub-
categories of technical information. There were four categories of technical information, namely,
R&D data; process know-how and technology; formulae and recipes; and product technology,
with each of them receiving value 1 for low importance, 2 for medium importance and 3 for high
importance. We add these four values and divide them in three categories based on their sum,
similar to each of them as low, medium and high.
15We constructed the variable importance of TS for business information based on the sub-
categories of business information. The variable for importance of TS for business information
included four categories, namely, customer or supplier lists and related data; commercial bids,
contracts and contractual terms; marketing data and planning (advertising, market surveys, sales
gures and forecasts); and nancial information & buisenss planning. The importance of TS
for business information is then divided in three categories; low, medium and high, as for the
importance of technical information.
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in line with the OSLO manual.
g) Medium Firms Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if rm has less than 50-249
employees, in line with the OSLO manual.
h) Country Dummies: We include country dummies16 to take care of country
specic e¤ects. Country dummies are used with a reference category France. The
choice was random, however, it may be noted that trade secrets are considered as
intellectual property in France. The rms which report being the rms outside the
sampled countries, have been put under a banner "others".
For model (4), we have Infosharing = x + ; where Infosharing represents
trade secrets or commercial business information sharing of the rms with third par-
ties through contracts or other arrangements like know-how transfer licensing of un-
patented technology and services know-how etc. The variable takes on the value 1
if the rms never share their trade secrets information, 2 for occasional trade secrets
sharing and 3 for regular trade secrets sharing. The independent variables for model
(4) are as follows:
a) Medium importance of secrecy for innovativeness and competitive growth dummy:
It takes on the value 1 if rms report medium importance of trade secrets for innov-
ativeness and competitive growth of their rms, else zero.
b) High importance of secrecy for innovativeness and competitive growth dummy:
It takes on the value 1 if rms report high importance of trade secrets for innovative-
ness and competitive growth of their rms, else zero.
c) Multinational Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if the rm happens to be multi-
national, else zero.
16A dummy variable is a numerical variable used in regression analysis to represent subgroups of
the sample in an empirical study. For instance, France is the reference category for our regression
analysis. In terms of running regression, it means that all countries except France were kept in
regression. Thus, the co¢ cients of all other countries can be interpreted with respect to France.
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d) Short Life-Cycle Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if rms produce the products
having a short life (less than 2 years).
e) Manufacturing Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if the rms principal activity
happens to be manufacturing (all kinds of manufacturing from Table 4.1), else zero.
f) Small Firms Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if rm has less than 50 employees,
in line with the OSLO manual.
g) Medium Firms Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if rm has less than 50-249
employees, in line with the OSLO manual.
h) Country Dummies: We include country dummies to take care of country specic
e¤ects. Country dummies are used with a reference category France. The choice was
random, however, it may be noted that trade secrets are considered as intellectual
property in France. The rms which report being the rms outside the sampled
countries, have been put under a banner "others".
For model (5), the dependent variable remains the same as of model (4), we just
replace the independent variables a) and b) of the model (4) with medium importance
of secrecy for technical information, and high importance of secrecy for technical
information, which take on the value 1 if the rms report medium and high importance
of trade secrets for technical information respectively, else zero. All other independent
variables remain the same as of model (4). Similarly, for model (6), with the same
dependent variable, we replace the independent variables a) and b) of model (4)
with medium importance of secrecy for business information, and high importance of
secrecy for business information, which take on the value 1 if the rms report medium
and high importance of trade secrets for business information respectively, else zero.
All other independent variables remain the same as of model (4).
Finally, the models for nding the relationship of the misappropriation of trade
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secrets and information sharing, and the relationship of the misappropriation of trade
secrets and the perceived importance of trade secrets are given by models (7), (8) and
(9).
For model (7), we haveMisapp = x+ ; whereMisapp represents misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, which takes on the value 2 if the rm has faced misappropriation
more than 5 times inside the EU, or outside the EU, 1 if it faced lower than 5 incidences
in both inside and outside the EU, with at least one incidence of misappropriation
in either inside the EU or outside the EU; and the value 0 if it faced no incidence of
misappropriation. The independent variables are the following:
a) Medium importance of secrecy for innovativeness and competitive growth dummy:
It takes on the value 1 if rms report medium importance of trade secrets for innov-
ativeness and competitive growth of their rms, else zero.
b) High importance of secrecy for innovativeness and competitive growth dummy:
It takes on the value 1 if rms report high importance of trade secrets for innovative-
ness and competitive growth of their rms, else zero.
c) Occasional information sharing dummy: It takes on the value 1 if the rms
share information occasionally, else zero.
d) Regular information sharing dummy: It takes on the value 1 if the rms share
information regularly, else zero.
e) Multinational Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if the rm happens to be multi-
national, else zero.
f) Short Life-Cycle Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if rms produce the products
having a short life (less than 2 years).
g) Manufacturing Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if the rms principal activity
happens to be manufacturing (all kinds of manufacturing from Table 4.1), else zero.
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h) Small Firms Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if rm has less than 50 employees,
in line with the OSLO manual.
i) Medium Firms Dummy: It takes on the value 1 if rm has less than 50-249
employees, in line with the OSLO manual.
j) Country Dummies: We include country dummies to take care of country specic
e¤ects. Country dummies are used with a reference category France. The choice was
random, however, it may be noted that trade secrets are considered as intellectual
property in France. The rms which report being the rms outside the sampled
countries, have been put under a banner "others".
For model (8), the dependent variable remains the same as of model (7), we
just replace independent variables a) and b) of model (7) by medium importance of
secrecy for technical information and high importance of secrecy for technical infor-
mation respectively. All other independent variables remain the same as of model
(7). Similarly, for model (9), the dependent variable remains the same as model (7),
whereas the variables a) and b) of model (7) are replaced by medium importance of
secrecy for business information and high importance of secrecy for business infor-
mation respectively. All other independent variables remain the same as of model
(7).
We now move to the empirical analysis where we perform econometric analysis of
the models described above. We look at the importance of trade secrets for technical
information, business information and innovative growth of the rms, trade secrets
sharing and misappropriation of trade secrets with various independent variables.
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4.6 Empirical Analysis
As discussed in the previous sections, the main question of interest is whether rms
having higher trade secrets information sharing face a higher probability of misappro-
priation of a trade secret. It has implications for the law-makers if they want faster
di¤usion of knowledge. They may devise stricter laws to promote and protect infor-
mation sharing among rms. We rst focus on the factors that a¤ect information
sharing among rms.
Is information sharing bad for owners of trade secrets? Or, how does trade secret
sharing give rise to misappropriation incidences? Do rms face a higher incidence of
misappropriation if they share information regularly among each other? Safer trade
secrets sharing can be advantageous for rms to advance their technical know-how.
However, weaker trade secret law may be conducive to misappropriation behaviour
of trade secrets. This is also related to Arrows information paradox, which some
legal scholars claim to have been partially solved with trade secrets law (Lemley
2008). Even with the current laws, if rms observe misappropriation with higher
information sharing, it may be the result of Arrows explanation, or probably the
laws are too weak to protect information among the voluntarily information sharing
parties.
4.6.1 Importance of Trade Secrets for technical information, business information
and the innovative growth of rms
Firstly, we look at how the importance of trade secrets depends on various rm specic
characteristics, like, size of the rm, whether it is a multinational rm,whether it is a
manufacturing rm and whether rmsproducts are characterised by a short life term
or not. Further, the importance of secrecy is regressed on the usage of patents by the
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rm, in light of the possible substitutability or complementarity between the two in
the existing literature (Ottoz and Cugno, 2008), and country dummies are included
to look for possible di¤erences among the countries in terms of importance of secrecy.
The dependent variables used are valuation of rms given to secrecy for technical
information, business information and innovativeness and competitive growth of the
rms. All three dependent variables take on the value 1 for low valuation of secrecy, 2
for medium importance of secrecy and 3 for high importance of secrecy by the rms,
as described in the Econometric Methodology section. An ordinal logit regression
is performed for understanding the association between importance of secrecy and
various variables considered.
Before the discussion of the results, rst we describe the expected results from
this econometric exercise. For models (1), (2) and (3), the dependent variables are
the perceived importance of trade secrets for innovative and competitive growth of
the rms, the importance of trade secrets for their technical information and the
importance of trade secrets for their business information. The independent variables
are common to all three models and we expect their coe¢ cients to have the following
signs:
a) Medium Patent Usage Dummy: We would expect this to have a positive relation
with the importance of trade secrets for all three models, because of the complemen-
tarity of secrecy and patents, as argued by several researchers (e.g. Jorda, 2008, Ottoz
and Cugno, 2008, 2011). The reference category used for this dummy is low patent
usage, so the rms which have medium usage of patents, as compared to the rms
with low usage are expected to consider trade secrets to be more important. Thus,
for models (1), (2) and (3) we expect a positive and signicant sign with this variable.
b) High Patent Usage Dummy: Similar to the medium patent usage dummy, we
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expect this to have a positive and signicant sign. Again, the reference category is
low patent usage, thus, rms that have a high reliance on patents are expected to
have higher importance of trade secrets for innovative growth of their rms, for their
technical information and for their business information.
c) Multinational Dummy: For multinational rms, we expect the coe¢ cient to
have a positive sign, because rms that are multinational are expected to have better
technology with them. We would generally expect multinational rms to have a bigger
portfolio of intellectual assets, and thus may expect them to consider trade secrets
to be important for their critical information such as their innovative knowledge,
technical information and business information.
d) Short Life-Cycle Dummy: If a rm produces goods which generally have a
short life cycle, then we may expect them to put a lower importance on trade secrets.
This is because rms producing products with a life-cycle lower than 2 years might
not need to maintain secrecy because of the costs associated with maintaining trade
secrets. Therefore, we would generally expect a negative sign of the coe¢ cient of this
variable.
e) Manufacturing Dummy: For technical information and innovative knowledge,
we would expect manufacturing rms to have a positive relationship with importance
of trade secrets. This is because manufacturing rms are expected to be technology
driven and to maintain technology they might consider trade secrets to be important.
Gonzalez-Alvarez and Nieto-Antolin (2007), focusing on Spanish manufacturing rms,
nd that rms that are characterised by high usage of implicit knowledge, consider
secrecy to be important. Manufacturing rms are expected to be technically oriented
and thus might consider trade secrets to be important. For business information on
the other hand, the link does not seem to be very clear.
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f) Small Firms Dummy: We expect this coe¢ cient to be negative because the
reference category is large rms, and the small rms are expected to consider trade
secrets to be less important as compared to the large rms.
g) Medium Firms Dummy: Similarly we expect this coe¢ cient to be negative
because when compared to large rms, medium rms are probably expected to nd
trade secrets less important.
h) Country Dummies: We include country dummies to take care of country specic
e¤ects. The reference category is kept to be France. We may expect other countries
to di¤er positively or negatively as compared to France in terms of importance they
put on trade secrets.
Now, we turn to the regression outcomes for models (1), (2) and (3). Table 4.4
presents the results of ordinal logit regression of importance of trade secrets for in-
novative growth and competitiveness, technical information and business information
of the rms surveyed. We nd that rms that make high use of patents (in relation
to the rms who have low usage of patents) are more likely to value secrecy highly,
as interpreted with a positive and signicant coe¢ cient of "High Patent Usage" for
all kinds of areas. We also note that small and medium sized rms are less likely to
value secrecy highly as compared to large sized rms for the innovative growth and
competitiveness of the rms, interpreted from a negative and signicant sign. It is
also observed that multinational rms are likely to value secrecy highly for technical
information. Furthermore, it is noted that there are some di¤erences among countries
in terms of valuation that rms give to secrecy, as suggested by signicant coe¢ cients
of some countries (the reference category being France). Another interesting outcome
of this regression is that manufacturing rms are more likely to value secrecy highly
for technical information, whereas for business information, they are less likely to
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value secrecy highly as compared to non-manufacturing rms. It is intuitive because
manufacturing rms are expected to care more about technological secret informa-
tion as compared to the non-manufacturing rms which may value secrecy more for
business information.
Most of the ndings of the econometric analysis are consistent with the expected
outcomes. For instance, we see a clear complementarity between the use of trade
secrets and patents for all three models analysed here. Firms that rely heavily on
patents heavily seem to consider trade secrets important for their innovative growth,
technical information and business information. Manufacturing rms are found to
consider trade secrets to be important for their technical information, as interpreted
from the positive sign of its coe¢ cient. However, they do not seem to consider trade
secrets to be important for their innovative growth, as seen from its insignicant
coe¢ cient in the regression result. The negative coe¢ cient for the importance of
business information seems to suggest that manufacturing rms do not consider trade
secrets to be important for their business information. The size of the rms seems to
matter as far as importance of trade secrets for innovative growth is concerned. It
turns out that small and medium sized rms (as compared to large rms) consider
trade secrets to be less important for innovative growth of their rms. Firms that
produce short life-cycle products, that is their products life is shorter than 2 years,
do not consider trade secrets to be important for their innovative growth, whereas it
seems to have no relation with the importance of trade secrets for their technical and
business information.
4.6.2 Information Sharing and Instances of Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
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Regressors Importance of TS for
Innovative Growth
Importance of TS for
Technical Information
Importance of TS for
Business Information
(1) (2) (3)
Medium Patent Usage 0.311
(0.272)
1.101***
(0.277)
0.543*
(0.281)
High Patent Usage 1.664***
(0.285)
2.624***
(0.351)
1.713***
(0.336)
Multinational Dummy -0.115
(0.252)
0.566**
(0.284)
0.083
(0.285)
Short Lifecycle Dummy -0.457**
(0.232)
-0.114
(0.255)
0.269
(0.257)
Manufacturing Dummy -0.138
(0.238)
0.645**
(0.271)
-0.561**
(0.262)
Small firms dummy -0.675**
(0.287)
-0.538*
(0.307)
-0.340
(0.307)
Medium firms dummy -0.599**
(0.294)
0.312
(0.348)
0.495
(0.347)
Country Dummies
(Reference category France)
Austria 1.410**
(0.588)
-0.566
(0.635)
0.276
(0.681)
Belgium 0.515
(0.602)
0.518
(0.693)
0.149
(0.701)
Czech Republic -0.267
(0.592)
0.033
(0.664)
-0.342
(0.670)
Germany 1.429**
(0.661)
0.474
(0.697)
0.420
(0.746)
Hungary 1.347**
(0.586)
0.649
(0.688)
0.375
(0.705)
Italy 1.044*
(0.575)
1.450**
(0.691)
0.051
(0.660)
The Netherlands 0.094
(0.632)
-0.543
(0.690)
-0.815
(0.703)
Poland -0.069
(0.636)
-0.193
(0.727)
-0.834
(0.724)
Spain 1.129**
(0.576)
0.638
(0.659)
0.475
(0.697)
Sweden 0.655
(0.589)
-0.150
(0.641)
-0.306
(0.658)
Switzerland -0.291
(0.597)
-0.088
(0.675)
0.389
(0.741)
Great Britain 1.027
(0.678)
-0.005
(0.716)
-0.593
(0.734)
Others 16.539
(827)
15.668
(911)
14.601
(973)
No. of Observations 351 368 368
LR chi2(33) 95.47 148.36 66.34
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.221 0.113
Note: Standard Errors are in brackets. Significance at 1% ***, at 5% **, at 10% *
Table 4.4: Ordinal Logit: Importance of TS for technical information, business infor-
mation and innovative growth and competitiveness of rms and usage of patents
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Next we look at the sharing of trade secrets by the rms and its potential relation-
ship with the importance of trade secrets for innovative growth and competitiveness,
technical information and business information of the rms. Table 4.5 presents the
ordered logit regression of models (4), (5) and (6), that is regressing trade secrets
information sharing by the rms on the importance of secrecy for innovative growth
and competitiveness of the rms, of technical information and of business information,
and various other rmscharacteristics; whether the rm is a multinational, whether
the products it produces are characterised by a short life cycle, whether it happens
to be a manufacturing rm and the size of the rms.
We rst discuss the expected relationships of the variables with trade secrets
sharing. For model (4), (5) and (6), except for the rst two independent variables, all
other variables are the same. We denote the rst two variables of model (4); (5); and
(6) by 4.a) and 4.b); 5.a) and 5.b); and 6.a) and 6.b) respectively. After describing the
rst two independent variables of all these models, we will describe all other variables
which are common to all these models. We have:
4.a) Medium importance of secrecy for innovativeness and competitive growth:
We expect this to have a positive sign in the regression result because rms that
consider trade secrets to be important for their innovative growth are expected to
have a bigger portfolio of secret knowledge and thus may indulge in the optimum
usage of their trade secrets by sharing it with their partners. Firms regularly acquire
external knowledge and share their technology (Quintas et. al., 1997).
4.b) High importance of secrecy for innovativeness and competitive growth: Sim-
ilarly, rms that give high importance to trade secrets (as compared to those rms
that give low importance) are expected to share information with external parties to
optimally use their secret knowledge and gain critical knowledge of other rms.
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5.a) Medium importance of secrecy for technical information: For technical infor-
mation as well, we expect a positive and signicant sign because rms that consider
trade secrets to be important for their technical information are expected to share
their secret information and obtain the critical knowledge of other rms.
5.b) High importance of secrecy for technical information: Again, we expect a
positive sign for the similar reasons mentioned above.
6.a) Medium importance of secrecy for business information: It is not clear whether
rms may want to share their business information with external parties or not. We
may expect an insignicant relationship between medium importance of secrecy for
business information and trade secrets sharing behaviour of the rms.
6.b) High importance of secrecy for business information: Similar to the medium
importance, we expect an insignicant relationship between this variable and trade
secrets sharing behaviour of the rms.
All other independent variables are same for all these three models which are:
c) Multinational Dummy: For multinational rms, we expect the coe¢ cient to
have a positive sign, because rms that are multinational are expected to have more
technology partners across borders and access to better technology.
d) Short Life-Cycle Dummy: For the rms that produce goods with a short life-
time, we would not expect them to share trade secrets with external parties because
they might not maintain a portfolio of secret information. In fact, secrecy is impor-
tant for the rms only if it can be maintained for a reasonable amount of time. If
the rmsproducts do not last long, there may be no demand of their trade secrets
knowledge. Thus, we may expect an insignicant relationship with this variable.
e) Manufacturing Dummy: Manufacturing rms are generally technology centered
and thus may share trade secrets information with their partners in the industry. We
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may expect a positive sign of this variable.
f) Small Firms Dummy: We expect this coe¢ cient to be negative because the
reference category is large rms, and the small rms are expected to share less infor-
mation as compared to the large rms. Large rms are generally expected to have
a big trade secrets portfolio and better technology transfer collaborations. Thus we
expect the sign to be negative for small rms dummy.
g) Medium Firms Dummy: Similarly we expect this coe¢ cient to be negative
because when compared to large rms, medium rms are probably less expected to
share their trade secrets.
h) Country Dummies: We include country dummies to take care of country specic
e¤ects. The reference category is kept to be France. We may expect other countries
to di¤er positively or negatively as compared to France in terms of sharing of trade
secrets among rms.
From the results, we interpret that rms are more likely to share secret information
with third parties (using know-how transfer, licensing of unpatented knowledge etc.)
if they put medium or high value to the use of secrecy for innovative knowledge in their
rms. Further, small rms are less likely to share secret information as compared to
large rms, as suggested by a negative and signicant coe¢ cient. Again most of the
results are in line with the expected outcomes. However, we nd that the importance
of trade secrets for technical information and business information are not signicantly
related to the trade secrets sharing behaviour. Probably rms share the information
which a¤ects their innovativeness and not their technical and business information
with external parties. This may happen due to the need for trade secrets sharing to
develop inventive knowledge whereas sharing trade secrets for technical information
and business information may not be benecial for the rms.
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Dependent Variable: TS information Sharing
(4) (5) (6)
Medium importance of Secrecy for
innovativeness and competitive growth
0.676**
(0.276)
High importance of secrecy for
innovativeness and competitive growth
0.908***
(0.301)
Medium importance of Secrecy of
technical information
0.390
(0.325)
High importance of secrecy of technical
information
0.309
(0.304)
Medium importance of Secrecy of
business information
0.104
(0.400)
High importance of secrecy of business
information
0.240
(0.380)
Multinational Dummy
0.285
(0.218)
0.450**
(0.208)
0.444**
(0.206)
Short Lifecycle Dummy
-0.039
(0.199)
0.079
(0.187)
0.077
(0.186)
Manufacturing Dummy
-0.281
(0.205)
-0.254
(0.196)
-0.220
(0.195)
Small firms dummy
-0.623***
(0.244)
-0.724***
(0.226)
-0.709***
(0.225)
Medium firms dummy
-0.353
(0.256)
-0.383
(0.248)
-0.373
(0.247)
Country Dummies
(Reference category France)
Austria 0.509
(0.526)
0.561
(0.491)
0.554
(0.491)
Belgium 0.081
(0.521)
0.175
(0.494)
0.180
(0.494)
Czech Republic 0.321
(0.513)
0.531
(0.488)
0.553
(0.488)
Germany -0.496
(0.571)
-0.325
(0.528)
-0.348
(0.528)
Hungary -0.851
(0.522)
-0.391
(0.490)
-0.396
(0.489)
Italy -0.160
(0.490)
0.093
(0.465)
0.109
(0.462)
The Netherlands 0.474
(0.544)
0.441
(0.511)
0.442
(0.511)
Poland 0.216
(0.530)
0.235
(0.495)
0.215
(0.494)
Spain 0.623
(0.516)
1.056**
(0.492)
1.057**
(0.492)
Sweden 0.413
(0.514)
0.532
(0.486)
0.591
(0.484)
Switzerland 0.257
(0.522)
0.643
(0.497)
0.640
(0.497)
Great Britain -0.535
(0.584)
-0.453
(0.541)
-0.426
(0.540)
Others 0.655
(0.826)
1.101
(0.748)
1.071
(0.747)
No. of Observations 433 486 486
LR chi2(36) 45.68 50.25 49.45
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0516 0.0508 0.0500
Note: Standard Errors are in brackets. Significance at 1% ***, at 5% **, at 10% *
Table 4.5: Ordinal Logit: TS sharing with external parties and importance of TS for
innovative growth and competitiveness, technical information and business informa-
tion
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For a safer sharing of inventive knowledge among rms, a strong legal protection
against potential improper acquisition of trade secrets by external parties is required.
Next we look at the relationship between information sharing and misappropriation
of trade secrets, and the importance of trade secrets and their misappropriation. This
will help us understand the probability of rms facing misappropriation if they share
their trade secrets with external agents. This will have a direct policy implication
regarding strengthening of trade secrets laws against improper acquisition of secrets
of the rms. There was a question in the survey regarding the misappropriation
instances during last 10 years, both within the EU region and outside the EU region.
We rst discuss the expected relationships of the variables with incidences of
misappropriation. For model (7), (8) and (9), except for the rst two independent
variables, all other variables are the same. We denote the rst two variables of model
(7); (8); and (9) by 7.a) and 7.b); 8.a) and 8.b); and 9.a) and 9.b) respectively. After
describing the rst two independent variables of all these models, we will describe all
other variables which are common to all these models. We have:
7.a) Medium importance of secrecy for innovativeness and competitive growth: We
expect this to have a positive sign in the regression result because rms that consider
trade secrets to be important for their innovative growth are expected to have a large
portfolio of secret knowledge and thus may indulge in collaborations with external
parties, which may lead to possible misappropriation of their secrets.
7.b) High importance of secrecy for innovativeness and competitive growth: Sim-
ilarly, rms that give high importance to trade secrets (as compared to those rms
that give low importance) are expected to share information with external parties,
and thus face higher risk of misappropriation.
8.a) Medium importance of secrecy for technical information: For technical infor-
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mation as well, we expect a positive and signicant sign because rms that consider
trade secrets to be important for their technical information are expected to indulge
in trade secrets sharing with other rms. Thus they may face higher misappropriation
chances.
8.b) High importance of secrecy for technical information: Again, we expect a
positive sign for the similar reasons mentioned above.
9.a) Medium importance of secrecy for business information: It is not clear whether
rms may want to share their business information with external parties, and thus
they may not face incidences of misappropriation. We may expect an insignicant
relationship between medium importance of secrecy for business information and trade
secrets sharing behaviour of the rms.
9.b) High importance of secrecy for business information: With the rms which
give high importance to secrecy for business information, we may expect a positive sign
because if the value of secrets is high, the employees of the rms, or the competitors
may want to misappropriate it.
All other independent variables are the same for all these three models which are:
c) Occasional information sharing dummy: The relationship of trade secrets shar-
ing and its misappropriation is the most important relationship of interest in this
chapter. We expect this to have a positive and signicant sign because when rms
share trade secrets information occasionally (as compared to no trade secrets shar-
ing) with external parties, the chances of misappropriation of their trade secrets are
expected to increase.
d) Regular information sharing: We expect this sign to be positive and signicant
as well. When rms share their trade secrets information on a regular basis they are
expected to face a high probability of misappropriation of their secrets. It would be
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especially true if the legal system governing trade secrets sharing is weak.
e) Multinational Dummy: For multinational rms, we may expect the coe¢ cient to
have a positive sign, because multinational entities are generally spread in many coun-
tries and the business environment of di¤erent countries may have di¤erent chances of
facing misappropriation. Further, the trade secrets information might also be spread
in many di¤erent locations, and thus the chances of misappropriation may be higher.
f) Short Life-Cycle Dummy: We expect this to have a negative coe¢ cient since
rms with short life products may not possess high valued secrets, and thus may face
lower chances of misappropriation of their trade secrets.
g) Manufacturing Dummy: Manufacturing rms are generally technology centered
and may require to share trade secrets with many employees in the process of pro-
duction. It is expected to increase the possibilities of misappropriation of rmstrade
secrets. Thus we may expect a positive sign of this variable.
h) Small Firms Dummy: As compared to large rms, small rms are expected to
face lower chances of misappropriation because they may have smaller trade secrets
portfolios and thus may protect them better. Thus we expect the sign to be negative
for small rms dummy.
i) Medium Firms Dummy: Similarly we expect this coe¢ cient to be negative
because when compared to large rms, medium rms are probably less prone to
misappropriation.
j) Country Dummies: We include country dummies to take care of country specic
e¤ects. The reference category is kept to be France. We may expect other countries
to di¤er positively or negatively as compared to France in terms of misappropriation
of trade secrets of the rms.
Table 4.6 represents the regression results. Most of the ndings are as expected.
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For instance, we nd that rms which consider trade secrets for innovativeness and
competitive growth to be important are more likely to face misappropriation, given
by the positive and signicant coe¢ cients for both medium valuing and high valuing
rms. Firms having medium and high importance of secrecy for technical and busi-
ness information are expected to face higher misappropriation as compared to the
rms with low importance of trade secrets. Further, the rms sharing trade secrets
information are more likely to face misappropriation, suggesting that there might be
a need for stronger laws to protect the rms which want to share the secret informa-
tion. We also nd that manufacturing rms, and rms producing products which are
characterised by a short life-cycle (less than 2 years) are more likely to face higher
incidences of misappropriation.
Overall, we interpret that rms sharing general secret information with other par-
ties are more likely to face misappropriation of their trade secrets. Thus, lawmakers
might want to modify the legal system17 to enhance freer information sharing because
di¤usion of knowledge is a desirable outcome for the growth of innovative knowledge
in general. However, we also note that this should not lead to collusive behaviour
among rms. Trade secrets sharing should promote technical advancements without
giving rise to collusive behaviour among rms. The competition authorities should
pay attention to this possibility. The responses of this survey reveal that rms sharing
information with third parties are more likely to face misappropriation as compared
to the rms with no information sharing. Thus, the lawmakers may want to enhance
the legal set up to allow for more di¤usion without rms losing control over their
trade secrets.
17Note that it is beyond the objective of this paper to suggest the legal instruments which might
be used to strengthen the current legal system of protection of trade secrets to reduce misappro-
priation incidences.
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Dependent Variable: Misappropriation of TS
(7) (8) (9)
Medium importance of Secrecy for innovativeness and competitive
growth
0.954**
(0.414)
High importance of secrecy for innovativeness and competitive
growth
1.467***
(0.440)
Medium importance of Secrecy for technical information 1.607***
(0.591)
High importance of secrecy for technical information 1.475***
(0.575)
Medium importance of Secrecy for business information 1.584*
(0.825)
High importance of secrecy for business information 2.169***
(0.801)
Occasional information sharing dummy 0.733**
(0.293)
0.854***
(0.279)
0.881***
(0.279)
Regular information sharing dummy 1.304***
(0.357)
1.352***
(0.345)
1.373***
(0.348)
Multinational Dummy 0.437
(0.273)
0.494*
(0.269)
0.506
(0.266)
Short Lifecycle Dummy 0.604**
(0.253)
0.450*
(0.242)
0.450
(0.242)
Manufacturing Dummy 0.769***
(0.259)
0.622**
(0.250)
0.810
(0.254)
Small firms dummy -0.094
(0.316)
-0.330
(0.305)
-0.215
(0.304)
Medium firms dummy 0.017
(0.320)
-0.123
(0.312)
-0.118
(0.313)
Country Dummies
(Reference category France)
Austria -1.966***
(0.646)
-1.571**
(0.622)
-1.740***
(0.625)
Belgium -0.798
(0.603)
-0.740
(0.590)
-0.757
(0.588)
Czech Republic -0.123
(0.572)
-0.041
(0.553)
0.028
(0.554)
Germany -1.725**
(0.710)
-1.165*
(0.644)
-1.278**
(0.649)
Hungary -1.680***
(0.623)
-1.461**
(0.599)
-1.534***
(0.599)
Italy -1.855***
(0.597)
-1.611**
(0.580)
-1.639***
(0.580)
The Netherlands -1.187*
(0.641)
-1.121*
(0.617)
-1.149*
(0.618)
Poland -2.742***
(0.873)
-1.864***
(0.697)
-1.918***
(0.700)
Spain -2.030***
(0.634)
-1.810***
(0.614)
-1.816***
(0.616)
Sweden -1.414**
(0.630)
-1.263**
(0.592)
-1.178**
(0.596)
Switzerland -0.274
(0.598)
-0.274
(0.576)
-0.375
(0.584)
Great Britain -1.738**
(0.789)
-1.720**
(0.765)
-1.610**
(0.768)
Others 0.306
(0.853)
0.780
(0.775)
0.606
(0.775)
No. of Observations 486 486 486
LR chi2(36) 89.11 92.03 95.79
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1454 0.1391 0.1448
Note: Standard Errors are in brackets. Significance at 1% ***, at 5% **, at 10% *
Table 4.6: Ordinal Logit: Misappropriation of TS, infomation sharing behavior and
importance of TS for innovative knowledge and competitiveness for the rms
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4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we looked at the existing empirical literature on Trade Secrets. It is
observed that the existing literature studies trade secrets with relation to patents in
a general manner. This chapter, however, looks at trade secrets specically, using
a novel survey data. The survey report on trade secrets for the EU (2014) gives an
opportunity to look at specic issues of trade secrets in Europe. An econometric
analysis is carried out using this data to understand the misappropriation behaviour
among the rms in the EU.
Our main ndings can be summarised as follows; i) we found that the rms which
consider trade secrets to be important also face a higher possibility of facing misap-
propriation of their trade secrets; ii) we also found that rms that make high use
of patents are more likely to consider trade secrets important, which is often argued
in the theoretical literature on the relationship between trade secrets and patents
(Ottoz and Cugno, 2008; Jorda, 2008); iii) Furthermore, rms that share information
(as compared to the ones that do not) with external parties are more likely to face
misappropriation.
This points toward a need to protect the di¤usion objective of the law makers.
If the rms can not share information without the fear of loss of their secrets, the
information ow is restricted, and this might be bad for the society as di¤usion
of knowledge is very important for knowledge advancements. The policy makers
may need to redraft the legal system to allow for misappropriation-free transfer of
knowledge.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In this thesis, we analysed law and economic issues revolving around trade secrets.
The goal was to analyse the trade secret law and provide policy recommendations.
All chapters of this thesis were interconnected because they analyse various aspects
of the same subject matter, trade secrets.
Trade secrets is a topic of great importance in both developed and developing
countries where the intellectual property regime and enforcement may encourage the
use of Trade Secrets over other kinds of protection mechanisms. The eld of trade
secrets is becoming more and more important in the academic literature because of
an increasing number of cases in the media where trade secret regulation has come
under the microscope. An e¤ect of the increase in the focus on trade secrets as
an academic topic is that theoretical and empirical frameworks have started to be
established. However, no academic literature has covered the important topics of:
the optimal scope of trade secrets law; damages (lost prots vs. unjust enrichment)
in case of miappropriation of trade secrets; and, the actual misappropriation of secrets
on European rms. This thesis, in examining trade secrets, looked at these important
areas of study. Given the lack of previous research on these topics, the results of the
current thesis are particularly important. Indeed, as results from the fourth chapter
show, given the actual rate of missapropriation of secrets faced by European rms,
policy recommendations formed as a result of this thesis would be well founded.
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The second chapter of this thesis presented the analysis regarding the desired
strength of trade secrets law. This chapter covered a broad research area which
analysed how strong the protection should be. The optimal scope of protection of
trade secrets was studied in light of the positive and negative e¤ects of stronger pro-
tection on the elasticity of innovation with respect to the strength of trade secrets
law. The e¤ects on social welfare were also taken into consideration while analysing
the optimal scope. It was shown that there existed a tension between two compet-
ing objectives of promoting innovation and facilitating di¤usion of knowledge. The
optimality required a balance of these two goals. This chapter provided a fundamen-
tal rule to determine the optimal scope of trade secrets law. Further, it was shown
that markets characterised by a signicant degree of product di¤erentiation required
weaker protection of trade secrets.
The next core chapter of this thesis, Chapter 3, looked at what happens when the
owner of the secret faced misappropriation of her trade secrets. Legal remedies in
the case of misappropriation were discussed with a focus on damages. Two damage
regimes were compared in terms of their e¤ects on the owner of the secret, competitors
and social welfare. This chapter was a logical consequence to the previous one where
we discussed the optimal strength of law. The strength of the law has implications for
the remedies in case of misappropriation of trade secrets. If the law protecting trade
secrets is strong, the remedies are expected to be strong as well. The comparison
of the two most used damage regimes, i.e. the lost prots damage regime and the
unjust enrichment regime, was carried out using a model of asymmetric information
where the owner of the secret did not know whether the duplicator he faced had
developed the same secret knowledge by independent research or had misappropriated
the secret. The comparison gave useful results in terms of policy implications. For
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instance, the policy makers may want to opt for the damage regime which exhibits a
lower deadweight loss. After these two core chapters of this thesis, we moved to the
third core chapter, Chapter 4, which analysed a novel survey data of European rms
econometrically.
The focus of Chapter 4 was on actual misappropriation faced by the European
rms. This chapter established a relationship between trade secrets sharing and mis-
appropriation incidences. Using an ordered logistic model, we found that rms that
share their trade secrets with third parties were more probable to face misappropri-
ation compared to rms that did not share their trade secrets. We pointed towards
possible weakness of the existing trade secrets law because of which rms might be
facing misappropriation when they shared the secret information among each other.
Several other important relationships were also reviewed. For example, several theo-
retical papers in this area have established that patents and secrecy are complements
to each other rather than being substitutes. We actually tested this hypothesis with
the Baker & McKenzie reports survey data and found that rms that have a high
use of patents make high use of secrecy as well. Overall, three core chapters of this
thesis have essentially focused on three pillars of law and economics of trade secrets,
which are:
i) Before the innovation: How to draw boundaries between "what is allowed" and
"what is not allowed" while drafting trade secrets law?
ii) After the innovation: Once the owner of the secret loses his secret, what reme-
dies are available? Which damage regime (the lost prots regime or the unjust enrich-
ment regime) provides better protection to the owner of the secret. Which damage
regime provides higher ex-post welfare?
iii) Checks on the existing law: Is there any relationship between trade secrets
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sharing and misappropriation incidences? Are patents and trade secrets compliments
or substitutes?
These three chapters together looked at the central theme of trade secrets law,
that is, how to draft the law, how to provide damages in case of misappropriation, and
whether the existing laws are weak in terms of providing e¤ective protection against
misappropriation. It is noted that the European Commission is strengthening the
existing legal protection to trade secret owners by bringing a harmonised protection
system across the European Union.
We summarise the results and ndings of the core chapters of this thesis as follows.
The second chapter of this thesis analysed the optimal scope of trade secrets law.
It was shown that with stronger protection of trade secrets, the secret owner reduced
her e¤orts in keeping the secret and the imitator reduced her e¤orts in extracting the
secret.
Stronger trade secrets law also increases the incentives to innovate by increasing
the payo¤ to the innovative rms. However, it also makes di¤usion of innovative
knowledge in the society harder. Thus, there exists a conict between protecting the
innovator with stronger protection and promoting dissemination of innovative knowl-
edge. The policy makers must balance these two contrasting objectives in the best
possible manner. It was shown that a proper balance between these two objectives
depend on the intensity of market competition in the product market, the cost of self-
protection by the owner of the secret and secret extraction costs. Optimality requires
protection in such a way that the incentives to innovate are not diminished and at
the same time di¤usion of innovative knowledge is promoted. The model developed
in Chapter 2 considered both benets and costs of a stronger protection. We showed
that maximal protection was warranted when product market competition was weak,
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cost of self-protection was low and cost of secret extraction was high.
The possibility of horizontally di¤erentiated goods modies the results in favour
of weaker protection as compared to the case of a homogenous goods market. In
the case of horizontally di¤erentiated goods, the optimal scope of trade secrets law
is thinner. It increases the benets of entry for the consumers, but also allows rms
to charge more. This result has interesting ramications in the context of unfair
competition law. For example, in Germany, courts consider the degree of similitude
between the products before delivering their verdicts. The chances of a suit under
unfair competition succeeding in court is higher if the products are similar to each
other (see de Vrey 2006).
The third chapter of this thesis investigated civil remedies available to the owner of
the secret in case of misappropriation. In particular, we analysed alternative damage
regimes and their implications on market competition and welfare.
A model of simple oligopoly competition with asymmetric information was devel-
oped in Chapter 3. The asymmetry arises in the following sense: the owner of the
secret does not know whether the duplicator has introduced a similar product by mis-
appropriating the secret formula, or developed the product by independent research.
The possibility of receiving damages a¤ects the payo¤ to the owner of the secret, and,
hence the market outcome. Similarly, the possibility of paying damages a¤ects the
payo¤ of the duplicator who misappropriated the secret. Furthermore, alternative
damage regimes a¤ect the market outcomes in a di¤erent manner. We concentrated
on the lost prot and the unjust enrichment doctrines of damages and analysed their
impacts on the behaviour of the owner of the secret and market outcome. The pur-
pose was to compare these alternative regimes and nd out the desirability of one over
the other in terms of their impacts on the owner of the secret, ex-post welfare and
167
incentives to misappropriate the secret rather than investing resources to discover it.
The owner of the secret was found to be better o¤ under the lost prot regime
whereas the duplicator who developed his product with independent research was
found to be better o¤ under the unjust enrichment regime. However, the duplicator
who misappropriated the secret could be better o¤ or worse o¤ under either regime,
depending on the parameters of the model.
Further, we found that the unjust enrichment regime resulted in higher welfare as
compared to that under the lost prot regime. The incentives to misappropriate were
expected to be higher or lower under either regime, depending on the degree of accu-
racy of courts and on the proportion of violators (duplicators who misappropriated
the secret). Clear conditions were found under which the lost prots regime provided
greater incentives to misappropriate as compared to that under the unjust enrichment
regime. Thus, if protection of the secret owner is considered more important than the
ex-post welfare by the policy makers, lost prots damage regime is to be preferred.
However, the unjust enrichment is better from the perspective of welfare. If the mar-
ket is characterised by high proportion of misappropriators and courts make correct
judgements most of the times, misappropriation incentives are higher under the lost
prots regime (the reverse also holds).
The fourth chapter provided an empirical analysis which was centred on misappro-
priation and its relationship with trade secret sharing behaviour of rms with third
parties. In the existing literature, trade secrets have mostly been studied with refer-
ence to patents. In this chapter, however, we used a novel survey data, which covered
most important issues underlying misappropriation of trade secrets. This helped us to
look at the relationship of trade secrets sharing and their misappropriation by various
parties.
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The main ndings of this empirical work can be summarised as follows. We nd
that rms that share trade secrets information with third parties are more likely
to face acts/attempts of misappropriation of their trade secrets. We also nd that
rms are more likely to nd secrecy important for their inventive knowledge, technical
information and business information if they make high usage of patents, which points
towards possible synergy between patents and secrecy. This is in line with recent
research on the complementary nature of patents and trade secrecy.
Now we look at the existing legal protection of trade secrets in some countries.
This helps to understand the possible modications in the existing legal system in
light of the results obtained in this thesis. Note that the objective of this thesis is not
to study and to provide policy recommendations to a specic countrys legal system.
On the contrary, the focus has been on the general features of laws governing trade
secrets.
The Legal Scenario governing Trade Secrets in the USA, the UK,
Germany and India
In this section, we look at some characteristics of legal systems governing trade
secrets law in the USA, the UK, Germany and India. More specically we look at three
features of the legal system: whether there is separate legislation on trade secrets,
what it takes to start a suit against misappropriator, and, whether misappropriation
constitutes a criminal liability. A brief discussion on India is included to highlight the
neglect of trade secrets in developing countries in general.
The USA
In the USA, there exists a clear denition of trade secrets, provided by the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). Thus all information which satises the requirements of
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UTSA may be considered to be trade secret. To commence a legal proceeding in
case of trade secret misappropriation, the plainti¤ must be able to show that, a) the
plainti¤has interest in protecting the trade secret, b) incidence of misappropriation of
such a trade secret, and, c) the defendant is behind the misappropriation. Available
civil remedies include injunction for actual or threatened misappropriation, and dam-
ages (cumulative). Criminality of the misappropriation of trade secrets is subject to
individual state law. California and Texas have enacted specic statutes prohibiting
the theft of trade secrets, while New York has amended its larceny statutes to include
trade secrets.
The UK
In the UK there is no specic legislation on the protection of trade secrets. In
general trade secrets are governed by the English common law of condence and
contract law. However there are some legislations which indirectly provide rights and
obligations to persons who may hold certain secrets in certain circumstances. English
law does not provide a generally applicable denition of trade secrets. Freedom of
Information Act (2000) provides for trade secrets as information where, "its disclosure
under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any
person (including the public authority holding it)".
Generally trade secrets are protected by condential information under the com-
mon law provided that such information satises the following properties: a) Infor-
mation must have the necessary quality of condence, implying that it must not be
public property or public knowledge, b) it has been "imparted in circumstances im-
parting an obligation of condence" upon the recipient, and c) there must have been
unauthorised "use of the information to the detriment of the party communicating
it". It is important to note that classifying a document as "condential" does not
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automatically make it a trade secret, unless the document possesses necessary quality
of condence and thus creates duty of condentiality in equity. On the other hand,
an unmarked document may also be condential information depending upon the
circumstances under which it is imparted.
To commence a legal proceeding under trade secret misappropriation, it must be
established that:
i) The trade secret has the quality of condence,
ii) It has been imparted in circumstances of condence,
iii) It has been misused.
In case of misappropriation of trade secrets, available remedies under English Law
for "breach of condence" are: a) Final injunction or interim injunction (to prevent
threatened breach of condence), b) Destruction of material containing condential
information or derived from the use of those trade secrets, c) Damages, and, d) Ac-
count of prots. Ex parte search orders are also available to preserve the documents,
information and materials at risk of being destroyed in anticipation of a full civil
action. A person who receives the information innocently will not be under a duty of
condentiality unless he is made aware of the condentiality of the information. If a
person independently develops the information the same as that of the trade secret,
no duty of condentiality can arise.
In the UK, there is no criminal liability per se in the case of trade secrets misappro-
priation. However limited criminal protection is achieved with a number of common
law regimes and some separate legislations, like the Theft Act 1968, the Fraud Act
2006, conspiracy to defraud (under the common law), the Computer Misuse Act 1990,
and, the Data Protection Act 1984.
Germany
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In Germany, the law does not provide a statutory denition of trade secrets,
however it is generally known to have the following characteristics: a) all information
connected to the business; b) which is not public knowledge; c) which is expressively
kept secret for the purpose of economic interest; and, d) the business owner needs to
have a rightful commercial interest in keeping the trade secret. To commence a legal
proceeding against misappropriation of trade secrets, we need the following:
i) A competent court for the appointment,
ii) Identication of the trade secret infringed,
iii) Proof of the infringement.
It is to be noted that proof of the infringement may be di¢ cult. Case law al-
lows claimants to le the suit by proving the necessary circumstances by relying on
some legal assumption such as prima facie evidence. Furthermore, many cases start
with a criminal prosecution, and thus the complainant generally does not have to
provide all-embracing proof because it is the obligation of the prosecuting authorities
to gather evidence in the preliminary proceedings. Therefore the complainant can
use this evidence in civil proceedings. The following civil remedies under trade secret
misappropriation can be claimed cumulatively; a) Cease and desist orders; b) Claims
for injunction; c) Claims to have account of prots for the purpose of calculating dam-
ages; d) Claims for damages; and, e) Claims to hand back or destroy the protected
secret information.
An interesting aspect of the German legal system is that remedies are enforceable
against third parties also who may have got the trade secret in good faith. The
only statutory di¤erence is whether the secret is obtained during the employment or
by industrial espionage. However the third party who obtained the trade secret in
good faith can not be liable for damages, which require culpability. If the third party
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does not stop using misappropriated trade secret even after being informed by the
owner, the party becomes culpable. However if the same trade secret is developed
independently, no action can be taken.
Trade secret misappropriation gives rise to criminal liability under German legal
system. The relevant provisions are scattered over various branches of law including
Act Against Unfair Competition; a) the Criminal Code; b) the Limited Liability
Company Act; c) the Public Disclosure Act ; d) the Insurance Supervision Act; e)
the Workplace Constitution Act; f) the Cooperative Business Association Act; g)
the Transformation Act; h) the Act on the co-determination of Employees in Cross-
Border Mergers; i) the Act on European Works Councils; j) the Act Transposing the
Directive Regulations regarding the Involvement of Employees in SEs; k) the Public
Accountants Act; and, l) the Stock Corporation Act.
India
The conditions in India are quite di¤erent from the countries described previously.
The standards followed for trade secrets in India are far below as compared to that
in the western countries in general (Roy 2006). India has no specic law dedicated to
trade secrets, however contract law may be used in protecting trade secrets. Courts
seem to have upheld protection of trade secrets on the basis of principles of equity, the
common law action of breach of condence and contractual obligation (Nomani and
Rahman 2011). Courts have dened trade secrets as "formulae, technical know-how
or a peculiar mode or method of business adopted by an employer which is unknown
to others" (American Express Bank Ltd Vs Priya Puri, 2006).
No criminal action can be brought about for revealing condential information.
The remedies for breach of condence includes action for an account of prots from
usage of the information; action for damages and further an injunction to prevent
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further use. For an action to succeed, the information should have been condential,
should have been shared under an obligation of condence with the defendant, and
the actual misuse should have been done.
Overall we observe huge di¤erences across di¤erent countries in terms of what
constitutes trade secrets and what information can be protected. On one hand, US
has tough laws for protection of trade secrets and has a di¤erent legal protection
particularly for trade secrets, on the other hand, India lacks any specic law relating
to trade secrets. The UK and Germany also have no statutory denition of trade
secrets but have stronger provisions for the protection of trade secrets. Some states
in the US consider trade secrets misappropriation as a criminal o¤ence, however the
UK law does not consider trade secrets misappropriation as a criminal o¤ence per se.
Germany has relatively stronger criminal provisions under the case of misappropria-
tion of the secret, whereas India provides simply no criminal liability against trade
secrets misappropriation. Action against third parties involved in misappropriation
who might have got the secret in good faith also di¤ers greatly across the jurisdic-
tions. Germany provides for very strong protection for action against third parties
depending on particular situations under which they got the secret. Thus the overall
protection of trade secrets varies signicantly across various jurisdictions.
Findings of this thesis and the policy recommendations
The ndings of this thesis can be used to suggest some policy recommendations
to amend the legal systems governing trade secrets. For instance, the second chapter
comes up with the optimal scope of trade secrets law. The focus was on the question
of "how strong the protection should be", based on the market characteristics. It may
be noted that the ndings of the rst chapter suggests that the optimal scope of the
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law depends on the specic market structures in the country of interest. A thinner
protection is desirable if the market is characterised by a high degree of product
di¤erentiation. We also noted that when the market competition is low, the strongest
protection is desirable. Most of the results obtained in the second chapter of this
thesis point toward a stronger or a weaker protection, depending on specic market
conditions. Thus we require knowledge of market conditions to make more specic
policy recommendation for the legal system in a particular country.
Policy makers can use various tools to make the protection of trade secrets stronger
or weaker. For example, if trade secrets misappropriation leads to no criminal liability,
the law is relatively weaker. Provision of damages, on top of injunctions makes
protection stronger compared to a situation where no damages can be awarded. Both
Germany and the US (most states) have criminal liability in case of trade secrets
misappropriation. In India on the other hand, no criminal action can be brought.
In the UK, trade secrets misappropriation does not lead to a criminal sanction per
se. In the rst chapter of this thesis, we looked at the ongoing policy changes in the
United States and the European Union. The policymakers have recognised the need
for stricter trade secrets protection, especially in the European Union.
The third chapter compared the two most used damage regimes in the case of
misappropriation. The desirability of one damage regime over another was analysed.
It was shown that, given the assumptions of the model, the unjust enrichment regime
leads to a higher ex-post static welfare as compared to the lost prots regime. The
policy makers are confronted with two contradictory objectives; protection of the
innovator/trade secret owner and maximising welfare. If the prime objective of the
policy makers is to protect the interests of the innovators/owners of trade secrets,
then the lost prots regime is to be chosen. However, if we just look at the ex-post
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welfare, the unjust enrichment is to be chosen. Which damage regime is used more
in practice is again an empirical issue.
Lastly, the fourth chapter of the thesis looked at the relationship of trade se-
crets sharing and misappropriation. The most important insight coming from the
fourth chapter is that the rms face a high probability of misappropriation when they
share their trade secrets with third parties. The policymakers may want to make
the information ow (in terms of sharing trade secrets) easier to speed up di¤usion
of knowledge. In fact, the European Commission has proposed to make misappro-
priation tougher in its Directive on Trade Secrets in the EU. The main objective of
this new harmonised legislation is to empower trade secret owners across the Euro-
pean Union. Another lesson coming from the fourth chapter is that trade secrets
are considered important by the rms to protect their innovative knowledge. In this
way, providing better protection for trade secrets provides incentives to innovators as
well. This is at the heart of law and economics analysis of trade secrets, as the law
can create clear incentives for rms and have long lasting economic implications as a
result. It is well documented in the existing empirical literature that trade secrets are
more important to the innovators than patents and other related intellectual property
rights. Therefore, providing better protection to trade secret owners also gives them
incentives to spread their portfolio of intellectual property assets.
Caveats and future research extensions
This thesis has touched upon a topic that is currently going through legal restruc-
turing in the European Union and many other parts of the world. We analysed the
questions of how to structure trade secret law, what to do if misappropriation of trade
secrets takes place. We also established a relationship between trade secrets sharing
and its misappropriation. However, we note that the economic insights provided in
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this thesis are a simplistic view of the world, which is inherent to all economic re-
search. The policy implications need to be supported by political and legal analysis.
Nonetheless, the economic analysis in this thesis provides a background for further
research, both theoretical and empirical. In addition, the policy implications of this
research, particularly considering the prevalence of trade secret misappropriation in
the EU, are strong.
As discussed in this thesis, the economic analysis of trade secrets law is still an
emerging area and provides fruitful research opportunities. Future research in this
area may focus on cross-country empirical studies relating to trade secrets protection,
growth in business protability indexes and innovativeness of businesses. A relation-
ship between trade secrets protection and macroeconomic variables such as economic
growth would also enrich this area. More research on the importance of specic fea-
tures of trade secrets law such as covenants not to compete and employee mobility
with respect to market competition and incentives to innovate will enhance this eld
of law. Case studies of actual trade secrets cases and their econometric analysis would
provide fresh impetus to policy analysis of trade secrets law.
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